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Abstract.  
The objective of the 3rd ENER Forum was to discuss the  
prospects of the RES-E directive and to identify criteria for 
successfully promoting RES in Europe among relevant 
stakeholders, such as governments, energy companies, 
regulators, and consumers, in EU and Accession countries. 
In detail the following issues were treated: 
• Experiences with different types of instruments (feed-
in tariffs, bidding/tendering, tradable green certifi-
cates, rebates, Green Pricing, environmental taxes) 
depending on technologies and countries. 
• Interference of different supporting schemes on public 
involvement in the RES businesses and, thus, on the 
public acceptance; influence of different supporting 
schemes on the type of investor (Large companies vs 
small cooperatives vs individuals). 
• Interaction of financial resources available from JI and 
CDM projects and ET and national or EU money com-
ing from different RES supporting mechanisms. 
• The consequences of the proposal for a EU Directive 
establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission al-
lowance trading within the Community 
(COM(2001)581final) on the deployment of renew-
able energy sources and their interactions with the EU 
directive on renewables (2001/77/EC) to the EU 
member and accession countries will be investigated. 
• Future prospects of different types of strategies will be 
discussed for single countries and technologies, trans-
boundary and for the whole EU/Europe. 
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The European Network for En-
ergy Economics Research (ENER)  
 
Energy policies, traditionally national preserves, have 
become increasingly determined in international areas, 
and nowhere more so than in the European Union. In 
view of these movements towards more international 
and more environmentally responsive energy policies, 
researchers from IEFE (Institute of Energy Economics, 
Bocconi University, Milan), IEPE (Institute of Energy 
Policy and Economics, University of Grenoble), and 
SPRU (Science and Technology Policy Research, 
University of Sussex) made a cooperation agreement in 
September 1985 to promote better communication 
among the groups and stimulate joint research activi-
ties. Since then the activities of the Network have been 
financially supported by the European Commission's 
Directorates General for Energy and for Research.  
ENER has since then grown to include FhG/ISI 
(Fraunhofer Institute of Systems and Innovation Re-
search, Karlsruhe) in 1988, CEEETA (Centre for the 
Economic Study of Energy, Transport and the Envi-
ronment, Lisbon) in 1989, GIEE (Inter University 
Group on Energy Studies, Madrid) in 1992. In 1995, 
the Systems Analysis Department of Risø National 
Laboratory, Roskilde, the Policy Study Unit of the 
Netherlands Energy Research Foundation (ECN), Pet-
ten, and the Study Centre on Technology, Energy and 
Environment (STEM, University of Antwerpen) joined 
the network. Lund University, Department of Envi-
ronmental and Energy System Studies became a mem-
ber in 1996, Energy Economics Group at Vienna Uni-
versity of Technology (EEG)) in 1997. 
With the current series of Forums the ENER Net-
work is opening up to the accession countries with 
participants from Poland (Polish Foundation for En-
ergy Efficiency FEWE Center in Krakow / University 
of Mining and Metallurgy UMM), Czech Republic 
(ENVIROS),), Hungary (Energia Klub), Romania 
(Institute of Power Studies and Design ISPE) and to 
Switzerland (Centre for Energy Policy and Economics 
CEPE). 
These Forums are financed as a Thematic Network 
under the European Union Fifth Framework Pro-
gramme (ENERGIE). This contract started by the end 
of 2000, and it covers four Forums until 2003. A pro-
posal for extension submitted for the last call of the 
Fifth Framework Programme in December 2001 was 
successful. The extension aims at integrating a larger 
number of accession country partners in the activities 
through two additional Forums, and to enhance interac-
tion with stakeholders from Parliaments by two com-
mon Forums with the international organisation 
GLOBE Europe. 
The new participants are from Bulgaria (INRNE-
BAS, in co-operation with BSREC), Estonia (SEI-
Tallinn), Latvia (IPE), Lithuania (LEI), Slovak Repub-
lic (Profing), and Slovenia (IJS). 
ENER Forum 3. Successfully Promoting Renewable Energy Sources in Europe. 
 Budapest, Hungary, 6-7 June 2002 
ENER 25.02 5 
Preface 
 
The objective of the Forum of the European Network 
for Energy Economics Research ENER is to create a 
debate between relevant stakeholders in academia, 
governments, industry and NGOs in important fields in 
relation to energy, climate change and economics. It 
also aims at strengthening the links between national 
centres in energy/environment policy and economics 
research in particular with Central and Eastern Euro-
pean countries in view of their accession to the EU. It 
is hoped that the common activities with the partner 
institutes in those countries as well as with stake-
holders participating in the events organised by ENER 
will contribute to continued co-operation in the same 
way as the one initiated among ENER institutes in the 
current EU Member States one decade ago. 
For this purpose a Thematic Network was set up, fi-
nancially supported by DG Research under the 
ENERGIE Programme. The Thematic Network co-
ordinated by the Fraunhofer Institute of Systems and 
Innovation Research FhG-ISI/Germany gathers 16 
institutes from EU Member Countries, Central and 
Eastern European Accession Countries and Switzer-
land, which bring in their skills and experiences in both 
qualitative and model-based analyses. Within the The-
matic Network, four ENER Forums are to be held, all 
of which in the EU accession countries, under the 
common theme of Paths for Energy Policy between 
Policy Challenges and Market Domination. 
The first ENER Forum 1 was held in Krakow, Po-
land, February 2001 on the topic Integrating the Kyoto 
Mechanisms into the National Framework. The pro-
ceedings of the ENER Forum 1 can be found in the 
ENER Bulletin 23.01. 
The second ENER Forum 2 was held in Prague, the 
Czech Republic, November 2001 on the topic Monitor-
ing the progress of the implementation of the EU Gas 
and Electricity Directives: Are European markets 
becoming competitive? 
The proceedings of the ENER Forum 2 are compiled 
in the ENER Bulletin 24.01.  
This ENER Bulletin contains the papers presented at 
the ENER Forum 3 held in Budapest, Hungary, June 
2002 on the topic Successfully Promoting Renewable 
Energy Sources in Europe. 
The objective of the ENER Forum 3 has been to 
stimulate the discussion and exchange of knowledge on 
the progress, barriers, difficulties and prospects of the 
deployment of RES technologies among relevant 
stakeholders, such as governments, energy companies, 
regulators, TSOs and consumers, in EU Member and 
EU Accession Countries. 
In four sessions, the participants addressed a range of 
issues related to the deployment of RES technologies 
in the EU Member States and Accession Countries.  
The ENER Bulletin provides the text of most of pa-
pers presented during the two days of the ENER Fo-
rum 3 and also the summaries and major conclusions 
form the individual sessions. All presentations – also 
from speakers who have not provided a text paper - are 
available (as PowerPoint or pdf file) on the ENER web 
site: www.eu.fhg.de/ENER/Enerhome.htm 
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Abbreviations 
CCGT Combined cycle gas turbine 
CDM Clean Development Mechanisms 
CHP Combined heat and power 
CO2  Carbon dioxide 
DLTR Deportment for Transport, Local Government and the Regions, UK 
DG Directorate General (European Commission) 
DTI Department of Trade and Industry (UK) 
EC European Commission 
EEG Erneubare Energie Gesetz (Germany) 
EIB European Investment Bank 
ERA European Research Area 
ET Emission trading 
EU European Union 
EWEA European Wind Energy Association 
FIT Feed-in tariff 
GHG Greenhouse gas(es) 
IEA International Energy Agency 
IP Integrated project (EU 6th Framework Programme) 
IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
JI Joint Implementation 
MPS Maximum price standard 
MSW Municipal solid waste 
NAS New Associated States 
NETA New Electricity Trading Arrangement (UK) 
NFFO Non-Fossil Fuel Obligation (UK) 
NGO Non-Government Organisation 
NIS Newly Independent States 
NoE Network of Excellence (EU 6th Framework Programme) 
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
PPA Power Purchase Agreement 
PV Photovoltaics 
RES Renewable energy sources 
RES-E Renewable energy sources – electricity 
RET Renewable energy technologies 
ROC Renewables Obligation Certificates (UK) 
RPS Renewable portfolio standards (Texas) 
SME Small and Medium sized Enterprises 
TCE Transaction cost edconomics 
TGC Tradable Green Certificates 
TWh Tera Watt hours (109 kWh) 
WTP Willingness to pay 
UN United Nations 
UNDP United Nations Development Programme 
UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
WTP Willingness to pay 
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Summary of the 3rd ENER Fo-
rum:  
How to promote renewable energy 
systems successfully and effec-
tively  
Reinhard Haas, Claus Huber (EEG, Vienna University 
of Technology), Wolfgang Eichhammer (ISI), Ole 
Langniss (Lund University), Arturo Lorenzoni (IEFE), 
Reinhard Madlener (CEPE), Philippe Menanteau 
(IEPE), Poul-Erik Morthorst (Risø), Alvaro Martins 
(CEEETA), Anna Oniszk (EC BREC), Joachim 
Schleich (ISI), Adrian Smith (SPRU), Emiel van Sam-
beek (ECN), Zoltan Vass (Energia Klub), Aviel 
Verbruggen (University of  Antwerp, STEM) 
Introduction 
The main objective of the 3rd ENER Forum was to 
discuss the following core questions: 
• What are the pros and cons of various promotion 
strategies? 
• What are the criteria for successfully promoting 
electricity produced from renewable energy 
sources (RES-E)? 
• What are the most promising future instruments 
for promoting RES in EU and in access countries? 
In detail the following issues were tackled: 
• Experiences with different types of instruments 
(feed-in tariffs (FITs), bidding/tendering, tradable 
green certificates (TGC), rebates, Green Pricing, 
environmental taxes...) depending on technologies 
and countries; 
• Impact of different supporting schemes on public 
involvement in the RES businesses and, thus, on 
the public acceptance; influence of different sup-
porting schemes on the type of investor (Large 
companies vs small cooperatives vs individuals); 
• Future prospects of different types of strategies 
were discussed for single countries and technolo-
gies, and for the entire Europe 
The major perceptions of this meeting as well as the 
most important conclusions and recommendations for 
energy policy makers are compiled in this summary1. 
Survey on strategies  
To increase the market penetration of RES strategies 
have been implemented in various European countries 
in recent years. The core objective of strategies to 
foster RES-E is the substitution of sustainable energy 
use for non-sustainable energy forms, and thus a wider 
deployment of (active) RES capacities. Therefore, the 
major focus must of course always be to trigger in-
vestments in new capacities. But the maintenance, 
upscaling, improvement of existing capacities has also 
to be borne in mind. 
                                                           
1 The statements compiled in the following represent a consensus 
within the ENER Network while on some questions differences in 
perception and analysis persisted. 
Objectives derived from this core objective are:  
(i) to stimulate technological progress; (ii) to trigger 
learning effects with respect to investment costs; 
(iii) to minimise administration and transaction costs; 
(iv) to maintain public acceptance regarding RES tech-
nologies. 
The debate on the promotion of RES focuses most 
on the comparison between price-driven, (e.g. FITs) 
and capacity-driven (e.g. TGC-based quotas) strate-
gies, see Table 1. These two approaches aim at the 
same target, but start from different points: in the first 
case the PRICE is set and the quantity is decided by the 
market; in the second case (which includes TGC-based 
quotas and bidding procedures) the QUANTITY is set 
and the price is decided by the market, see Fig. 1a and 
1b. 
EURO/
kWh
kWh
PFix
QOut
Costs
?  
Fig. 1a. How a feed-in tariff works 
EURO/
kWh
kWh
PVar
Costs
?
QUOTA  
Fig 1b. How a TGC-based quota works 
Table 1 provides a classification of regulatory  
strategies for encouraging the use of RES.  
Table 1. Fundamental types of regulatory strategies 
 Price-driven Capacity-driven 
Investment 
focused 
• Rebates 
• Tax incentives • Bidding 
Generation 
based 
• Feed-in tariffs 
• Rate-based  
  incentives 
• Quotas/TGC 
. 
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Table 2. Past, current and in the near future planned regulatory promotion strategies for electricity from RES in EU 
and some NAS countries  
 
 Large 
hydro Small Hydro  
"New" RES  (Wind, PV, Biomass, Biogas, Landfill gas, 
Sewagegas, Geothermal 
Municipal 
Solid Waste 
current No 8% current quota  (based on TGCs) 
4% non-tradable quota until 2008 in combination with regional-
specific FITs and other instruments (investment subsidies, 
bidding etc.) 
No 
Austria 
proposed No 
Non-tradable quota: 9% for small hydro in 2008, 4% for “new” RES in 2008 – in 
combination with national harmonised minimum FITs. In addition regional-specific 
instruments (investment subsidies, bidding, higher guaranteed FIT)  
Biogenic 
fraction ac-
counts to  
“new” RES 
Belgium 
 
No 
Flemish region: 3% quota (based on TGCs) in 2004 for RES (excl. MSW), escalating penalty 
(7.5 c€/kWh in 2002, rising to 12.5 c€/kWh in 2004); Wallonia: 5% quota (based on TGCs) in 2004 for 
RES & CHP; Brussels region: No support scheme yet  
current No Mix of strategies (FITs, tax credits etc.) No 
Denmark 
proposed No Planned 200?: Quota system based on TGCs for RES No 
Finland  No No 
Wind: Investment subsidies by 30-40% (on a case-by-case 
basis) and tax refund (0.7 c€/kWh); 
Biomass: Tax relief (3.1 c€/kWh)  
No 
France  No FITs : 5.5-6.0 c€/kWh 
FITs, in more detail:  
Wind: 4.8-8.4 c€/kWh on a 15 year average2; PV: 15.25-
30.5 c€/kWh3; Biomass: FITs in progress 
4.5-5.0 
c€/kWh 
Czech  
Republic  No 
FITs : 5.0 c€/kWh 
Inv. subsidies for 
selected projects 
FITs, in more detail: Wind / Geothermal: 10.0 c€/kWh, Biogas / 
-mass: 8.3 c€/kWh, Solar / PV: 20.0 c€/kWh 
Investment subsidies for selected projects 
No 
Germany  No FITs: 6.65-7.67 c€/kWh 
FITs, guaranteed for 20yr., in more detail FITs for new installa-
tions in 2002 are4: Wind: 6.1-9 c€/kWh;5  
PV: 48.1 c€/kWh, Biomass: 8.6-10.1 c€/kWh6;  
Geothermal: 7.16-8.95 c€/kWh;  
Sewage-, Landfill- and marsh gas: 6.65-7.67 c€/kWh 
No 
Greece  No 
FITs (at al level of 75-90% of the selling tariff, higher on islands, lower on the 
mainland) and a mix of other instruments  
(30% investment subsidies, tax credits, reduced loans etc.) 
No 
Ireland  No Bidding Programme – Currently: AER V with technology bands and price caps for small and large wind, small hydro and biomass; Furthermore: tax relief  No 
Italy  2% quota (based on TGCs) for all new RES (incl. large hydro and MSW) – with rolling redemption
7 (8yr.), un-
clear penalty enforcement; Investment subsidies (“10,000 roofs-programme”) for PV; structural funds for Wind 
Luxembourg  No No FITs and investment subsidies for Wind, PV and Biomass No 
current 
7.5% of RES electricity in 2010 starting from 2.4% in 2001, FITs 5-7 c€/kWh (voluntary – max. 
duration of 3-5 yr.). Legal framework weak - only regulation, no Act (no long-term PPAs), 
 no punishment = no stability for investors,  
No 
Poland 
proposed No 7.5% of RES in total primary balance in 2010 and 14% in 2020 in RES Strategy - no sound legal framework No 
Portugal  No FITs and investment rebates for Wind8, PV, Biomass, Small hydro No 
Spain  <50MW: FITs on top of market price (premium!): 2.99 c€/kWh 
FITs on top of market price (premium!), in more detail (only 
premium): Wind: 2.89 c€/kWh, PV: 18-36 c€/kWh,  
Biomass: 2.55-2.77 c€/kWh 
FITs-premium:
2.15 c€/kWh, 
current - 
<1.5 MW: 15% 
Investment grant,  
0.09 SEK/kWh 
operation grant 
Biomass: 25 % Investment grant; 
Wind: 10-15 % Investment grant, 0.27 SEK/kWh operational 
support (0.09 SEK/kWh environmental premium + 0.18 
SEK/kWh energy tax refund) on top of low market price  
(1.5 c€/kWh) 
- 
Sweden 
proposed - Target 10 TWh increase by 2010 = 15.3 % quota in 2010  
Netherlands  Mixed strategy (green pricing and tax exemptions9); Investment subsidies for wind 
United  
Kingdom  
Quota (based on TGCs) by 2010 for all RES (exc. large hydro and MSW);  
quota starts at 3% in 2002, rising to 10.4% by 2011 – penalty set at 3 p/kWh (5 c€/kWh).  
Tax exemption (“climate change levy”) for RES (0.66 c€/kWh).  
Investment grants for offshore wind (€ 68 Mio. For demo projects, plus € 16 Mio. from “New Opportunities fund”) 
                                                           
2 8.4 c€/kWh for the first 5 years and then between 3.1 and 8.4 c€/kWh depending on the quality of the site – project size limited to 12 MW. 
3 30.5 c€/kWhfor Corse and Overseas Departments 
4 For some RES, guaranteed FIT for new installations decrease over time: For biomass 1% per year, for PV 5% per year, for wind 1.5% per year.  
5 9 c€/kWh for the first 5 years and then between 6.1 and 9 c€/kWh depending on the quality of the site. 
6 The guaranteed FIT depends on the size of the biomass plant (8.6 c€/kWh for plants <500kW, 10.1 c€/kWh for plants >5MW); similar regula-
tions are given for geothermal as well as sewage-, landfill- and marsh gas plant. 
7 In general only plants put in operation after 1 April 1999 are allowed to receive TGCs for their produced green electricity. Moreover, this 
allowance is limited for the first 8 years of operation (rolling redemption)  
8 E.g. wind producer receive a stepped FIT of 4.3-8.3 c€/kWh, plus investment grants up to 30% 
9 Customers of green electricity are exempt from paying the energy tax (currently about 5 c€/kWh).  
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The state-of-the-art on currently implemented 
strategies 
Currently in various European countries different 
strategies are in force. Table 2 provides an overview of 
strategies by country for the major technology catego-
ries addressed  
It can be seen from this table that FITs are currently 
the prevailing instrument, followed by rebates, tax 
incentives, tendering systems, and green tariffs. 
An analysis by country reveals the patchwork on im-
plemented strategies and ongoing changes. 
In Austria currently no promotional system exists for 
electricity from large hydropower, municipal solid 
waste and sewage biomass. With respect to electricity 
from “new RES” a quota not based on TGCs is imple-
mented by law. It requires that 4% of final electricity 
consumption is generated from "new" RES by 30 Sep-
tember 2008. 
Currently, the promotional systems to meet this 
quota are different in the nine Austrian provinces and 
consist of mixes between FIT, rebates, and bidding 
systems. For small hydro power a TGC based quota 
system has been introduced in 2001, which as so far 
not fulfilled the expectations. The major problems are 
that there is no liquid market and that the penalties 
(different in every of the nine provinces) are at the 
margin by far too low to stimulate investments in new 
capacities. Currently, even the association of small 
hydro power generators, which has initially demanded 
the TGC-based quotas is in favour to abolish this sys-
tem completely.  
In Belgium up to 2002 RES-E generators benefit 
most from an add-on payment of 4.96 c€/kWh above 
the (low) price of about 2.75 c€/kWh on average paid 
by the utilities for feed-in power. Also direct invest-
ment subsidies (e.g. in the Flemish region 75% of 
investments in PV in 2001 have been subsidised, but 
limited to a small fund) co-exist as well as better feed-
in conditions (only for PV a revolving meter is al-
lowed). Flanders enacted a TGC-system from Jan. 1, 
2002 onwards; Wallonia is planning for a different 
system. 
Denmark has more or less abandoned its FITs and 
tax-incentives system by the end of 2000 and an-
nounced to switch to a TGC-based quota system. This 
led to the fact that currently Denmark is destroying part 
of its technological and socio-economic progress made 
so far e.g. for wind turbines. Even more damaging is 
the fact, that the TGC system has not been imple-
mented yet. The uncertainty is a high obstacle to in-
vestment. 
In France until 2001 a bidding system for wind 
power (Eole 2005) was in force, which turned out not 
to be very successful. In 2001 the system was changed 
towards a stepped10 FIT. 
In Germany a FIT was adopted unanimously by Par-
liament in 1990. In 1991, the so-called “Stromein-
speisungsgesetz” went into force. As a consequence of 
                                                           
10 The terminology “stepped FIT” will be explained in the last 
section of this summary, No. 8.. 
the German electricity market being fully liberalised in 
1998, this law had to be adjusted, and it was replaced 
in April 2000 by the Renewable Energy Act. It is a 
federal law determining FITs by RE technology. This 
strategy has been very successful so far, making Ger-
many the number one world wide in wind energy use, 
with a total installed capacity of 10.000 MW (on 
Aug.8, 2002). The financial “burden” due to this strat-
egy is equally distributed over all electricity customers. 
While the EC was until 2001 very reluctant against 
this law a decision of the European Court of Justice 
confirmed that the German law is in line with the  
provisions of the EU Treaty, more specifically with the 
State Aid rules, since it does not constitute state aid 
given the fact that it is financed directly by the  
customers. 
Italy after a decade under a fixed tariff scheme (CIP6 
contracts, with a premium for 8 years to new RES-E 
projects admitted in a list, which will keep on until 
2012), a portfolio has been created in 2002. All the 
production from fossil fuels, excluding CHP and small 
companies producing less than 100 GWh, and import 
of electricity, have an obligation to cover 2% of their 
sales with new renewable energy production. New 
RES-E are projects come on line after April 1999. 
They have the right to receive the TGCs for the first 
eight years of operation. The fulfilment of the obliga-
tion is facilitated by the creation of a Green Certificate 
Market in operation from 2002. Producers not comply-
ing with the portfolio requirement will have to pay a 
fine equal to 1.5 times the highest price paid in the 
previous year on the TGC market. The 2% quota will 
grow by 0.125% per year from 2005 to 2012.  
The most obscure system is currently practiced in 
The Netherlands. While the principle is good (see van 
Sambeek 2002, this issue) the fact that also the import 
of green electricity from existing power plants is al-
lowed leads to the fact, that a huge amount of money is 
wasted for providing “windfall profits” for German, 
Swiss, and Austrian hydro and wind power utilities. 
In Portugal since 1998 FITs are in force for all RES 
except large Hydropower and Municipal Solid Waste 
(MSW). More recently, in 2001, very interesting FITs 
have been defined and the mandatory percentage of 
self financing has been relaxed which explains the 
existing boom for wind energy projects. It is expected 
that the actual wind potential of 3000 MW will all be 
used by 2007. 
In Spain in 1998 the „Real Decreto 2828/1998“ was 
established. It is based on FITs by technology. Al-
though it is delivering good results in some technolo-
gies (it brought Spain into the TOP 2 of European 
Wind generators within three years) it is not enough to 
overcome other barriers. The main barriers for RES 
development is essentially a lack of integrated political 
will, e.g too low prices for biomass. A lack of transpar-
ency and objectivity in the grid connection framework 
and too different regional procedures make a global 
RES approach difficult. 
In Sweden for the period 1 July 1997 to 30 June 
2002 investment grants were available for electricity 
from wind power, small-scale hydro plant and biomass. 
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The highest investment grants are available for biofuel-
fired CHP. Subsidies of around (358 €/kW) are granted 
for investments that provide a new contribution to 
electricity generation, but may not exceed a maximum 
of 25% of the investments. Grants for wind power and 
environmentally friendly small-scale hydro plants were 
available amounting to 15% of the investment for new 
facilities over 200 kW capacity.  
In addition, two other mechanisms exist for support-
ing small renewable energy projects in Sweden. The 
first is guaranteed power purchase contracts with local 
utilities. Prior to electricity market reform, holders of 
regional power concessions were required to purchase 
electricity at the utility’s avoided cost from all small 
power projects with generation capacities of up to 1500 
kW. This requirement continues to exist under the new 
law, in which local distribution utilities must still pur-
chase all electricity generated by projects of less than 
1500 kW within their service territories. The price now 
paid to small generators is equal to the residential tariff 
plus a credit for reduced transmission and distribution 
losses minus reasonable costs for utility administration 
and profit.  
The other support mechanism is an environmental 
bonus paid from the government. Small-scale RES-
based electricity production is favoured by lower or 
zero energy taxation. In addition biofuels are exempted 
from sulphur taxation.  
In the UK until 2000 tendering systems have been 
used to promote RES. The most well known of these 
promotion strategies is the Non-fossil Fuel Obligation 
(NFFO) in England and Wales. Similar schemes have 
been set up for Scotland (Scottish Renewables Order - 
SRO) and Northern Ireland (NI-NFFO). This strategy 
has recently been changed and renamed so as to in-
crease the amount of renewables capacity. 
In 2003 in the UK a TGC-based quota system will be 
introduced. The quote rises from 3% this year to 10.4% 
in 2011. Also, large hydro and MSW schemes are not 
eligible for the Renewables Obligation, and are there-
fore excluded. 
General conclusions 
From the presentations and discussions the following 
recommendations and conclusions for EU policy mak-
ers are most important: 
1. Without additional policy measures, many EU 
member countries are likely to fail reaching the 
national targets for electricity from renewable en-
ergy sources (RES-E) indicated in the EU Direc-
tive (2001/77/EC). In case of NAS (new accession 
states) it is necessary to start to create their policy 
framework in order to be prepared of adapting the 
mentioned Directive. 
2. Sufficient prices for RES electricity, long-term 
stability of support mechanism, fair and easy ac-
cess to the electricity grid and clear building codes 
are very crucial factors each to be addressed by 
successful RES support mechanisms. 
3. There is no single, universally applicable “best” 
support mechanism or policy for the bundle of dif-
ferent technologies known as RES. A mix of pol-
icy instruments needs to be tailored to the particu-
lar RES and the specific national situation to pro-
mote the evolution of the RES from niche to mass 
markets. This policy mix needs to evolve with the 
technology.  
4. More important than the choice of the system is 
the proper design and monitoring of the support 
system adopted; in this respect the functionality, 
stability and continuity of a policy-support system 
are crucial features. 
5. Not all RES are at the same level of development. 
They are not all sitting on the shelf ready to be 
plugged into the electricity system. Some RES, 
such as wind, are almost competitive in mass elec-
tricity markets. Others are viable in niche markets, 
like PV, biomass, while others are still in the early 
stages of technological evolution, e.g. wave 
power. Support mechanisms should take this into 
account by permitting larger producers’ surpluses 
in earlier stages of market introduction to make 
possible manufacturers’ investments in R&D as 
well as in manufacturing facilities. In later market 
stages, these surpluses should be reduced. At the 
same time excessive (windfall) profits should be 
avoided. Given that no major uncertainty is intro-
duced that could displace investment a stepped 
FIT provides such an incentive. Stepping FITs 
(e.g. by decreasing the feed-in tariffs over time ac-
cording to the expected learning curve and econo-
mies of scale and scope effects of both new re-
newable and conventional energy technologies, 
and/or the discriminating of the feed-in tariffs ac-
cording to some technology performance indica-
tors) can lead to comparable cost reductions with 
FITs as model calculations show.  
6. It is important that a promotional system makes 
the proper distinctions between existing (fully de-
preciated) and new capacities, and that the distinc-
tions are suited to the technology segment of the 
RES-market. Depending on the development tar-
gets of the particular RES-technology and depend-
ing on the promotional instruments in use, the dis-
tinction is of more or lesser importance. Thus for a 
quota system, the quota should preferably be ap-
plied to new capacities, and for a TGC system, 
primarily certificates for new systems should qual-
ify for trading; 
7. The support mechanism of any instrument should 
be guaranteed for and restricted to a certain time 
frame, e.g. 10 years. 
8. Feed in tariffs (FIT), RES quotas and bidding 
systems are all exclusively governing the relation 
between the RES generator and the electricity sup-
plier. That means in principle that competition 
among RES plant manufacturers exists regardless 
of the choice of support mechanism. 
9. In case of new RES technologies it is likely that 
the procedures set up by the authorities and the le-
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gal framework are not adequate enough to deal 
with a lot of small energy generation projects. 
Therefore it is necessary to harmonise the author-
ising process in the particular country. 
10. With a given target of a certain amount of RES at 
a certain time, neoclassical economic theory pre-
dicts an EU-wide quota exclusively for new RES 
installations with an accompanying international 
trading scheme (further to be referred to as ‘RES 
quota’) to be the most efficient approach in terms 
of minimising additional costs. Does an EU-wide 
harmonised promotion strategy make sense? If so 
under which conditions? For European wide trade 
of certificates with maximum efficiency gains an 
EU-wide harmonisation is undoubtedly necessary 
for an European RES quota. Currently, however, it 
appears unlikely that such a harmonised strategy 
will be implemented in the short-term because: 
a. trade in certificates will not contribute to na-
tional CO2-reduction unless it is closely co-
ordinated with an emission quota-system – 
even then it is the emission quota which give 
the CO2-reduction 
b. the value of CO2-reduction will not be in-
cluded in the price of TGCs. Thus the only 
reason to track TGCs is to enforce the devel-
opment of sustainable long-term technologies 
c. presently the TGC-systems introduced in EU-
MS are very different. To introduce a harmo-
nised system will be very difficult. 
11. Moreover, FIT can easily be changed towards an 
international RES quota if the quota refers to new 
capacities only. Yet, strong efforts will be needed 
to adapt/harmonise existing national RES quotas 
towards an international RES quota! Currently the 
support systems are rather diverging than getting 
harmonised  
12. Regarding the argument that for FITs and rebates 
subsidies are provided while the exertion of mar-
ket forces drives quota-based TGC systems it has 
to be stated that that in all promotion strategies fi-
nally the public pays! In voluntary programmes 
some people pay more, some people pay less. If 
cost-driven strategies are implemented these sub-
sidies (rebates, FITs) are paid by the electricity us-
ers and the same applies for capacity driven strate-
gies. The major goal for policy should be to find 
strategies which minimises public costs. 
13. If a (national) support scheme exists fostering 
reasonable market development of RES-E at rea-
sonable (not too high) compensation costs it can-
not be recommended to change the (national) sys-
tem! Efficiency gains possibly incurred with a 
change are unlikely to outweigh risks due to insuf-
ficient implementation and policy uncertainty in 
that case. Therefore, this choice of a strategy has 
to take into account the current state of promotion 
and the possible future dynamics for retaining the 
current system vs. changing to another system! 
14. When switching from one support system to an-
other, the increased investors’ risk caused by regu-
latory uncertainty should be taken into considera-
tion. In this respect a clear commitment by policy-
makers, and excellent planning of the transition 
phase and design of the new system is absolutely 
crucial. 
15. In the scientific discussion trade within RES quo-
tas are usually modelled with spot markets. How-
ever, this seems to be inappropriate since long-
term investments in RES power plants will be se-
cured by long-term power purchase contracts in 
the most cases as Transaction Costs Economics 
predicts. Preliminary experience with RES quotas 
in Texas and Australia confirms this prediction. 
Thus, efficiency gains from tradable RES quotas 
in comparison with a fixed feed-in tariff (FIT) 
might be not as large in practise as envisaged by 
Neoclassical Economics.  
16. Incentive-based promotion schemes alone are 
insufficient to create a sustainable RES-E market 
development; innovative regulation and institu-
tions fostering institutional change and training 
and education of the relevant actors are also of 
high importance; in this context a systemic per-
spective provides useful, which allows to identify 
and tackle the important barriers and latent drivers 
simultaneously and in a comprehensive way. 
17. Organising bidding auctions, verifying RES power 
plants, issuing and redeeming certificates as well 
as adapting and tuning continuously RES regula-
tion are causing transaction costs. A proper com-
parison of promotion mechanisms has to take into 
account these transaction costs when making an 
appraisal of the effectiveness. Moreover, operators 
of small RES power plants are more vulnerable to 
high transaction costs than operators of large RES 
power plants. 
18. Finally, empirical evidence has shown that in a 
real world with ‘real politicians’ carefully de-
signed stepped feed-in tariffs are the preferable in-
strument for a mature technology (e.g. wind).  
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Opening of the ENER Forum 3: 
Sustainable energy systems in the 
6th RTD Framework Programme 
of the EU (2002–2006) 
Domenico Rossetti di Valdalbero and Benat Bilbao 
Osorio, European Commission, DG Research (Energy 
programme) 
 
FP6 represents a deliberate break with the past FPs 
with regards to its ambition, scope and instruments to 
be used in its implementation. It adopts a new philoso-
phy, aimed at achieving a greater focus on questions of 
European importance and a better integration of re-
search efforts on the basis of an improved partnership 
between the various actors in the European Research 
Area (ERA).  
ERA aims to an open co-ordination with the different 
National Programmes and other European organisa-
tions, creating a more comprehensive European Re-
search Policy. 
FP6 will be the key tool for supporting the ERA. Its 
main components work on the direction of integrating, 
structuring and strengthening the foundations of the 
ERA. 
The budget which is primarily allocated for imple-
menting this new FP is 17.5 € billions, which repre-
sents 3.9% of the EU’s budget and approximately 6% 
of the EU’s public civilian research investment. 
The application of this budget pursuits the objective of 
financing the different components/ activities of the 
FP11: 
1. Focusing and integrating Community Research 
2. Structuring ERA 
3. Strengthening the foundations of ERA 
The first part (more than € 13 billions) is the most 
important one and cover the following priorities: 
1. Life sciences, genomics and biotechnology for 
health 
2. Information Society Technologies 
3. Nanotechnologies and nanosciencec, knowledge-
based multifunctional materials, new production 
processes and devices 
4. Aeronautics and Space 
5. Food quality and safety 
6. Sustainable development, global change and eco-
system 
7. Citizens and governance in a Knowledge-based 
society 
In addition to these seven research priorities, there 
are other “specific activities covering a wider field of 
research” including the part related to “Supporting 
policies”. 
                                                           
11 See Annex 1, page 15 for a detailed budget breakdown. 
Sustainable energy systems 
In addition to Euratom (940 € millions) carrying out 
research in fusion and fission, the “Sustainable energy 
systems” programme (810 € millions) addresses the 
following strategic objectives: 
• reduction of greenhouse gases and pollutant emis-
sions; 
• security of energy supply; 
• increased use of renewable energy; 
• enhanced competitiveness of European industry.  
Achieving these objectives in the short term requires 
a large-scale research effort to encourage the deploy-
ment of technologies already under development and to 
help promote changes in energy demand patterns and 
consumption behaviour by improving energy effi-
ciency and integrating renewable energy into the en-
ergy system.  
The longer term implementation of sustainable de-
velopment requires also an important RTD effort to 
assure the economically attractive availability, of en-
ergy, and overcome the potential barriers to adoption 
of renewable energy sources and new carriers and 
technologies such as hydrogen and fuel cells that are 
intrinsically clean. 
Within this context, the different research priorities 
can be divided in12:  
Research activities having an impact in the short and 
medium term 
Community RTD activity is one of the main instru-
ments, which can serve to support the implementation 
of new legislative instruments in the field of energy 
and to change significantly current unsustainable pat-
terns of development. These patterns are characterised 
by growing dependence on imported fossil fuels, con-
tinually rising energy demand, increasing congestion of 
the transport systems, and growing CO2 emissions, by 
offering new technological solution which could posi-
tively influence consumer/user behaviour, especially in 
the urban environment. 
The goal is to bring innovative and cost competitive 
technological solutions to the market as quickly as 
possible through demonstration and other research 
actions aiming at the market, which involve consumers 
/ users in pilot environments, and which address not 
only technical but also organisational, institutional, 
financial and social issues. 
• Clean energy, in particular renewable energy 
sources and their integration in the energy system, 
including storage, distribution and use.  
The aim is to bring to the market improved renew-
able energy technologies and to integrate renew-
able energy into networks and supply chains, for 
example by supporting stakeholders who are 
committed to establishing “Sustainable Communi-
ties” employing a high percentage of renewable 
energy supplies. Such actions will adopt innova-
tive or improved technical and/or socio-economic 
                                                           
12 COM(2002)43final 
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approaches to “green electricity”, heat, or biofuels 
and their integration into energy distribution net-
works or supply chains, including combinations 
with conventional large scale energy distribution. 
• Energy savings and energy efficiency, including 
those to be achieved through the use of renewable 
raw materials. 
The overall objective is to reduce the demand for 
energy by 18% by the year 2010 in order to con-
tribute to meeting the EU’s commitments to com-
bat climate change and to improve the security of 
energy supply. Research activities will focus in 
particular on Eco-Buildings to generate energy 
savings and improve environmental quality as well 
as quality of life for occupants. “Polygeneration” 
activities will contribute to the Community target 
of doubling the share of co-generation (CHP) in 
EU electricity generation from 9% to 18% by 
2010. Equally, it will improve the efficiency of 
combined production of electricity, heating and 
cooling services, by using new technologies such 
as fuel cells and integrate renewable energy 
sources. 
• Alternative motor fuels.  
The Commission has set an ambitious target of 
20% substitution of diesel and gasoline fuels by al-
ternative fuels in the road transport sector by the 
year 2020. The aim is to improve the security of 
energy supply through reduced dependence on im-
ported liquid hydrocarbons and to address the 
problem of greenhouse gas emissions from trans-
port. In line with the Communication on alterna-
tive fuels for road transportation, short term RTD 
will concentrate on three types of alternative motor 
fuels that potentially could reach a significant 
market share: biofuels, natural gas and hydrogen.  
Research activities having an impact in the medium 
and longer term 
In the medium and longer term, the objective is to 
develop new and renewable energy sources, and new 
carriers such as hydrogen which are both affordable 
and clean. Also; they can be well integrated in a long 
term sustainable energy supply and demand context 
both for stationary and for transport applications. Fur-
thermore the continuing use of fossil fuels in the fore-
seeable future requires cost-effective solutions to the 
disposal of CO2. The goal is to bring about further 
reduction in greenhouse gas emissions beyond the 
Kyoto deadline of 2010. The future large-scale devel-
opment of these technologies will depend on signifi-
cant improvement in their cost and other aspects of 
competitiveness against conventional energy sources, 
within the overall socio-economic and institutional 
context in which they are deployed.  
• Fuel cells, including their applications: 
These represent an emerging technology which is 
expected, in the longer term, to replace a large part 
of the current combustion systems in industry, 
buildings and road transport, as they have a higher 
efficiency, lower pollution levels and a potential 
for lower cost. The long term cost target is 50 
€/kW for road transport and 300 €/kW for high-
durability stationary applications and fuel 
cell/electrolysers. 
• New technologies for energy carriers/transport 
and storage, in particular hydrogen 
The aim is to develop new concepts for long term 
sustainable energy supply where hydrogen and 
clean electricity are seen as major energy carriers. 
For H2, the means must be developed to ensure its 
safe use at an equivalent cost to that of conven-
tional fuels. For electricity, decentralised new and 
in particular renewable energy resources, must be 
optimally integrated, within inter-connected Euro-
pean, regional and local distribution networks to 
provide secure and reliable high quality supply. 
• New and advanced concepts in renewable en-
ergy technologies: 
Renewable energy technologies have, in the long 
term, the potential to make a large contribution to 
the world and EU energy supply. The focus will be 
on technologies with a significant future energy 
potential (photovoltaics and biomass) and requir-
ing long-term research (including the integration 
of renewables), by means of actions with high 
European added value in particular to overcome 
the major bottleneck of high investment costs and 
to make these technologies competitive with con-
ventional fuels. 
• Capture and sequestration of CO2, associated with 
cleaner fossil fuel plants: 
Cost effective capture and sequestration of CO2 is 
essential to include the use of fossil fuels in a sus-
tainable energy supply scenario, reducing costs to 
the order of 30€ in the medium term and 20€ or 
less in the longer term per tonne of CO2 for cap-
ture rates above 90%. 
A limited part on Energy Research will also be car-
ried out under the “Specific activities covering a wider 
field of research” (supporting policies), which com-
plement research within Thematic Priority 6. 
These activities have, among others, the objective of 
underpinning the economic potential and cohesion of a 
larger and more integrated EU. Two specific items 
should be underlined for energy: 
• Development of tools, indicators and operational 
parameters for assessing sustainable transport and 
energy systems performance (economic, environ-
mental and social); 
• Forecasting and developing innovative policies for 
sustainability in the medium and long term). 
Instruments for implementation 
In order to carry out these activities, FP6 envisages the 
use of a wider range of new instruments, which will 
allow a better implementation of the different research 
priority. The main instruments are the new Networks 
of Excellence and Integrated Projects13, the Article 169 
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(Community participate in the joint implementation of 
national research programmes) and the “Stairway of 
Excellence” (traditional instruments like the shared-
cost RTD projects, the Co-operative research projects 
for SMEs and the Co-ordination actions).  
Both Networks of Excellence and Integrated Projects 
will be implemented in the seven priority thematic 
areas of the Framework Programme and, in duly justi-
fied cases, in research areas supporting policies and 
anticipating scientific and technological needs.  
Networks of Excellence 
The purpose of Networks of Excellence (NoE) is to 
strengthen and develop Community scientific and 
technological excellence by means of the integration, 
at European level, of research capacities currently 
existing or emerging at both national and regional 
level. Each network will also aim at advancing knowl-
edge in a particular area by assembling a critical mass 
of expertise. They will foster co-operation between 
capacities of excellence in universities, research cen-
tres, enterprises, including SMEs, and science and 
technology organisations. The activities concerned will 
be generally targeted towards long-term, multidiscipli-
nary objectives, rather than predefined results in terms 
of products, processes or services. 
A NoE will be implemented by a joint programme of 
activities involving some or, where appropriate, all of 
the research capacities and activities of the participants 
in the relevant area to attain a critical mass of expertise 
and European added value. A joint programme of ac-
tivities could aim at the creation of a self-standing 
virtual centre of excellence that may result in develop-
ing the necessary means for achieving a durable inte-
gration of the research capacities. A joint programme 
of activities will necessarily include those aimed at 
integration, as well as activities related to the spreading 
of excellence and dissemination of results outside the 
network. 
The size of the network may vary according to the 
areas and subjects involved. As an indication, the 
number of participants should not be less than half a 
dozen. On average, in financial terms, the Community 
contribution to a network of excellence may represent 
several million € per year. 
Integrated Projects 
Integrated Projects (IP) are designed to give increased 
impetus to the Community's competitiveness or to 
address major societal needs by mobilising a critical 
mass of research and technological development re-
sources and competence. Each IP will be assigned 
clearly defined scientific and technological objectives 
and should be directed at obtaining specific results 
applicable in terms of, for instance, products, processes 
or services. Under these objectives they may include 
more long-term or “risky” research. 
IP will comprise a coherent set of component actions 
which may vary in size and structure according to the 
tasks to be carried out, each dealing with different 
aspects of the research needed to achieve common 
overall objectives, and forming a coherent whole and 
implemented in close co-ordination. 
They will be carried out on the basis of overall fi-
nancing plans preferably involving significant mobili-
sation of public and private sector funding, including 
funding from EIB and collaboration schemes such as 
Eureka. 
All the activities carried out in the context of an IP 
will be defined in the general framework of an “im-
plementation plan” comprising activities relating to: 
• research, and as appropriate technological devel-
opment and/or demonstration; 
• management, dissemination and transfer of knowl-
edge with a view to promoting innovation; 
• analysis and assessment of the technologies con-
cerned, as well as the factors relating to their ex-
ploitation. 
In pursuit of its objectives, it may also comprise ac-
tivities relating to training researchers, students, engi-
neers and industrial executives, in particular for SMEs; 
support for the take-up of new technologies, in particu-
lar by SMEs and information and communication, and 
dialogue with the public concerning the science/society 
aspects of the research carried out within the project. 
The combined activities of an IP may represent a fi-
nancial size ranging from several million € to several 
tens of millions of €. However, the size of projects is 
not a criterion for exclusion, and access to new instru-
ments is ensured for SMEs and other small entities. 
Conclusion 
Research into Sustainable Development is one of the 
priorities of the European Union. Both the Euratom 
Programme and the “Sustainable energy systems” 
cover actions regarding Energy research to be seen in 
close co-operation with the two other components of 
the Priority 6, i.e. “Sustainable surface transport” and 
“Global change and ecosystems”. 
New instruments (NoE and IP) have been created to 
achieve higher levels of efficiency in the implementa-
tion of this research policy. IP and NoE will allow 
European Research to achieve the necessary critical 
mass to obtain significant and relevant results. 
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ANNEX 1 
FP6 BUDGET (as decided by the Council, 3/6/2002) 
 
 
 
 
Notes to Annex 1: 
1  of which at least 15% for SMEs 
2  including up to 400 € millions for cancer related research 
3  including up to 100 € millions for further development of 
Géant and GRID 
4  this amount of 315 € millions will fund specific measures 
in support of international co-operation, involving devel-
oping countries, Mediterranean countries including the 
Western Balkans, and Russia and the Newly Independent 
States (NIS). Another 285 € millions are earmarked to fi-
nance the participation of third country organisations in 
the “Thematic priorities” and in the "Specific activities 
covering a wider field of research", thus bringing the to-
tal amount devoted to international co-operation to 600 € 
millions. Additional resources will be available under 
Section 2.2 “Human resources and mobility” to fund re-
search training for third country researchers in Europe 
5  including up to 200 € millions for further development of 
Géant a nd GRID 
 
 
  million 
€s 
1. Focussing and integrating Community 
research 
13345 
 1.1 Thematic priorities : 112851 
  1.1.1 Life sciences, genomics and 
biotechnology for health 
- Advanced genomics and its 
applications for health 
- Combating major diseases 
22552 
1100 
1155 
  1.1.2 Information society technolo-
gies 
36253 
  1.1.3 Nanotechnologies and 
nanosciences, knowledge-based 
multi-functional materials and 
new production processes and 
devices 
1300 
  1.1.4 Aeronautics and space 1075 
  1.1.5 Food quality and safety 685 
  1.1.6 Sustainable development, 
global change and ecosystems  
- Sustainable energy systems 
- Sustainable surface transport 
- Global change and ecosys-
tems 
2120 
810 
610 
700 
  1.1.7 Citizens and governance in a 
knowledge-based society 
225 
 1.2 Specific activities covering a wider field 
of research 
1300 
  1.2.1 Supporting policies and 
anticipating s/t needs 
555 
  1.2.2 Horizontal research activi-
ties involving SMEs 
430 
  1.2.3 Specific measures in sup-
port of international coop-
eration 
3154 
 1.3 Non-nuclear activities of the Joint 
Research Centre 
760 
2. Structuring the European Research Area 2605 
 2.1 Research and innovation 290 
 2.2 Human resources and mobility 1580 
 2.3 Research infrastructures 6555 
 2.4 Science and society 80 
3. Strengthening the foundations of the Euro-
pean Research Area 
320 
 3.1 Support for the co-ordination of 
activities 
270 
 3.2 Support for the coherent develop-
ment of R&I policies 
50 
TOTAL 16270 
  
1. Priority thematic areas of research 890 
 1.1 Controlled thermonuclear fusion 750 
 1.2 Management of radioactive waste 90 
 1.3 Radiation protection 50 
2. Other activities in the field of nuclear 
technologies and safety 
50 
3. Nuclear activities of the Joint Research 
Centre (JRC) 
290 
TOTAL 1230 
  
OVERALL TOTAL 17500 
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Session 1: Promoting RES in Europe – The state-of-the-art 
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Introduction 
Within the European Union’s energy policy renewable 
energy sources (RES) enjoy an important position. 
Nevertheless, the potential for their exploitation is 
underused in the EU at present. Within the Communi-
ties energy mix RES contribute to about 6% at present, 
see Fig. 1. As there can be seen from Table 1, electric-
ity produced from renewable energy sources (RES-E) 
as share of total electricity generation amounts 14% for 
EU-15, although, huge differences occur between the 
Member States. Two countries, Austria and Sweden, 
generate more than a third of electricity from these 
sources. Fig. 2 illustrates the shares of the RE tech-
nologies on total primary energy production from RES 
for the Community: The largest share of RES comes 
from biomass, followed by hydro.   
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Fig. 1  EU energy mix in 1998 
Source: EUROSTAT, 2001 
 
63,6%
1,4%
3,6%
31,0%
0,4%
Biomass & Waste
Wind
Geothermal
Hydro
Solar
 
Fig. 2  Shares of the various RE technologies on total 
primary energy production from RES in 1999 
Source: EUROSTAT, 2002 
 
Table 1: RES contribution in 1999 for EU countries – 
(a) RES as share of total inland consumption and (b) 
RES-E as share of total electricity generation 
 
Country Total inland 
consumption [%] 
Total electricity 
generation [%] 
B 1.2 1.4 
DE 2.6 5.4 
DK 9.2 11.7 
GR 5.5 10.0 
E 5.2 12.8 
FR 7.0 12.9 
IRL 1.8 5.2 
I 7.8 16.9 
L 1.3 2.5 
NL 2.1 3.4 
A 23.4 68.1 
P 11.1 19.8 
FIN 22.2 26.3 
S 26.7 46.2 
UK 1.1 2.7 
EU-15 5.9 14.0 
Source: EUROSTAT, 2002 
 
The Community recognises the need to promote re-
newable energy sources as a priority measure given 
that their exploitation contributes to environmental 
protection and sustainable development. 
Energy Policy Targets for the Future  
Clear Energy Policy Targets exist within the EU, all of 
them with particular relevance for the future develop-
ment of RES. In more detail these targets are: 
• Meeting Kyoto Objectives 
8% CO2 reduction between 2008 - 2012 compared 
to 1990 
• Doubling the Share of Renewable Energies 
From 6% to 12% of gross inland  energy produc-
tion 2010 
• Improving Energy Efficiency 
Increase by 18% until 2010 compared to 1995  
• Maintaining Security of Supply 
How to achieve the Energy Targets? – The 
Tools 
A comprehensive set of tools has been developed to 
achieve the given Energy Targets, on the EU level 
most important are: 
• White Paper on Energy Policy 
• White Paper on RES & Action Plan 
• Green Paper on security of supply 
• Directives 
• Support programmes. 
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A short description of each of these tools will be 
given in the following. 
White Paper on Energy Policy 
As the first tool, in January 1996 the White Paper on 
Energy Policy (European Commission, 1996) has been 
adopted. It defines the following objectives: 
• Environmental protection 
• Security of energy supply 
• Industrial competitiveness 
In general, RE technologies are consistent with these 
objectives. With respect to RES the following content 
of the White Paper is of interest:  
• National and Community authorities are invited to 
adopt policies mobilizing significant resources for 
RES; 
• Specific programmes or subsidies, least harmful to 
competition are foreseen; 
• It is acknowledged, that RES constitute in the long 
term the main sustainable energy source, which 
calls for a strategy on RES development. 
White Paper on Renewable Energies & Action 
Plan 
On 26th November 1997 the European Commission 
adopted the White Paper for a Community Strategy 
and Action Plan -  Energy for the future: Renewable 
Sources of Energy (European Commission, 1997), 
which can be seen as one of the highlights of EU en-
ergy policy statements with respect to RES. In general, 
it sets out a Community strategy and an Action Plan to 
double the share of Renewable energy from 6 to 12 % 
in Gross Inland Production by 2010. Therefore, sub-
targets are established in the various sectors and a tri-
annual review procedure is instigated. In view of 
Community enlargement flexibility is preserved. 
The Action Plan defines the accompanied measures, 
in more detail these are: 
• Internal market measures 
• Reinforce Community policies 
• Support measures  
• Campaign for take off. 
Green Paper on Security of Energy Supply 
On 29th November 2000, the Commission adopted a 
Green Paper on Security of Energy Supply (European 
Commission, 2000), in order to launch a debate on the: 
• geopolitical 
• economic  & 
• environmental   
stakes involved in  securing the EU’s energy supply. 
Therein basic facts about energy are described. In this 
context it is stated, that energy self sufficiency is im-
possible to achieve. Due to EU’s energy-intensive 
economy with annual growth rates of 1 to 2 % in con-
sumption, the existing gap between energy production 
and consumption will grow rapidly in the future, see 
Fig. 3.  
To improve the situation, in general two priorities of 
tomorrow occur: 
• to curb the growth in demand 
• to manage the dependence on supply. 
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Fig. 3  Energy consumption vs. production – a scenario 
for EU’s future 
Curbing the growth in demand can be achieved by: 
• Completing the internal market 
• Review of energy taxation 
• Energy saving and diversification plans 
• Dissemination of new technologies. 
Managing the supply dependence means: 
• to foster the development of less polluting energy 
sources, 
• to maintain access to resources  & 
• to ensure external supplies. 
New and renewable forms of energy are the first op-
tions for action in relation to security of supply, the 
environment and rural populations. Due to their poten-
tial, waiting to be exploited, it is a political priority to 
accelerate their future development.  
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Fig. 4  Reference scenario for the development of RES  
An impression of their possible development is given 
in Fig. 4, nevertheless, the various RE technologies 
have differing growth prospects. Their takeoff assumes 
that financial or tax incentives will be provided. To 
achieve the EU target of 12 % of energy consumption 
in 2010, equal to a doubling of their share compared to 
current level it is of crucial necessity to mobilise the 
support for RES. As an example RES could be fi-
nanced by temporary levies on a share of the profits of 
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other conventional operators in the energy sector. The 
aid for RES is justified on the grounds that conven-
tional energies do not contribute much towards the 
external cost they entail. Also, renewable do not have 
the same development facilities that other sectors had. 
Draft Directives 
With respect to RES three draft directives are of impor-
tance at present: 
• the Buildings Directive; 
• the Directive on Combined Heat and Power (CHP) 
with the target of doubling the share of CHP from 
9% (1994) to 18% (2010) and a special provision 
for renewable  and 
• the Directive on Liquid Biofuels with the mandate 
for a minimum use of biofuels and their detaxa-
tion. 
In more detail, the Proposal for a Directive on the 
Energy Performance of Buildings shows the following 
objectives:  
• Promoting the improvement of energy perform-
ance of buildings within the EU through cost-
effective measures  and 
• Convergence of building standards towards those 
of Member States which already have ambitious 
levels.  
To meet the objectives the following measures are 
proposed: 
• Methodology for integrated buildings energy 
performance standards, including on-site 
renewables, and bioclimatic design; 
• Application of these standards on new and existing 
buildings; 
• Certification schemes for all buildings  and 
• Inspection & assessment of boilers/heating and 
cooling installations. 
Directive on the promotion of electricity from 
RES 
On 27th September 2001, the Directive on the promo-
tion of electricity from RES (European Union, 2001) 
has been adopted. It establishes national targets for 
electricity from renewable energy sources (RES-E), in 
more detail this means: 
• Member States are obliged to establish national 
targets for future consumption of RES-E. The Di-
rective gives in its Annex indications for these na-
tional targets. 
• If the targets are met, consumption of electricity 
from renewable energy sources will rise from 14 
% in 1997 to 22% by 2010; 
• The Commission will monitor progress made by 
Member States towards achieving their national 
targets. 
With respect to support systems the following parts 
are of importance: 
• The Directive abstains from proposing a harmo-
nised Community wide support system for RES-E; 
• The Directive obliges the Commission to make if   
necessary a proposal for such a harmonised sup-
port system within 4 years, taking into account the 
experiences gained in Member  States with the op-
eration of the different national support  systems. 
Also considered are technical issues to promote 
RES-E – the Directive obliges Member States: 
• to assure guaranteed access for RES-E; 
• to issue guarantees of origin of RES-E; 
• to assure that the calculation of costs for connect-
ing new producers of RES-E should be  transpar-
ent and non-discriminatory.  
Support programmes on Renewables 
On a Community level three major support pro-
grammes on RES exist: 
• The 5th Framework Programme (ENERGIE) with 
technological development as its main objective; 
Budget of 1.042 M€ (1998-2002);  
• the ALTENER II Programme which fills the gap 
between demonstration & commercialization by 
providing non technological actions and studies 
aiming at overcoming non technical barriers; 
Budget of 74 M€ (1998-2002)  and 
• Regional Policy & Structural Funds with dedi-
cated budget for deployment of RES in most 
promising EU Regions; Budget of 487 M€ (2000-
2003). 
Cost comparison – Fossil vs. RES 
As already mentioned conventional energies do not 
contribute much towards the external cost they entail. 
Of course, also RES cause external costs, but on a 
much lower level, e.g. see Fig. 5. 
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Fig. 5  Damage cost estimates for energy fuel cycles 
(UK specific results);  
Source: DG Research 
In general, production costs are of crucial importance 
for the selection of a certain energy technology. A cost 
comparison of electricity generation costs – w/o exter-
nal costs – for RES and fossil fuels is depicted in Fig. 6 
(RES vs. Gas) and Fig. 7 (RES vs. Coal). 
ENER Forum 3. Successfully Promoting Renewable Energy Sources in Europe. 
 Budapest, Hungary, 6-7 June 2002  
ENER 25.02 19 
2
4
6
8
1 0
1 2
1 4
8 1 8 2 8 3 8 4 8 5 8 6 8 7 8 8 8 9 9 0 9 1 9 2 9 3 9 4 9 5 9 6 9 7 9 8 9 9 ' 0
HY
GE
Gas vs RES power  plants 
Production cost
BM WE
Gas
Gas + Ext. cost
BM+Ext cost
WE+ Ext. cost
€
ce
nt
/k
W
h
(Combined cycle Gas Turbines)
 
Fig. 6  Electricity generation costs of Gas vs. RES 
power plants (w/o external costs)  
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Fig. 7  Electricity generation costs of Coal vs. RES 
power plants (w/o external costs)  
Conclusions 
The major conclusions are: 
• Development of RES should become a political 
priority for the European Union; 
• The EU strategy for RES will be successful pro-
vided – political impetus is seconded by adequate 
and timely legal and financial initiatives; 
• To attain the ambitious targets set for 2010, apart 
from public financing, private investment in RES 
will be crucial in the coming years.  
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Abstract. The promotion of Renewable Energy Sources 
(RES) has a high priority in the energy policy strategies of 
many countries world-wide. In this paper a survey on the 
potentials and costs of RES in EU countries is given. More-
over, a survey on international promotion strategies is pre-
sented and some examples for successful dissemination 
strategies are depicted. Finally, the most important criteria 
for successful deployment strategies are described. The major 
conclusion for further strategies is: strategies have to address 
both, enhancements in customers WTP as well as cost reduc-
tions, simultaneously. Only then the demand for electricity 
from renewables can be increased significantly! 
Introduction 
The promotion of Renewable Energy Sources (RES) 
has a high priority in the energy policy strategies of 
many countries world-wide. In Europe the White Paper 
on Renewable Sources of Energy and the Directive on 
the promotion of electricity from RES, published by the 
European Commission, set challenging goals to double 
the share of renewables in the energy mix of EU coun-
tries. 
The great importance of electricity from RES is due 
to the expected associated benefits , namely: 
• Reduction of greenhouse gas emissions; 
• Increases in local employment and income; 
• Avoided risks of disruption in  fossil fuel supply 
and association price instability  
• Provision of infrastructure and economic flexibil-
ity by modular, dispersed and smaller scale  tech-
nologies;  
• Enhanced local tax revenues;  
Historical milestones  
Currently, a wide range of strategies exist in different 
countries to increase the market penetration of RES. 
Historically, the first dissemination strategies for elec-
tricity from RES were rebate programmes, whereby 
purchasers of renewable energy generating plants 
could claim back (i.e. be rebated for) part of the costs 
as a government grant. The most influential rebate 
programmes were (a) the wind promotion programme 
in Denmark, and  (b) the German “1000 Roofs Pro-
gramme” for promoting photovoltaic (PV) power, and 
the tendering programme within the Non-Fossil Fuel 
Obligation (NFFO) in UK. Moreover, rebates played 
an important role in increasing market penetration of 
wind energy in Denmark and Sweden.  
A less successful programme was the promotion 
programme for solar thermal collectors launched in 
1978 in the USA by president Jimmy Carter. The ma-
jor problem was that no technical standards accompa-
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nied this programme and as a result many manufactur-
ers of solar thermal systems were “fly by night”. 
In the early 1980s financial incentives, in the form of 
loans or reduced taxes, were also popular. The most 
successful examples were in Germany and Denmark, 
where, for instance, it was possible to  obtain preferen-
tial real estate loans for wind turbines.  
In the mid-1990s, in various European countries, 
promotional programmes based on regulated tariff 
rates for the purchase of electricity from specified 
renewable sources became more common and were 
enhanced. The most important models in this context 
were enhanced feed-in tariffs and rate-based incentives 
in Denmark, Spain and Germany.  
An increasingly popular mechanism is Green Elec-
tricity Pricing. Within these programmes, supply com-
panies and utilities offer electricity from renewable 
sources at special tariffs. Generally, these are at an 
enhanced price to cover increased generation costs. By 
giving customers the opportunity to choose the “brand” 
of electricity according to their willingness to pay, no 
public funds are necessary to increase the use of re-
newables. Table 1 summarises the most important 
historical steps for such promotional strategies.  
Table 1 Milestones in the promotion of renewables in 
different countries 
Year Strategy / Programme /country 
1978-1985 Rebates for wind in Denmark 
1978-??? Tax incentives for solar thermal collectors in 
the USA 
1981-present Net metering for RES-E in various states in the 
USA 
1989-1998 Do-it-yourself groups for solar thermal collec-
tors in Austria 
1989-1993 1000-Dächer-Programm 
1990-1999 Bidding/Tendering for RES-E in UK (NFFO) 
1990-present Feed-in tariffs for RES-E in Germany 
1991-present “Bra Miljöval” – Label for Green electricity in 
Sweden 
1992-1999 Tax relief for wind energy in Denmark 
1994-present “Residential PV promotion programme” in 
Japan (Rebates) 
1996-present “Solarstrombörse” for PV in various cities in 
Switzerland 
1997-present Various brands of labelled Green Electricity 
(TÜV, Grüner Stromlabel e.V., Öko-Institut) 
in various countries 
1999-present Soft loans for PV in the German “100,000 
Dächer-Programm” 
1999-2000 Voluntary Green certificate trading system in 
The Netherlands 
1999 -200x California's emerging renewables buydown 
rebate programme 
1999-present  Feed-in tariffs for RES-E due to the Royal 
Decree in Spain 
2000-present Feed-in tariffs for RES-E due to the “Renew-
able energies law” in Germany 
Potentials and costs 
Now we look at the possible contribution of RES to 
energy supply. Fist of all it is important, to figure out 
whether there is a substantial potential which makes it 
worth to pursue this idea further. Second the corre-
sponding costs have to be identified by means of deriv-
ing static cost curves. Third, it is of relevance to iden-
tify strategies to remove the barriers. 
Fig. 1 depicts how potentials, barriers and strategies 
are linked in principle. The electricity generated is 
shown depending on the time. We start with the his-
torical development of a renewable energy source in a 
certain country and identify different potentials. Vari-
ous barriers I, II, III ... exist which impede the practical 
achievement of the potentials. If no policy strategies 
are implemented, the lower broken line will be 
achieved the so-called business-as-usual scenario. If an 
ambitious policy launches the proper strategies the 
upper broken line will be achieved. 
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Fig. 1. Interaction between potentials, barriers and 
strategies 
The Figures 2 and 3 show that there is a substantial 
potential for generating electricity from various RES-
sources as well as for producing heat from biomass. 
The by far largest potential exist for on-shore and off-
shore wind energy. Almost 6000 TWh electricity could 
be generated every year in EU countries by wind tur-
bines (Fig. 2). For a comparison: The total electricity 
consumption in EU countries is around 2500 TWh in 
2000. 
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Fig. 2. Potential for electricity generation from RES 
The total primary energy potential for biomass is 
about 8280 PJ (2300 TWh/year) based on the year 
2010. Of course this potential could be converted either 
in heat only or in electricity & heat or in bio fuels (see 
Fig. 3). 
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Fig 3. Primary energy potential of biomass and poten-
tial for heat and electricity generation  
A static cost curve provides for any specific point-of-
time a relationship between (categories of) technical 
available potentials (of e.g. wind energy, hydro power, 
biogas...) and the corresponding (full) costs of utilisa-
tion of this potential at this point-of-time (Note, no 
learing effects are included in static cost curves!). Fig 4 
depicts an example for a static cost curve where the 
investment costs (IC) depend on quantity only. 
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Fig. 4. Example for a static cost curve (Wind on-shore 
in the EU countries)  
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Fig. 5 Development of the investment costs of wind 
turbines in Europe 
The development of the costs for wind turbines in 
Germany is shown in Fig. 6. It is of interest that prices 
dropped from around 4500 €/kW in 1982 to 2000 €/kW 
in 1990 and further to below 1000 € in 2000. 
The high capital investment costs of RES have been 
a major impediment to broader market penetration. 
These costs are shown in Fig. 4 for various types of 
RES from 1980 to 2000. All cost curves of the new 
technologies have decreased over time. The current 
range of costs in Europe is depicted in Fig. 5. 
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Fig. 6. Development of investment costs of RES for 
electricity generation in EU-15 from 1980 – 2000  
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Fig. 7. Costs of electricity generation from RES in 
Europe in 2002 
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Fig. 8. Costs of heat production from RES in Europe in 
2002 
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Deploying RES: How? 
To increase the market penetration of RES strategies 
have been implemented in various European countries 
in recent years. Table 2 provides a classification of the 
existing strategies for encouraging the use of RES. The 
terminology is explained in detail in Haas 2000. Note, 
that with respect to these strategies it is of high rele-
vance to differ between RES generating electricity and 
RES producing heat!  
Table 2 Fundamental types of strategies 
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Investment 
focused Bidding, Quota (X) X X  Regulatory capacity-
driven Generation based Quotas, TGCs  X X X 
Investment 
focused 
Rebates, Investment 
based tax incentives X X X X Regulatory 
price-
driven Generation based 
FITs, Rate-based 
incentives, Genera-
tion based tax 
incentives 
 X X  
Investment 
focused 
Do-it-yourself 
groups, Investment 
coop’s, Purchase 
coop’s, Shareholder 
coop’s, Contribu-
tion programmes 
X X X X 
Voluntary 
Generation 
based 
Green tariffs, Solar 
stock exchange, 
TGCs 
 X X  
 
In principle we differ between direct and indirect 
types of strategies. Direct strategies are regulatory 
capacity-driven strategies, regulatory price-driven and 
voluntary price-driven strategies. 
Regarding the variety of strategies it must be stated 
that much more are available for electricity and grid 
connected heat than for individual heating/hot water 
system and fuels for transport. An important issue in 
this context is furthermore the difference in invest-
ment-focused and generation-based approaches. Most 
important is that generation based approaches auto-
matically provide the incentive for a technical optimal 
operation of the system. 
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Fig. 9. Voluntary approach: focus on customers WTP   
Voluntary generation-based Green Pricing models by 
utilities as Green tariffs and Solar stock exchanges are 
based on a high consumers’ willingness to pay for 
“green electricity” and trust in the seriousness of the 
utility which offers it. Hence, they depend very 
strongly on the credibility of the organisation that of-
fers it. Effective green pricing programmes have to 
exhaust electricity consumers’ willingness to pay for 
“green electricity” as far as possible. In general green 
tariff programmes need a lot of public relations work 
from the utility to make them work (See e.g. the RWE 
programme in Germany or the ewz “Solarstrombörse” 
in Switzerland). Most important is that they are ac-
companied by a credible green label.  
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Fig. 10. Regulatory price driven strategies: fixed price 
for RES-E  
A promotion strategy, which has attracted attention 
since the late 1980s especially in Denmark and Ger-
many and, in the 1990s, in Spain are Feed-in tariffs 
(FITs), see Fig. 10. A feed-in tariff is the price per unit 
of electricity that a utility or supplier has to pay for 
renewable electricity from private generators (also 
called “producers”). Thus, a federal (or provincial) 
government regulates the tariff rate. Such schemes may 
limit the offer to a certain total capacity for the whole 
programme. Currently the highest “feed-in” prices in 
Europe are in force in Germany, Italy and Spain. Note 
that any intending producer is guaranteed the feed-in 
tariff for each unit of electricity fed into the grid if his 
form of generation meets the stated criteria; no bidding 
process or tendering is involved. This ‘open’ procedure 
without tendering contrasts with “obligation” pro-
grammes, e.g. the NFFO in the UK, where increased 
tariffs are only available to the selected ‘winners’ after 
competitive tendering. The feed-in tariffs attract much 
capacity, since the revenues from the plant are guaran-
teed, as long as the unit price is set on a high level (e.g. 
the substantial growth of wind power in Denmark, 
Germany and Spain in the past years.  
The major advantages of regulatory price driven 
strategies are: 
• They are effective in the sense that they trigger 
substantial installations of new RES; 
• They ensure technically efficient operation of the 
plant; 
• The transaction costs and the administration costs 
are low; 
TOP- 
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BOTTOM 
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• FITs provide an assured aspect of business plans 
for new investment; 
• They allow small co-operative groups and compa-
nies to participate. 
The major points of criticism with respect to feed-in 
tariffs are: 
• They provide subsidies; 
• They do not ensure that the economically most 
efficient plant is installed; 
• They do not encourage competition between gen-
erators. 
EURO/
kWh
kWh
PVar
Costs
?
QUOTA  
Fig. 11. Regulatory capacity driven strategies: fixed 
quota for RES-E and high penalty  
A type of strategy which has attracted a lot of atten-
tion at least in theoretical discussions are quota-based 
Tradable Green Certificate programmes. In principle 
they should work as follows, see Fig. 11: The genera-
tors (producers), wholesalers, retailer or consumers 
(depending who is obligated in the electricity supply 
chain) are obligated to supply / consume a certain 
percentage of electricity from renewable energy 
sources. At the date of settlement, they have to submit 
the required number of certificates to demonstrate 
compliance. Those obligated obtain certificates in three 
ways: 
• They can own a renewable energy generation 
plant. Each defined amount of energy (e.g. 10,000 
kWh in the Dutch system) produced by these fa-
cilities would represent one certificate;    
• They can purchase electricity and associated cer-
tificates from another renewable energy generator.  
• They can purchase certificates without purchasing 
the actual power from a generator or broker, i.e. 
purchasing certificates that have been traded sepa-
rated from the power itself. 
Due to competition on the supply side, this system of 
tradable certificates should in theory, under the as-
sumption of perfect market conditions (perfect price 
signal), lead to minimal generation costs from renew-
able energy sources. Of course, this happens only if 
there is a surplus of renewables generation above the 
demand for certificates. Regarding TGC it has to be 
stated that so far to less experience is available to pro-
vide an in-depth evaluation. The major arguments in 
favour of TGC are: 
• High economic efficiency; 
• A market for best-practice in the environment is 
created; 
• No market distortion due to fixed subsidies; 
• The market determines the magnitude of the sub-
sidy. 
Possible setbacks are:  
• Uncertainty about actual investment; 
• Unpredictable (volatile) revenues; 
• High administration and transaction costs14. 
Anyway, it is important to state, that in all three 
cases mentioned above finally the public pays! In vol-
untary programmes some people pay more, some peo-
ple pay less. If cost-driven strategies are implemented 
these subsidies (rebates, FITs) are paid by the electric-
ity users and the same applies for capacity dr. strate-
gies. The major goal for policy must be to find the 
strategies which minimizes public costs! 
Examples/Success stories 
In the following some successful examples for pro-
grammes implemented in the past or currently are 
described in brief.  
Promotion of solar thermal systems in Austria 
Since the early 1990s in Austria the market penetration 
of solar thermal systems for hot water preparation 
increased tremendously mainly due to so-called do-it-
yourself groups, see Fig. 10 Yet, in recent years two 
effects emerged: the number of systems installed per 
year decreased since 1997 and the market share of the 
do-it-yourself groups dropped substantially from 51% 
in 1992 to 8% in 1998! 
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Fig. 12. Dissemination of Solar thermal systems in 
Austria  
Sources: Faninger 1999, Faninger 2001, Weiss 1996 
                                                           
14 Experience from the Netherlands shows that these costs are in the 
order of 2% of the price paid for a certificate. When the volume 
traded will increase, this rate is likely to decrease, because a large 
portion of the costs is associated with fixed costs and start-up of the 
system. 
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Biomass district heating systems in Austria 
The Austrian case of Biomass District Heating Systems 
(BMDH) is one of the few examples within Europe 
where biomass has successfully been introduced into 
the energy market (see Danielsen et al 1995). 
The first BMDH plant was established by a sawmill 
operator in the village of Feldbach in 1979. Starting in 
the early eighties and continuing to the present interest 
in BMDH has been rising rather continuously. Figure 
13 shows the increase in the number of yearly con-
structed BMDH plants between 1980 and 2001. The 
rate of growth has been on an average 25% since 1987; 
before, growth rates showed large fluctuations due to 
the small number of plants. During the first phase until 
1984, sawmills owners were the predominant operators 
of BMDH plants. They were succeeded by municipali-
ties and farmers co-operatives. In the late 1980s elec-
tric utilities emerged as new actors. In some cases, 
joint ventures with farmers co-operatives were initi-
ated. Currently, (2002) around 700 systems exist. The 
highest density exists in the province of Styria, see Fig. 
14. Villages with BMDH plants usually have between 
500 and 3000 inhabitants and are of a predominantly 
rural character. Accordingly, the size of BMDH plants 
varies between a few hundred kW and up to 8 MW, 
with corresponding grids between 100 meters and 21 
km. Almost two-thirds of all plants have a power of 
less than 1500 kW. The average size of all BMDH 
plants in Austria is currently around 1.25 MW 
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Fig. 13. Dissemination of biomass district heating 
systems in Austria  
The key features that contributed to this dissemina-
tion effect are: 
• Considerable financial incentives in the range of 
30-50% were provided; 
• Local values, like increase in employment and 
revenues for farmers and the municipality were 
added. 
Yet, it has also to be mentioned that there are some 
critical aspects with respect to the spread of BMDH: 
• The cost of the systems as well as of the heat gen-
erated are considered to be very high; 
• The design of most systems is poor, Tits, the boil-
ers as well as the pipe networks are oversized in 
many cases. 
 
Fig 14. Dissemination of biomass district heating sys-
tems in Styria in Austria 
Wind energy in Denmark 
Incentives for wind energy in Denmark varied over 
time. In principle the Danish government has not spent 
much money directly to support wind power but has 
provided intellegent indirect and non-economic support 
(Helby 1996).  
First in the 1980s environmental restrictions were 
relaxed. While it was quite difficult to get a permission 
to build any kind of structure in the Danish country-
side, liberal rules were created for wind mills (Helby 
1997). Note, that in recent years these rules have been 
made more restrictive.  
Second, the electric utilities were forced by law to 
connect private wind mills to the grid and to pay a fair 
price for the power. 
Third, income tax rules have favoured family in-
vestment in wind power. As long as the number of 
shares owned by a family corresponded to the families 
own electricity consumption there has been no tax on 
the shares in Denmark. (Helby, 1997) 
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Fig. 15. Development of installed Wind capacity in 
Denmark 
In general, the incentives depended on ownership, 
which can be divided into three categories: wind en-
ergy co-operatives, private ownership, and utility own-
ership. For co-operatives and private owners, incen-
tives include the following: 1: guaranteed power pur-
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chase contracts with utilities in which utilities pay 
generators 85 per cent of the local retail price of elec-
tricity; 2: refund of the energy tax; and 3: refund of the 
CO2 tax.  
Note that only in the early days of wind power sub-
sidies were available. These guaranteed capital grants 
of 30 per cent for wind energy were gradually reduced 
until their removal in 1989. 
Furthermore, individual persons who participate in 
wind energy co-operatives can own up to 20,000 
kWh/year-worth of shares in the co-operatives, of 
which the first DKK 3000/yr of income is tax-free (and 
the remainder taxed at a 60 per cent rate). To the extent 
that the wind power purchase contracts increase the 
cost of electricity, these costs are passed on to utility 
ratepayers. Lastly, any grid reinforcement which may 
be required as a result of non-utility wind power instal-
lations are paid for by the utilities. 
Utility-owned wind power projects do not benefit 
from preferential tax treatment or from any refund of 
the energy tax, though utilities can obtain refunds of 
the CO2 tax. Less incentive therefore exists for utilities 
to build wind projects than for co-operatives and pri-
vate owners. Nevertheless, utilities are committed to 
building more wind power as part of an agreement with 
the Danish government. In 1995, approximately 30 per 
cent of total installed wind energy capacity was utility-. 
Total installed wind energy capacity in Denmark in 
late 2000 was approximately 2400 MW. It can also be 
seen from Fig. 15 that due to a change in promotion 
policies the numbers in yearly installations dropped 
from 650 MW in 2000 to 117 MW in 2001! (see also 
Morthorst, this issue). 
Wind energy in Europe 
The feed-in tariffs introduced so far in Denmark (until 
2000), Germany and Spain led to the installed cumula-
tive capacities for wind, as depicted in Fig. 16. The 
high growth rates of 45 to 50% in some years are espe-
cially impressing. 
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Fig. 16. Development of cumulated installed wind 
energy capacity in the most successful European coun-
tries 1995-2001 
Fig. 17 compares the dissemination effectiveness of 
bidding vs feed-in tariffs for wind energy in Europe. 
The higher dissemination effectiveness of the feed-in 
tariff is evident. 
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Fig. 17. The success of feed-in tariffs and bidding 
strategies for promoting Wind energy in selected Euro-
pean countries 
PV in Switzerland  
The most successful country with respect to dissemi-
nating PV substantially without providing generous 
subsidies is Switzerland. An idea of providing financial 
incentives for the construction of PV systems which 
has especially attracted attention is the so-called “Solar 
stock exchange”. The idea is that electricity is gener-
ated by private-owned PV systems and fed into the 
public grid. Other customers may buy this electricity 
and pay rates corresponding to the PV production 
costs. On the supply-side only the most cost-effective 
projects are selected by a bidding process.  
PV-
generator
Utility
PV-
electricity
customer
call for bids  conducts
        marketinglong term
 contract
yearly 
subscription
 
Fig. 18. The principle of the “Solarstrombörse” applied 
by various utilities in Switzerland 
The utility acts as a “power exchange”. That is to say 
it organises the balance between supply and demand, 
see Fig. 18. Usually, the utility bears the administration 
costs but has no other expenses.  
The advantages of this strategy are: 
• Customers WTP is fully exhausted;  
• Efficient operation is ensured 
• Private “green” PV owners ensure that only the 
best examples for PV will be constructed; 
• Kind of a “Green label” with high credit maybe 
associated with this type of strategy; 
This idea has firstly been developed by ewz in Zu-
rich in Switzerland and has in the meantime attracted 
attention also in other cities. At the end of 2001 around 
2.2 MW has been installed, see Fig. 19.  
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Fig. 19. PV installments within the “Solarstrombörse” 
programme of the EWZ in Zuerich (Switzerland)  
Success criteria  
There is a wide range of possibilities to increase the 
dissemination of RES and many examples for success-
ful programmes exist. The most important general 
criteria for successful deployment strategies are: 
• Ensure continuity over a certain time frame 
• Ensure high credibility of the institution/actor who 
launches a strategy 
• Ensure social acceptance! 
• Trigger and enhance competition! 
• Add monetary or other values 
In detail there are eight key factors for successful 
dissemination strategies of RES-E systems, see Fig. 20:  
1. Provide a minimum of a financial incentive that 
allows to fully exhaust customers WTP! 
2. Improve the market: Ensure that the competitive-
ness and the transparency of the market for renew-
able energy technology as well as of the market for 
electricity (e.g. by means of a power content label) 
is enhanced! Moreover, ensure continuity of the 
strategy over time and sustainable growth of the 
industry! 
3. Strive for a guaranteed technical performance, an 
increase of standardisation and efficiency! 
4. Try to make the programme a social event and to 
address the public as well as the mass-media! 
5. Strive for setting the correct regulatory conditions 
from societies point-of-view! Remove barriers for 
access to the grid and introduce environmental 
pricing! 
6. Minimise the costs for the public! Strive for low 
administration and transaction costs and minimize 
monetary financial support to reach a certain 
amount of RES-E capacity! 
7. Provide comprehensive detailed and targeted in-
formation for the potential programme partici-
pants! 
8. Conduct marketing! What are the potential cus-
tomers and what are their needs?   
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Fig. 20. Key factors for successful dissemination 
strategies of RES 
Conclusions 
Currently world-wide a large variety of success stories 
for the dissemination of RES is available. The major 
conclusions derived from this analysis are: 
Of principal relevance is to take into account the dy-
namic development of two major features: 
• the costs to customers (monetary and “hidden” 
transaction costs) and 
• the WTP of private or commercial investors; 
Hence, most important is that measures contribute to 
both of these features: to increase customer´s WTP on 
the one hand and to reduce the (monetary and transac-
tion) costs for customers on the other hand. Only so the 
actual demand can be increased substantially. Fig. 21 
depicts these effects in a traditional supply and demand 
diagram.  
Reduce (Monetary
and transaction) Costs
INCREASE WTP
(acceptance, 
reliability...) 
Capacity (kWp) 
Demand
 
Fig. 21. How enhancements in customers WTP and 
decreases in costs influence the demand for RES  
Other important conclusions are: 
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• For politicians most important is to set the correct 
regulatory incentive; 
• Accompanying social acceptance activities are of 
high relevance for any deployment strategies! 
• Continuity over time is a basic condition for every 
type of strategy! 
• Increasing the efficiency of energy use is an im-
portant complementary objective! 
• and finally it became evident that to reach higher 
market shares is mainly a policy issue! 
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Abstract: Renewable portfolio standards (RPS) and mini-
mum price standards are two systems to foster the market 
dissemination of renewable energies in the electricity sector. 
Transaction Cost Economics brings forward that the contrac-
tual relations in real structures have to be investigated to 
judge on the efficiency of governance structures. This paper 
seeks to do so by comparing governance structures created 
by the Texan RPS and the German EEG as an example for a 
successful minimum price standard. Analysis suggests that 
differences in static efficiency between both regulations are 
not as big as economic theory would suggest. The need to 
safeguard long-term investments establishes long-term con-
tracts as the prevailing form of governance in the Texan RPS, 
thus limiting competition. On the other hand, the German 
EEG provides a large range of freedom to the power genera-
tors giving them strong incentives to optimise both the in-
vestment and the operation of a power plant. 
Introduction 
Renewable energy sources (RES) are seen by many as 
an indispensable part of a sustainable energy supply 
system (e.g. Nakicenovic et al. 2000; Nitsch et al. 
2000). Yet, utilisation of RES is often not economi-
cally competitive under current conditions. Therefore, 
different public regulations have been developed to 
support RES in the electricity sector. Most prominent 
are minimum price standards (MPS) (such as estab-
lished in France, Germany, Spain and until recently 
Denmark) and renewable portfolio standards (RPS) as 
they have been established only recently for example 
in Italy, Austria, the UK, Australia and some states of 
the US. Countries with MPS have seen by far the larg-
est growth of RES in particular in regard to wind 
power even though this development cannot be solely 
attributed to the specific support regulation but de-
pends also on e.g. a fair access to the electricity grid 
and transparent and rationale building permissions. In 
comparison with MPS, RPS are often assumed to in-
troduce more competition on RES markets thus allow-
ing to reach public targets for the implementation of 
RES at lower costs (e.g. Berry, Jaccard 2001). How-
ever, the quasi-rents from long-term investments typi-
cal for RES power plants need to be safeguarded 
against potential appropriation. Thus, long-term con-
tracts rather than spot-markets will be the prevailing 
form of governance eroding some of the benefits of 
competition. On the other hand, the governance struc-
ture created by minimum price standards might not be 
so anti-competitive in practise as neo-classical eco-
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nomic theory would suggest. Thus, static efficiency of 
both support regulation might not differ so much in 
reality.  
This paper seeks to analyse realised governance 
structures resulting from a minimum price standard and 
an RPS by comparing the provisions in the Texan RPS 
with the provisions under the German Renewable En-
ergy Act (EEG). We will examine the means which 
have been applied by RES generators, obliged parties 
and the state to reduce the risks for hold-ups in reality. 
Comparative advantages and short-comings of the 
different regulations are described. In our analysis, we 
rely heavily on tools provided by Transaction Cost 
Economics (TCE). 
The Theoretical Framework of Transaction 
Cost Economics 
The choice of an appropriate organisation of economic 
acting, a governance structure is in the central focus of 
TCE. It starts from the observation that the human 
capacity to process information is limited. People in-
tend to act rational but are bounded by their own limits 
of thinking. Thus economic actors are deciding with 
only imperfect information (Richter, Furobotn 
1999,510) and bounded rationality (Simon 1957,198). 
Having said this, the organisation of transactions is 
inevitable causing costs, so called transaction costs. 
Moreover, economic actors are guided by opportunism, 
a rather euphemistic term for dishonesty, fraud and 
malice. Investments specific to a certain transaction 
open the door for opportunistic behaviour: Specific 
investments are thereby characterised by quasi-rents 
which can be derived from this investment in compari-
son to its next profitable application. Since these quasi-
rents are specific to a certain transaction the quasi-rent 
is on risk for hold-ups by the transaction partner. By 
threatening the asset owner with breaking of the rela-
tion he will be able to appropriate at least a part of the 
quasi-rents. Anticipating this danger, the asset owner 
will invest in more generic assets with lower quasi-
rents but possibly also lower efficiency. Alternatively, 
an appropriate governance structure which safeguards 
the quasi-rents of the specific investments against hold-
ups may be established (Williamson 1987). In so do-
ing, efficiency gains due to the specific investment can 
be realised which is potentially profitable for both 
transaction partners. The extent of specific investments 
is a main determinant for the choice of an efficient 
governance. The higher the specifity the more will the 
governance be characterised by patterns of hierarchies 
with cooperative and intentional adaptations to changes 
in the environment, with accounting and auditing as 
administrative controls, but also with lower incentive 
intensity. In contrast, low specifity of investments 
allows a governance by markets benefiting from the 
high powered incentives to optimise which are pro-
vided by markets. This makes also clear, that the 
choice of an efficient governance is not solely that 
between markets or hierarchies but that there exist a 
number of hybrid governance structures. 
Power plants are typical examples of specific in-
vestments. Higher efficiency both in a technical and 
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economic sense comes usually with higher investment 
costs for a given generation capacity and a given fuel 
source. A power generator has usually to rely on a 
certain transaction partner at least on the short-term, 
making him vulnerable for hold-ups. To achieve a high 
efficiency, investments in power plants were safe-
guarded by comprehensive public regulation in the 
past. With liberalised markets an alternative govern-
ance in form of long-term power purchase agreements 
is established to allow similar safeguards.  
With RES power plants an additional opportunity for 
hold-ups exist: As far as RES power plants are still not 
fully competitive with fossil and nuclear power plants, 
the external benefits of RES power plants due to e.g. 
reduced environmental impact and higher supply secu-
rity needs to be remunerated. Public regulations are a 
way to create such extra-rents. The governance of the 
transaction between the generator and the purchaser of 
electricity converts to an ‘administered contract’ re-
stricting the freedom of the transaction partners to 
design the governance themselves (Goldberg 1976). 
However, the state may appropriate these extra-rents 
by altering the regulation. Thus, a ‘regulatory contract’ 
(Bickenbach et al. 2002) has to provide comparable 
safeguards against hold-ups in the relation to the state.  
Governance Structure in the German EEG 
In the following, we will describe the governance 
structure implied by the German Erneuerbare-
Energien-Gesetz (EEG – Renewable Energy Act).  
In Germany, the regulatory contract in the form of 
the EEG sets amount and minimum prices of any 
individual transaction between the generator16 and 
obliged grid-operators. Thus the primary or main 
duties of such transaction are governed by the 
regulation. The relation between the grid-operator and 
the generator relies on the regulation and the state 
rather than on a contract between them. Exclusively 
secondary duties like payment plans, metering and so 
on might be content of a private contract between the 
purchasing grid-operator and the generator. If these 
secondary duties are regarded as minor, especially 
regarding the absolute volume of a certain transaction 
(e.g. with small PV installations), a contract between 
the grid-operator and the generator might even be 
obsolete. In fact, the regulation does not state whether 
a contract must be agreed on or not. In numerous cases, 
no contract has been made. Yet, legal practise has 
denied a generator’s obligation to contract explicitly 
with of the grid-operator so far, which is a dubious 
position (Gent 2001, Brandt et al. 2001). Even though 
the regulatory contract may be seen as one between the 
state and the obliged grid-operator, the provisions of 
the regulatory contract interferes very much into the 
relation and the transaction between the generator and 
the grid-operator.  
                                                           
16 Since the following sections will exclusively deal with power 
generation from RES we will refrain from marking generators as 
‘RES generators’, power plants as ‘RES power plants’  or electricity 
as ‘RES electricity’ for the sake of better readability. If not other 
stated exclusively RES are covered. 
Compared to an RPS in the manner of the Texan 
regulation, the governance structure created by the 
German EEG can be understood as a more hierarchical 
one. In terms of ‘make-or-buy’ decision, the state has 
somewhat integrated the purchase of electricity into his 
own hierarchy. Concerning the grid-operator’s role 
within the EEG, he can be regarded as an agent of the 
state especially as grid-operation - the main business of 
the grid-operator - is subject to public regulations. The 
relation between the state and the grid-operator as his 
acting agent bears many characteristics of an hierarchi-
cal governance. The EEG allows the obliged grid-
operator no degree of freedom concerning the amount 
and the price to be paid for the electricity from RES. 
Consequently, the EEG provides no incentives to the 
grid-operator to decrease the price of generated elec-
tricity. The state maintains an accounting system to 
survey grid-operators. Moreover, a kind of audits of 
the generators are undertaken. The 250-MW-Wind-
Programme which accompanied the similar predeces-
sor of the EEG, the Electricity Feed-In Law (StrEG), 
forced participating wind-power-plant operators to 
reveal cost and performance data. Surveys on perform-
ance and costs are part of a biannual progress report17. 
Adaptations to changing conditions (e.g. cost devel-
opment, technology deployment, technologies to be 
incorporated, grid access issues) are undertaken in a 
intentional and to some extent also cooperative man-
ner. 
It has to be underlined, that the above said applies 
only to transfers of electricity between the generator 
and the grid-operator. Pre-products, i.e. especially the 
power plants themselves, are still purchased on com-
petitive markets, allowing the full benefits of such 
governance. For the sake of maximising their own 
profits, generators will go for as low as possible plant 
purchase prices. As a result, the value-added chain 
remains governed mostly by markets. Yet, the EEG 
implies that generators cannot force out business rivals 
by lowering electricity generation prices. Whereas in a 
competitive market relation between generators and 
electricity purchasers, a generator will be pushed out of 
the market in the long-run, if he does not optimise the 
input-output relation, this is not the case with the 
framework created by the EEG. Thus, generators might 
be more ready to share their quasi-rents with plant 
manufacturers. Especially, if supply of plants is scarce, 
plant manufacturers are in a good position to acquire 
parts of the quasi-rents. This way, parts of the quasi-
rents due to the EEG might be passed on downwards 
the entire value-added chain weakening the high-
powered incentives delivered by markets18. The state 
might even desire such rent-sharing to a certain extent 
since the extra quasi-rents allow reaping of returns 
from innovations thus supporting innovation (Viscusi 
                                                           
17 However, achieving precise and true data on the cost development 
of the different technologies for the purpose of price adaptation has 
been an challenge (Hirschl 2002). Enhancing access to cost data is 
one important issue to enhance the performance of the EEG. 
18 Indeed, rent-sharing with input suppliers is one reason why regu-
lated firms are likely to face higher than competitive costs once a 
regulation is relaxed (Noll 1989,1266).  
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et al. 2000,510). Furthermore, the extra motivation 
induced by the threat of being pushed out of the market 
would not come about without any extra cost since the 
additional risk, which investors have to bear, needs to 
be remunerated additionally. 
Governance Structure in the Texan RPS 
In contrast to the German EEG, the regulatory contract 
in form of the Texan RPS sets only the minimum total 
amount of RES electricity. This implies especially that 
the regulatory contract does not fix any provisions in 
any dimension of the transaction between the obliged 
electricity supplier serving ultimate costumers and the 
generator. Compared to the obliged party in the EEG 
(the grid-operator), Texan electricity suppliers have a 
larger degree of freedom to fulfil their obligations. In 
particular, obliged suppliers may fix individual prices 
and individual amounts of purchased certificates and/or 
electricity in individual contracts with individual part-
ners. They even get the freedom to integrate the RES 
power generation in their own business, too. Moreover, 
it is in the direct interest of the supplier to reduce his 
burden from the obligation. This is different from the 
motivation of the grid-operator as the obliged party in 
the German EEG, who has only an indirect motivation 
for cost reduction since as a regulated actor in a natural 
monopoly, he is principally able to pass on any burden 
to his customers. Thus, the relation between the state 
and the regulated entity is much looser in the Texan 
RPS than in the German EEG. This higher degree of 
freedom in Texas compared to Germany, from which 
potential efficiency gains accrue, offers the supplier 
also more opportunities for holding up the RES genera-
tor. Long-term contracts (if not entire integration) tend 
to be the resulting governance structure to safeguard 
the specific investment in the Texan RPS (Langniss, 
Wiser 2002). Thus, one has to distinguish between ex-
ante contract and ex-post contract regarding the trans-
action relation between the obliged electricity supplier 
and the generator: 
• As long as obliged electricity suppliers contract 
out their demand on RES certificates, a market 
type relation between the demander and the bid-
ders exists ex-ante. 
This fundamentally changes when a successful bid-
der enters into a delivery contract. These long-term 
contracts create a tighter, more hierarchical type of 
transaction. Not only price and amount is fixed by such 
contracts but additional provision like access rights to 
the facility, codes of conduct etc. create a hierarchical 
governance structure. 
It gets clear that a specific investment in the form of 
a RES power plant needs safeguards against potential 
hold-ups in any case. Generators will not invest in 
specific assets as long as no sufficient safeguards 
against appropriation of quasi-rents by the obliged 
purchaser are in place. Long-term binding commitment 
and contracts are thus inevitable, as far as the power 
plant represents a specific investment. But these safe-
guards need not to be provided by the state in form of a 
regulation since private contracts can provide safe-
guards of the same quality. In other words: a lack of 
safeguards by the regulation can be counterbalanced by 
additional safeguards in a private contract. The Ger-
man EEG which delivers almost perfect safeguards 
against hold-ups, might be regarded as the most far-
reaching attempt by the state to give secure and certain 
investment environment. The Texan regulation, on the 
other hand leaves a lot of freedom to the negotiating 
parties to deliver such safeguards. 
Resulting Hybrid Governance – a Comparison 
Thus both support schemes result in hybrid governance 
structures. Yet, the regulatory contract within the Ger-
man EEG has more characteristics of a hierarchy 
whereas in the Texan RPS the regulatory contract is 
shifted more towards a market-based governance. This 
means especially that the Texan regulatory contract 
provides more high-powered incentives for an efficient 
electricity generation with RES than the German EEG. 
Typically, in both cases, the character of governance of 
the regulatory contract is transferred to the individual 
transaction relations. Indeed, the German EEG already 
defines the primary duties of the purchaser on a long-
term basis thus only secondary duties needs to be de-
fined in an individual contract. As a result, there is no 
high-powered incentive by competition and market to 
raise efficiency.  
In contrast, the market-oriented approach of the 
Texan RPS leads to competition among potential gen-
erators. Consequently, strong incentives to raise effi-
ciency are provided in the pre-commissioning phase. 
This changes substantively once a long-term contract 
has been concluded19. The governance structure of the 
standard contracts20 concluded typically provides only 
limited incentives to the generator to enhance effi-
ciency further. For example, a generator receives the 
entire extra quasi-rent from an extended electricity 
generation, both in terms of electricity and certificates, 
only if this surplus generation does not exceed 5 to 
10 % of the contracted amount21. Should the excess 
generation exceed these amounts, the generator needs 
to share the extra quasi-rents with the purchasing elec-
tricity supplier. Since the individual generator is forced 
to deliver the entire generation to the contracting elec-
tricity supplier, a delivery of excess electricity to other 
parties with the advantage of keeping the full extra 
quasi-rents is not possible either22. In contrast, within 
the propositions of the German EEG, any extra quasi-
rents from extended generation will fall to the genera-
tor thus providing very high-powered incentives to 
increase production. The same applies to extra quasi-
rents due to efficiency gains by lowering input.  
                                                           
19 This is a fundamental transformation according to Williamson 
(1987,61). 
20 Our analysis relies on two model contracts (SWPSC 2000, TXU 
2000) which were provided together with two request for proposals 
for certificates and electricity from RES. Albeit the realised contracts 
are staying undisclosed they have followed reportedly the model 
contracts to a very large extent. The demand created by the two 
requests covers approximately half of the entire demand for certifi-
cates (and RES electricity) in Texas. 
21 § 4.02 TXU 2000, § 7.2 in connection with § 8.4 SWPSC 2000  
22 SWPSC 2000,1; § 4.01 TXU 2000 
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In the framework of the Texan RPS, operators are 
usually bound to fixed operation rules negotiated with 
the purchasing electricity supplier23. Additionally, any 
changes in the setting of the plant are needed to be 
reported to and approved by the purchasing electricity 
supplier24. Thus, the RES generator has difficulties to 
hide from the purchasing electricity supplier extra 
quasi-rents due to lowered input. The need of approval 
of any alterations gives the purchasing electricity sup-
plier a strong position in acquiring at least partly any 
extra quasi-rents, with the result that the generator’s 
extra quasi-rents decrease. From the purchasing elec-
tricity supplier’s point of view, these provisions are 
rational, because they ensure that he gets the opportu-
nity to profit from any extra quasi-rents due to effi-
ciency gains, even though he weakens the generator’s 
incentives to perform such efficiency enhancements. 
Without these provisions, the purchasing electricity 
supplier will be foreclosed from any extra quasi-rents 
in any case. Thus, these provisions enhance the pur-
chasing electricity supplier’s chance to achieve extra 
quasi-rents. Albeit individual contracts do not need to 
contain such clauses, the rationale described above 
makes it very likely that such provisions are typical 
part of contracts. This applies as long as major parts of 
the life-cycle costs and thus optimisation opportunities 
due to input minimisation, occurring up-front before 
commissioning, as e.g. with wind power or hydro 
power. In contrast, contracts on the purchase of elec-
tricity from power plants, for which total generation 
costs consist of a larger share of running costs on the 
total generation costs (e.g. biomass fired plants), might 
contain more incentives for the plant operator to opti-
mise operation. Table 1 summarises the typical gov-
ernance structures established under the German EEG 
and the Texan RPS. In both cases, the governance 
structure created by the regulation is still maintained in 
the ex-ante contract phase. After concluding the con-
tract (ex-post), the governance structure tends to the 
opposite. We will describe these shifts in more detail in 
the following. 
Table 1. Qualitative assessment of typical governance 
structures within the German EEG and the Texas RPS. 
Administered Contract  Regulatory  
Contract Ex-ante Ex-post 
On electricity 
amount and price 
Long-term contract on 
secondary duties German 
EEG Î more hierarchy Î more market 
On total 
electricity demand 
Long-term contract on 
amount, price & 
secondary duties Texan RPS 
Î more market Î more hierarchy 
 
In the Texan situation, restricting the generator’s ex-
tra quasi-rents, and transferring at least parts of them to 
the obliged electricity supplier, means that in the end 
                                                           
23 For example §10.5(B) SWPSC 2000 
24 § 2.08 TXU 2000, §5.8 SWPSC 2000 
the final consumer of electricity may benefit from the 
reduced costs. Arguably, competition among electricity 
suppliers must work to let final consumers benefit from 
reduced costs. Otherwise electricity suppliers would 
not be forced to supply at their marginal costs. Still, 
compared to the situation under the German EEG, 
Texan electricity customers have greater chances to 
benefit from reduced generation costs. Producers’ 
surpluses will be reduced in favour of consumers’ 
surpluses. Thus, the reduction of incentives to the gen-
erator comes together with a desirable distributional 
effect25.  
Only in an RPS the generator has the opportunity to 
enlarge his individual quasi-rents by increasing the 
price whereas in the German EEG this is not possible. 
However, this opportunity is temporarily limited, since 
in the long-run obliged electricity suppliers would 
search for other sources of certificates, in case they got 
victims of a generator’s hold-up. The generator’s pos-
sibility to blackmail the obliged electricity supplier is 
actually an important pre-condition which forces the 
obliged entity into a long-term commitment with the 
generator in form of long-term contracts or even inte-
gration of the generator. Public regulation has to create 
two other major pre-conditions in order to push the 
obliged entity into long-term commitments which 
safeguard specific investments26:  
1. The state has to commit reliably to long-term 
quantified targets for the supply of renewable en-
ergies. 
2. The state has to impose sufficient sanctions on 
obliged entities that fail to meet their obligations. 
These pre-conditions can be found in Texas. The tem-
porary availability of public generation grants in form 
of the federal Production Tax Credit creates an addi-
tional momentum to conclude long-term contacts 
(Langniss, Wiser 2002). As a consequence of these 
grants wind power plants27 commissioned at an early 
stage will generate cheaper electricity than plants 
erected later. Thus, it is favourable for the obliged 
electricity supplier to achieve and maintain access to 
these comparatively inexpensive sources of supply. 
Moreover, since certificates may be traded a surplus of 
certificates will not necessarily create a financial loss. 
The German EEG leaves grid-operators no freedom 
in governing their transactions with RES generators as 
far as the major issues are concerned. Especially, they 
must not integrate directly the generator because by 
law grid-operation has to be separated from electricity 
generation. In contrast, an obliged electricity supplier 
in Texas has every freedom to govern the transaction 
with the generator. Therefore, one might ask why are 
long-term contracts the predominant form of govern-
ance in the Texan RPS right now? As described, a 
governance purely based on spot-markets would not 
                                                           
25 Efficiency and distribution are often interdependent in regulation 
(Noll 1989,1262). 
26 Rader, Hempling 2001, pp7, pp72 
27 As the principal generation technology with the lowest generation 
costs of all RES in Texas. 
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safeguard sufficiently specific investments in the 
power plant. 
On the other hand why then is the operation of the 
power plants not entirely integrated in the business of 
the obliged electricity suppliers? Certainly, the hybrid 
governance created by the long-term contracts bears 
many characteristics of a hierarchy. Still, it is not en-
tirely hierarchical. Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) 
gives some answers to this question also applicable to 
this case. TCE suggests that transactions should be 
governed by markets as much as possible to achieve 
the benefits of the high-powered incentives of market 
governance. Only if markets can not provide sufficient 
safeguards, hierarchies should come into play (Wil-
liamson 1987). Thus, as long as long-term contracts 
provide adequate safeguards, there is no need for the 
obliged electricity suppliers to fully integrate the plant 
operation in their business. Instead, they benefit from 
the high-powered incentives delivered by competition 
in the pre-commission phase. Moreover, economies of 
scale can be realised by bundling the demand of sev-
eral obliged electricity suppliers through markets. 
Indeed, some of the wind parks developed for the RPS 
by a single developer are delivering to different elec-
tricity suppliers. Cost reductions by learning effects 
can be realised faster and to a larger extent, too, if the 
demand is bundled by markets. This is especially true 
considering that most obliged electricity suppliers so 
far lack experience with RES power plant development 
and operation. Good and abundant wind resources are 
situated in the western part of Texas but many suppli-
ers do not have access to these good wind resources in 
their own ancestral supply area28. Thus, in most of the 
cases obliged electricity suppliers cannot realise 
economies of scope by bundling their conventional 
generation with the RES generation. As described 
earlier in this section, long-term contracts may limit the 
obliged electricity supplier’s risk of appropriation of 
quasi-rents by the regulator. Against that, a total inte-
gration would put this risk completely on the electricity 
supplier. 
In Texas, the strong incentives induced by the 
stronger market characteristic of the RPS regulation 
itself and within ex-ante contracting, are supplemented 
by weaker incentives due to more hierarchical govern-
ance ex-post. Moreover, it is in the direct interest of the 
supplier to reduce the burden imposed by the obliga-
tion. This is different from the position of the grid-
operator as the obliged party in the German EEG. The 
German grid-operator has only an indirect motivation 
for hold-ups since as an actor in a regulated, natural 
monopoly he is able to pass on any burdens to his 
customers29. The German EEG creates just the opposite 
                                                           
28 Deregulation has suspended most of the spatial monopolies. Thus 
electricity suppliers and electricity generators are free to erect and 
operate power plants in any place. Thus, the argument brought 
forward here is based on the historical development of power plant 
placing rather than on still existing spatial monopolies. 
29 This prescinds from potential hold-ups, which the regulator may 
impose on the grid-operator by e.g. lowering regulated grid-tariffs. 
However, regulatory supervision of grid-tariffs is generally viewed 
as having been weak so far. In Germany, electricity grids are owned 
and operated by large integrated utilities. Unbundling is only re-
distribution of the incentive quality: the regulation 
itself and resulting transaction relations ex-ante are 
featured by low-powered incentives whereas higher-
powered incentives are in place ex-post (see Table 1).  
The Role of the State 
In both regulations, the state in its role as legislator and 
regulator is a potential source for hold-ups. Phasing out 
the obligation would effectively appropriate quasi-rents 
accruing from power plants in both systems. While in 
the German EEG it is clearly the RES generator who 
will be ousted this way, within the Texan regulation it 
very much depends on the individual contracts between 
the generator and the electricity supplier who of these 
two parties will bear this risk. As far as documented by 
the two published standard contracts30 representing the 
basis of this analysis of the Texan RPS, the obliged 
electricity supplier is not able to transfer his risk of 
appropriation by the state towards the generator. Still, 
contract terms which do not cover the entire usual 
economic life-time of a power plant are a way to shift 
parts of the risk of appropriation towards the generator. 
Yet, contract terms found in existing contracts exceed 
at least ten years and amount up to 25 years thus al-
most entirely excluding any risk for the generator 
caused by a phase-out of the regulation. 
Due to the specific design of the EEG, the German 
legislator’s possibility to appropriate quasi-rents is 
limited to power plants in construction but yet not 
commissioned. Beyond phasing out, regulators might 
chose to alter only parts of the regulation. In the Ger-
man regulation, additional technologies might be in-
curred to be eligible for regulated remuneration, remu-
nerations might be lowered for certain technologies or 
technologies already considered in the regulation might 
be differentiated to a higher degree. Again, this would 
apply only to new plants. Safeguards against 
appropriation by the state are delivered in three 
different interdependent means. First, the EEG as a 
regulation constitutes safeguards by fixing for example 
the remuneration for 20 years, or the terms when 
remuneration levels may be altered. Second, the 
“protection of legitimate expectations” through the 
German constitution provides a safeguard against a 
sudden phase-out of the regulation. Third, juridical 
decisions have enforced protection of legitimate 
expectations in the past. Thus all three restraints 
necessary for a satisfactory performance of a regulated 
industry (Levy, Spiller 1994,202) are in place. Also 
investments in plants not in operation are protected by 
provisions in the regulation as well as by constitutional 
rules against appropriation even though the protection 
is not as comprehensive as with generating plants. 
This is different in the Texan regulation. Ending the 
obligation would result in an immediate appropriation 
of quasi-rents both from existing plants as well as from 
                                                                                          
quired in accounts. Therefore, grid-operators might act as agents for 
certain electricity suppliers. They are indirectly motivated to hinder 
any form of additional electricity generation including that of RES 
electricity under the EEG. 
30 SWPSC 2000, TXU 2000 
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plants in construction. As long as a homogeneous 
quota, i.e. a single requirement for all RES technolo-
gies, is maintained, any reduction of the total level of 
the obligation in terms of MW, any suspension of the 
required amounts and/or any alteration of the RES 
technologies to be favoured will result in lower prices 
thus an appropriation. Thereby, the alteration of RES 
technologies eligible for the RPS has two effects. In 
case certain technologies are excluded, the specific 
investments in these technologies will be devaluated. 
At the same time, ceteris paribus the value of the other 
technologies will be increased. Incorporating addi-
tional technologies will have the opposite effect. The 
new technology will gain value, the others will be 
devaluated. Whereas the direction of effects from any 
kind of alteration is clear it is uncertain to which extent 
quasi-rents from specific investments will decrease 
since it is the market which decides on the equilibrium 
prices and amounts. Thus, there is high uncertainty 
incorporated with any decision on an alteration of RPS 
regulations. 
Table 2. Comparison of coverage of protection against 
appropriation of quasi-rents by the state on different 
institutional levels. 
 Private  
Contract 
Regulation Constitution 
German 
EEG 
Secondary 
duties 
• Individual 
price and 
amount 
• Term of 
remuneration 
• Alteration of 
prices 
Protection of 
legitimate 
expectations 
Texan 
RPS 
• Individual 
price and 
amount 
• Term of 
remuneration 
• Total amount 
• Term of 
obligation 
• Alteration of 
obligation 
Recovery 
mechanisms 
 
Within the deregulation of the electricity industry in 
Texas, comprehensive regulations have been estab-
lished on stranded investments31. These rules basically 
allow investors to recover costs due to investments 
which were undertaken under a regulated framework 
but which are now stranded because of deregulations. 
This applies especially to nuclear power plants. A 
‘Competition Transition Charge’ was established to 
finance the extra costs from this cost recovery. Albeit 
under the Texan RPS, these rules are not applicable to 
specific investment, their existence raise expectations 
on the treatment of substantive appropriation of spe-
cific investments the latter nothing else then stranded 
costs by definition. Investors in power plants may 
expect similar cost recovery mechanisms as the ones 
now established, in case changes of regulations would 
devaluate substantially their investment. 
                                                           
31 § 39.251 - § 39.265 Texan Public Utility Regulation Act (PURA) 
called ‘subchapter F: Recovery of Stranded Costs trough Competi-
tion Transition Charge’. 
Conclusion 
Transaction Cost Economics sees two generic alterna-
tives to reduce risks from hold-ups: Contracts are a 
feasible choice as long as they can be sufficiently com-
plete to ward off the main risks. If this is not the case 
transaction partners are likely to be integrated. With 
the state as a player a third alternative comes into play: 
regulation (Williamson 2000).  
The possible design of this different means varies in 
practise over a broad range. Under the German EEG, 
as well as under the Texan RPS sufficient means may 
be developed to limit the threat of hold-ups. The spe-
cific investment into power plants can be sufficiently 
safeguarded against the threat of hold-ups. Thus, these 
hold-ups do not create insurmountable barriers for the 
introduction of RES in either of the two support 
scheme analysed. Yet, rather different means have 
been established to govern the transactions in both 
states. Hence, different parties have the opportunity to 
hold-up due to the different design of the support 
mechanism. 
Within the Texan RPS, generators have strong incen-
tives to reduce generation costs ex-ante. After entering 
a long-term contract, these incentives are weakening 
by specific propositions. In contrast to that, the degree 
of generator’s incentive to decrease generation costs 
stays the same ex-ante and ex-post in the German EEG. 
Thus, albeit competition within an RPS provides 
probably more incentives ex-ante, incentives ex-post 
may be larger within an MPS. Efficiency gains of an 
RPS compared to a MPS are therefore smaller as eco-
nomic theory would suggest. 
Thus, if a successful32 MPS regulation has been es-
tablished in a certain country the benefits of enhanced 
competition are very likely to be smaller than the risks 
associated with an introduction of an RPS. 
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Abstract. In this paper we study regulatory and institutional 
innovations required for an accelerated market diffusion of 
new renewable energy technologies. The main focus is on the 
situation in Europe. The paper argues that the existence of 
incentive-based promotion schemes is just one of several of 
the necessary conditions that must be fulfilled in order to 
allow renewables to penetrate the energy system in the politi-
cally desired intensity. The main conclusion drawn from the 
analysis is that in order to successfully initiate and perpetuate 
the market diffusion of renewables, in most cases it will be 
useful to identify and tackle the most important latent drivers 
and obstacles involved jointly and in a systemic and actor-
oriented approach. 
Introduction 
New renewable energy technologies (RETs) are an 
important element for the long term transition towards 
a more sustainable energy system, and a more sustain-
able society and economy. Over the last decade, de-
spite a still very low average contribution to overall 
energy supply in most countries (which at the global 
scale still relies to 80% on fossil fuels today; 
UNDP/UNDESA/WEC 2000), several of these tech-
nologies have experienced double-digit growth rates in 
market diffusion in some European countries (e.g. 
Kaltschmitt et al. 2002; Johnson & Jacobsson 2000), 
and making substantial progress along the learning 
curve (e.g. Isoard & Soria 2001; Nitsch, 1999; Neij 
1997). 
The diffusion of many new renewable energy tech-
nologies has begun in the 1980s or 1990s, starting with 
the use of methane from landfills and waste water 
treatment plants, the passive and active use of thermal 
solar energy, the re-vitalisation of small hydro power, 
the first automation of wood-fired boilers and ovens, as 
well as with bio-diesel and ethanol from biomass as 
vehicle fuels. In terms of capacity installed, wind 
power and solar collector systems have been particu-
larly successful in some European countries and in 
Asia in the 1990s and received much attention; they 
can, therefore, serve as models for the increased utili-
zation of other RETs. Especially wind power presently 
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exhibits an enormous growth potential, as most of the 
material problems concerning the rotor which were 
most crucial in the past century (Heymann 1996) have 
been solved by now. This was an important precondi-
tion for a successful scaling-up of capacity, so that 
today learning effects and economies of scale and 
scope are becoming major drivers (Gipe 1995; Isoard 
& Soria 2001; Johnson & Jacobsson 2001), also with 
regard to exports (Jochem et al. 2002). 
Energy policy-makers and the related administrative 
bodies often focus their efforts primarily on R&D 
funding and the provision of financial incentives for 
the investment or operation of RETs (e.g. capital 
and/or operating & maintenance cost subsidies).The 
many additional factors that are potentially relevant for 
the diffusion of innovative RETs and for the various 
actors supporting the diffusion process are typically 
much less well understood and considered in policy 
design. 
Incentive-based regulatory promotion schemes, typi-
cally in the form of guaranteed feed-in tariff systems, 
quota-based tradable certificate systems, and bidding 
systems, have been intensively studied in recent years 
(e.g. Madlener & Drillisch 2002; Menanteau et al. 
2001; Espey 2001; Morthorst 2000; among many oth-
ers) and are meanwhile in place in most of the EU 
Member Countries. They are presently considered as 
key to increase the market penetration of renewables, 
as foreseen, for example, in the 
• 1997 EC White Paper “Energy for the Future” 
(CEC 1997), which calls for a doubling of the 
share of renewables from 6 to 12% in overall gross 
inland energy consumption by 2010, and the re-
cently signed 
• EU Directive 2001/77/EC on the promotion of 
electricity from renewables (CEC 2001), which 
contains indicative target shares for renewables for 
each of the EC member countries until 2010. 
Both documents clearly signal the willingness of the 
European Union and its member states to set and pur-
sue ambitious steps to raise the contribution made by 
RETs in the energy supply system. Given the political 
challenges implied by these targets (and related sub-
targets and efforts), and the momentum created at 
various levels, it becomes crucial to study the effec-
tiveness both of existing and planned future policies 
and of the institutional frameworks in the EU and its 
Member Countries in influencing the speed of diffu-
sion of particular renewable energy technologies. 
Recently, several researchers have made attempts to 
design system-based analytical frameworks to address 
the diffusion of renewable energy technologies (e.g. 
Fuchs & Arentsen 2002; Painuly 2001; Jacobsson & 
Johnson 2000; Loiter & Norberg-Bohm 1999; Roos et 
al. 1999). The goal of this rather exploratory paper is to 
add to this body of literature by studying the diffusion 
of innovation process in a broader interdisciplinary 
context of actors, their networks, and institutional 
settings, applying the concepts of barriers and latent 
drivers. Based on this analysis, policy instruments and 
measures of involved actors are discussed in their abil-
ity to stimulate technological progress and further 
market penetration of renewable energy technologies. 
Particularly, we address the regulatory and institu-
tional innovations needed for an increased diffusion of 
RETs by focusing on six aspects: (a) cost reduction 
potentials of new RETs; (b) know-how of the actors 
involved (e.g. investors, planners, architects, bankers, 
installers); (c) risk perception, lack of experience; (d) 
legal framework conditions; (e) technology competi-
tion; and (f) resistance of existing market players. We 
discuss these aspects by choosing illustrative examples 
for selected RETs in EU Member Countries, which can 
help to better understand the problems, possible reme-
dies, and chances incurred. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: 
we will first shed some light on the role of barriers and 
latent drivers for the diffusion of renewable energy 
technologies. Second, we introduce factors influencing 
the diffusion rate of innovations from the diffusion 
theory literature. Third, for the six aspects (a)-(f) men-
tioned above, we analyse the policy actions needed to 
induce regulatory and institutional innovations, giving 
particular attention to actor- and network-related policy 
instruments that can help to foster the diffusion of 
RETs, followed by the conclusions drawn from the 
analysis. 
Barriers and latent drivers 
The diffusion of RETs crucially depends on existing 
barriers and (latent) drivers. Barriers include market, 
network and institutional failures, such as 
• Lack of technological knowledge and market 
survey of relevant actors (e.g. installers, planners, 
architects, potential investors) and their profes-
sional associations; 
• Lack of financial flexibility of small businesses, 
newly founded companies, and home owners, as 
RETs are typically considerably more capital-
intensive, compared to traditional energy conver-
sion technologies; 
• Legal and administrative obstacles; such as re-
gional construction ordinances, traditional deci-
sion making or distrust of officials of local or re-
gional authorities against new technologies; 
• Price distortions (external costs of traditional heat 
and electricity generating systems not taken into 
account, such as environmental pollution along the 
energy chain, uncovered risks of major accidents 
etc.), or 
• Market power abuse of early entrants for the case 
of grid-based energies, such as large or local elec-
tricity, gas or district heat utilities, e.g. by offering 
very low feed-in tariffs or by asking for extremely 
high safety and measurement investments at the 
interconnection point, and/or high prices for re-
maining energy deliveries or maintenance power. 
For a further discussion of barriers for the long-term 
integration of RETs in Europe see for example Hoh-
meyer et al. (1998: esp. Chapters 4 and 5). Most impor-
tant here is the observation that several of the men-
tioned barriers exist simultaneously, forming a com-
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plex which may have to be alleviated by a bundle of 
synchronised parallel policy measures (see Figure 1 
and 2). Figure 1 illustrates this aspect of timing as a 
crucial factor faced by policy-makers trying to reduce 
barriers, and to activate latent drivers for an accelerated 
market diffusion of renewable energy technologies. 
 
time
barrier,
market
imperfection
latent driver
degree
of
market
diffusion
bundle of policy measures: e.g.
• professional training, demonstration plants
• changes of legal framework
• subsidies for market penetration 
Legal framework
market diffusion
lack of know how of 
actors
lack of experience
potential of cost reductions 
by learning and economies of 
scale
 
Source: own illustration 
Fig. 1.  Timing and intensity of barriers and of latent 
drivers as challenges for a policy to accelerate market 
diffusion of renewable energy technologies 
Figure 2, taken from the Third Assessment Report 
(TAR) of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC 2001) and adapted for RETs, provides 
some examples of barriers at the various RET potential 
levels, together with examples of measures to over-
come these barriers. In our opinion, this kind of 
graphical representation can provide highly useful 
hints for interdisciplinary and systematic discussions 
on which and how certain barriers can hinder the ex-
ploitation of the various RET potentials over time and 
how they can be successfully tackled. 
There has been much attention to barriers and market 
imperfections in the last two decades, representing a 
rather mechanistic concept of innovation and technol-
ogy diffusion. So far, however, rather little attention 
has been dedicated to latent drivers being able to pro-
mote the diffusion of renewables (Jochem et al. 2000; 
Rennings 2000); such drivers may include the 
• cost reduction potentials gained by learning effects 
and economies of scale and scope (both in equip-
ment manufacturing and use),  
• readiness of associations of technology suppliers, 
installers, contracting companies and energy users 
to undertake marketing, professional training and 
procurement programmes, possibly additionally 
supported by environmental groups or home sav-
ings banks, or the 
• internalisation of the externalities of fossil fuel 
use, accepted maybe even voluntarily by some in-
vestors in the residential, business or public sector, 
creating a policy climate in administration and 
policy-making that allows to develop the accep-
tance of a gradual introduction of energy taxes, 
emission certificates, or specific regulations or 
boundary conditions for the diffusion of renew-
ables in a liberalised energy market. 
 
 
Source: adapted from IPCC (2001), Fig. 5.1 
Fig. 2.  Barriers and different potential levels renew-
able energy utilization 
Factors influencing the rate of diffusion of in-
novations 
The term ‘diffusion of innovation’ refers to the process 
by which an innovation is communicated through cer-
tain channels over time among the members of a social 
system (see Rogers 1995: Ch.1; Dosi 1982). In diffu-
sion theory, one may distinguish between the following 
factors that influence the rate of diffusion of innova-
tions (Rogers 1995: Ch.6): 
• Perceived attributes (relative advantage, compati-
bility, complexity, trialability, observability); 
• Type of innovation decision (optional, collective, 
authoritative); 
• Communication channel/s used; 
• Nature of social system; 
• Extent of change agents’ efforts. 
Given the large range of influencing factors, RET 
technologies, applications, and types of adopters, it is 
obvious that there is no such thing as a simple recipe 
for the successful promotion of RET diffusion. Be-
sides, in the past especially change agents have often 
overemphasized adoption per se, neglecting possible 
undesirable consequences of innovation diffusions, 
which calls for a considerate, careful, and sufficiently 
foreward-looking approach. 
Regulatory and institutional innovations nee-
ded and policy actions recommended 
In this section we discuss, for the six selected aspects 
mentioned earlier, problems and solutions in the con-
text of RET diffusion, and the public policy action 
needed to foster regulatory and institutional innovation 
for the promotion of RETs. 
RET potential 
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(a) Cost reduction potentials of new RETs 
Experience, e.g. gained from the wind power industry, 
has taught that a promising RET strategy seems to be 
the following (Haier 1998): Start with small production 
levels and relatively high R&D costs per unit pro-
duced. Second, increase conversion efficiencies, mate-
rial efficiencies, and labour productivities. Third, scale 
up product capacities. Fourth, exploit cost degression 
potentials by economies of scale (automated produc-
tion) and scope (system integration), which can be 
expected to be significant (see Figure 3). 
 
 
Source: Nitsch (1999) 
Fig. 3.  Experience curves for selected energy tech-
nologies 
Feed-in laws for electricity fed into the grid, like in 
Germany, Spain and France, demonstrate the necessity 
that policy-makers establish stable boundary conditions 
for the creation of an investor-friendly climate in the 
market for new renewable energy technologies and 
services, so that the cost reduction potentials can actu-
ally be successfully exploited. 
(b) Know-how of actors 
New technologies and the related know-how have to be 
absorbed by all relevant actors involved: 
• new groups of investors (e.g. home-owners, farm-
ers, new SMEs) need information and education; 
• change agents (e.g. traditional planners, architects) 
need professional training and education; 
• traditional installers need to know how to integrate 
new systems and how to deal with the new profes-
sional environment (work on roofs, at farms, etc.); 
• new and traditional finance bodies (e.g. develop-
ment companies, venture capital financiers, con-
tractors) are in need for technical consulting ser-
vices. 
Depending on the stage of the adoption process and 
the type of potential adopter(s) involved, word-of-
mouth information (close to the decision) or mass 
communication channels (first information, raising 
awareness) are more appropriate (see Rogers 1995) for 
a successful diffusion of innovations. 
Therefore, policy-makers should carefully think 
about the most appropriate communication channels, 
and put their emphasis on group-specific information, 
professional training, changes in education, and techni-
cal consulting for finance market actors (e.g. banks). 
An interesting example for a successful training project 
in sustainable energy technologies provides the 
VOCATIONES project within the Leonardo da Vinci 
programme of the European Union undertaken in Ro-
mania (Fara et al. 2002). 
(c) Risk perception, lack of experience 
Many RETs are linked to some kind of supply- and/or 
demand-side disadvantage of intermittent production. 
Modern control technologies and intelligent system 
combinations can alleviate this problem, but back-up 
capacities for electricity and/or heat supply in times of 
low production output may still be required. 
Another risk factor is the often to a large extent still 
unknown performance of the technology involved, e.g. 
• Operational performance under unfavourable con-
ditions; (e.g. off shore wind turbine parks); 
• Health and safety aspects (e.g. occupational acci-
dents); 
• Uncertainty about market size and price develop-
ments, often aggravated through unstable bound-
ary conditions of energy policies; 
• Unknown costs of maintenance; 
• rRsks from starting too big / neglect of scaling up 
(e.g. the German 3 MW wind turbine GROWIAN 
failed mainly because some components still had 
severe weaknesses, while at the same time smaller 
Danish wind turbines had already proven their re-
liability in practical use; Gipe 1995; Heymann 
1996; Johnson & Jacobsson 2001). 
Finally, also the risk perception both of the public 
and of funding institutions are crucial (Johns & Bouillé 
2002; Wohlgemuth & Madlener 2000). 
" Policy-makers should therefore take into account 
that renewable energy policies may have a strong in-
fluence on the risk premiums asked for by investors, 
creating repercussions on the financing structure of 
renewables projects. A much better understanding on 
how policy design may affect project development and 
financing processes is needed, and financial assistance 
programmes for the promotion of RETs need to be 
predictable and stable over some time in order to sup-
port the attraction and confidence of investors and 
intermediaries in the new market. 
(d) Legal framework conditions 
Adequate legal framework conditions are an important 
prerequisite for a successful penetration of new RETs 
(e.g. building codes, planning procedures, financial 
support schemes, fair grid access, break-up of techno-
logical “lock-in” situations by allowing for the forma-
tion of niche markets). 
Sometimes, especially in the course of market liber-
alisation, adaptations to the legal framework have been 
lagging behind in order to conserve existing structures 
as long as possible (such as in France in the case of the 
electricity market opening), or they bear more inertia 
for a transparent and fair grid use pricing than others 
(an example is the negotiated third-party-access regula-
tion in Germany, as compared to the regulated TPA in 
all other EU member countries). 
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A second important aspect is the credibility and con-
tinuity of renewable energy promotion targets. The 
European White Paper COM(97)599 (CEC 1997), the 
Campaign for Action (CEC 1999), the Directive for the 
promotion of renewables (CEC 2001), and other im-
portant documents at the European level have been 
able to send consistent and strong signals in this direc-
tion. 
Similarly, the Renewable Energy Act in Germany 
(EEG 2000), despite its turbulent birth, has maintained 
an active and rather stable market environment, and 
currently serves as a model for many other European 
countries. In contrast, renewable energy promotion in 
Austria has been very heterogeneous across the nine 
federal provinces, and has been subject to frequent and 
not always predictable adaptations in recent years, and 
is only currently in the process of being streamlined in 
a Renewable Energy Act (Ökostromgesetz 2002). 
Finally, changes in governments, such as recently 
experienced in Denmark, can lead to sudden changes in 
policy; such changes are less likely if policies are 
based on parliamentary (and ideally unanimous) con-
sent among the political parties and/or enshrined in 
laws. 
" Hence policy-makers should make better use of 
the virtues of credible policy announcements that im-
prove the investment climate and overall RET market 
attraction (“announcement effect”). 
(e) Technology competition with traditional technolo-
gies and partially among other new RETs 
New RETs may pose a challenge and a threat to tradi-
tional technologies that can lead to significant (and 
often unanticipated) further improvements of the latter. 
An example provides the diffusion of electric heat 
pumps in Germany in the early 1980s, which induced 
technical progress in burners, condensing boilers, con-
trol techniques, and insulation of boilers, which in turn 
significantly slowed down the penetration of heat 
pumps throughout the 1980s and early 1990s (see Fig-
ure 4). 
In two seminal articles, Arthur (1989) and David 
(1986) have shown that technologies being less effi-
cient than others may nonetheless become “locked-in” 
over time, mainly because of increasing returns that 
accrue from positive network externalities. Ways to 
escape such lock-in situations, which currently consti-
tute a major barrier for new RETs, include crises in an 
existing technology (e.g. nuclear accidents), re-
regulation, radical innovation changes in lifestyle and 
taste, and the emergence of niche markets (e.g. Cowan 
& Hultén 1996; Islas 1997; Menanteau 2000; Unruh 
2000, 2002). 
Diffusion of Electric Heat Pumps in Germany, 1977-90
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Fig. 4.  Diffusion of electric heat pumps in Germany, 
1977-1990 
In this context it is worth mentioning that the escape 
out of a technological lock-in situation does not neces-
sarily imply the creation of another lock-in, as it may 
also lead to an increase in diversity due to a further 
segmentation of the range of product/technology appli-
cations. The simultaneous spread of condensing boil-
ers, heat pumps and solar thermal collector systems in 
many European countries in this decade may illustrate 
this increased diversity. In order to ameliorate techno-
logical lock-in, it is important to continuously elimi-
nate existing market entry barriers. Quota-based trad-
able green certificate (TGC) schemes, for example, aim 
to achieve dynamic efficiency by fostering the market 
entry of new players. 
Consequently, in order not to grossly overestimate 
RET potentials, it is important that both policy-makers 
and market players calculate the market and innovation 
potentials for RETs also on the basis of the remaining 
potentials of the traditional and of the potentials of 
other competing RET technologies. Moreover, lock-in 
situations should be avoided by creating an open mar-
ket environment. 
(f) Resistance of existing market players and formation 
of new players 
• Actors 
The transition to a different energy supply system with 
a new technology mix requires the existence of strong 
actors, or groups of actors, who push innovative energy 
technologies forward and help to change regulations 
and institutions (Edquist 1997). Prime movers, such as 
multinational enterprises or networks of smaller actors, 
are key actors. In contrast to small single or non-
organised actors, they have the potency to raise large-
scale funding, to invest substantially (e.g. in R&D and 
marketing), to raise public and political awareness, and 
to diffuse new technologies (Johnson & Jacobsson 
2000: 636) to a critical mass level where their further 
penetration becomes self-propelled (in the innovation 
diffusion literature a market penetration of between 10-
25% of the saturation level is often considered suffi-
cient; cf. Rogers 1995: Ch.8). 
Installers, planners, architects and other important 
actors may not recommend systems they are not very 
familiar with. A good example is the diffusion of solar 
thermal heating systems in Austria, which was 
launched by DIY groups and only later adopted by 
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commercial actors (Ornetzeder 2001). Similarly, mod-
ern and often automated small-scale biomass heating 
systems suffered from the fact that installers preferred 
to install oil- and natural-gas-fired heating systems 
with which they were much more acquainted, and from 
unjustified image problems (e.g. regarding operating 
comfort, reliability, greenhouse gas and pollutant emis-
sion levels). 
Another group of actors that has seen the diffusion of 
RETs mainly as a threat are transmission and grid 
operators (Isoard & Soria 2001: 631). They have often 
tried to hinder the feed-in of electricity from (renew-
able and non-renewable) distributed generation plants 
by charging excessive grid-use tariffs or by asking for 
expensive safety and measurement investments. 
• Networks of actors and institutions 
Existing energy market players often have strong and 
long-established associations that resist change. In 
some countries, such as Germany, industrial associa-
tions continue to play an important political role (e.g. 
in the set-up of the agreement of negotiated access of 
small generators and related grid-use tariffs).  
Likewise, it is important for renewable energy actors 
to form associations (e.g. many national wind power 
associations are very powerful and influencial in 
lobbying). However, associations for different 
renewable energy technologies do not always manage 
to effectively co-operate against competing non-
renewable energy technologies, and tend to only lobby 
for their own technology (instead of simultaneously 
lobbying for complementary RETs and efficient energy 
use as well in order  to achieve a greater overall impact 
on the transition of the energy system towards more 
sustainability). 
Consequently, the requested structures for a success-
ful and actor- and network-related promotion policy for 
the diffusion of new RETs comprise 
• Political support by members of parliament,  ad-
ministration, and others (e.g. for setting appropri-
ate boundary conditions in the liberalised energy 
markets); 
• Powerful associations that are initiated and subse-
quently supported either by proponents (such as 
EUROSOLAR) or technology producers and/or 
adopters (e.g. German Association Biogas, Ger-
man Federal Association of Wind Power, Euro-
pean Renewable Energies Federation – Eref, 
among many others); 
• Legitimisation and support by consumer associa-
tions (information, consulting, joint procurement 
initiatives); 
• Promotion of R&D networks (e.g. by means of EC 
research funding) and competence centres (e.g. 
RENET-Austria in Guessing for energy from bio-
mass; European Joint Study Centres); 
• Professional training of supply-side actors, such as 
planners, architects, installers, bankers (e.g. by in-
volving them in the set-up and running of pilot 
and/or demonstration plants); 
• Education of the demand-side actors (potential 
adopters), and more generally the public. 
Conclusions 
In this paper we have studied regulatory and institu-
tional innovations that help to foster the diffusion of 
renewable energy technologies. 
The transition to an energy system that is more reli-
ant on renewable energy sources implies a higher di-
versity of supply. It rests upon the simultaneous dis-
mantling of barriers and activation of latent drivers, 
and in particular the existence of powerful actors, the 
establishing of institutions and well-designed net-
works, and the build-up of competence. 
Finally, the analysis has shown that the long-term 
transition to sustainable energy systems needs a holis-
tic policy strategy, i.e. 
• The simultaneous activation of latent drivers and a 
reduction/elimination of existing barriers; 
• Adequate boundary conditions in liberalised mar-
kets, clear and continuous signals of prices and ob-
jectives (e.g. cost reductions); 
• Clear information about cost and emission reduc-
tion potentials of traditional technical alternatives; 
• Well-informed and well-educated investors, plan-
ners, installers, maintenance staff etc. 
• Strong associations of technology producers and 
users for quick collection and exchange of experi-
ence, quality control, information and professional 
training, marketing and lobbying (build-up of 
competence). 
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Abstract. A tradable green certificate (TGC) system is a 
recently introduced instrument at the energy and environ-
mental policy scene for supporting the development of new 
renewable technologies. It has within recent years gained 
much interest in Europe and elsewhere and a number of 
countries already have or are in the preparation phase of 
introducing a TGC-system. But between the EU member 
states opinions differ on the usability of this system, e.g. 
Germany and France have decided to stick to the well-tried 
feed-in tariff system for supporting renewable technologies. 
And although a number of projects have been carried out on 
the subject, how a TGC-market will function, both on its own 
and interacting with other policy instruments and markets is 
still not a trivial matter. This paper tries to survey some of 
the advantages and disadvantages of the green certificate 
system. 
Introduction 
Recently renewable energy technologies have gained 
much interest as some of the more promising options 
for attaining a sustainable energy development. This is 
reflected in the EU-Commission’s White Paper on a 
strategy for developing renewable energy technologies 
where the Commission has launched a goal of covering 
by renewable energy supplies 12% of the European 
Union’s gross inland energy consumption by 2010. 
These supplies would be mainly biomass, hydropower, 
wind energy and solar energy. Next to biomass, wind 
energy is foreseen to be the main future contributor 
(European Commission, 1997)35. In line with this the 
European Commission (European Commission, 2000) 
has launched a directive on the promotion of renewable 
energy technologies for power production (RES-E). 
This includes a proposal on the share of RES-E in the 
individual member states in 2010, based on the per-
centage of each country’s consumption of electricity. 
Although not binding by now it seems that these tar-
gets are accepted by the EU member states. 
To reach these targets for RES-E deployment a num-
ber of different policy instruments are on hand. Among 
the highly relevant ones is the establishment of a mar-
ket for tradable green certificates (TGCs), which 
within the past few years have gained an extensive 
interest in Europe and elsewhere. Markets based on 
green certificates or equivalent instruments are already 
established a number of places, among these Australia, 
Holland, England, Italy and Texas. Other countries are 
                                                           
35 The 12% target includes large-scale hydro, for which the potential 
for further exploration in the EU is very limited for environmental 
reasons.  
in the preparation phase. Sweden and Belgium (Flan-
ders) are moving fast towards certificate-schemes, 
while although an early mover the Danish Parliament 
has postponed the introduction in Denmark until 2004-
5. Until now TGC-markets are only established as 
national ones, but the above-mentioned indicative EU-
targets for renewable deployment could be a fine start-
ing point for the development of an international TGC-
market, including a number of EU member states. 
The TGC-market is a new instrument that has been 
introduced at the energy and environmental policy 
scene and how this market will function, both on its 
own and interacting with other policy instruments and 
markets is not a trivial matter. Although not aiming at 
fulfilling all needs, this paper outlines some of the 
advantages and disadvantages of introducing a tradable 
green certificate system for supporting the develop-
ment of new renewable technologies. 
The green certificate market 
In the following the main characteristics of a tradable 
green certificate system will be described. The descrip-
tion here is partly related to an existing Danish pro-
posal and the TGC-system is expected to be in opera-
tion in Denmark in 2004-5. Of course, other designs of 
TGC-markets than the one described here do exist but 
their main characteristics are all pretty much in line. 
For more detailed information on TGCs see 
(Morthorst, 2000). 
At present almost no renewable energy technologies 
on their own can economically compete with conven-
tional energy producing ones. The idea of a TGC-
approach is to use market forces to determine the nec-
essary additional payment to investors in renewable 
plants. Thus, the payments to owners of renewable 
plants will consist of two parts: one part from the sale 
of the electricity produced to the spot market and one 
from the sale of green certificates. The two parts will 
be traded at two separate markets and thus the financial 
certificate market in principle will be totally separated 
from the physical electricity market.  
The Danish proposal is connected to renewable tech-
nologies producing electricity (Ministry of Environ-
ment and Energy, 1999).  
• All consumers of electricity in Denmark are 
obliged to buy a certain share of electricity gener-
ated by renewable energy technologies. A major 
part of this will be covered by the electricity dis-
tribution companies, which will buy the green 
electricity on behalf of their consumers. Large 
companies (or other consumers) trading directly 
with power suppliers will have to cover an equiva-
lent share of their consumption with green electric-
ity 
• All renewable energy technologies, including wind 
power, biomass and biogas plants, photovoltaics, 
geothermal and small hydro plants, will be certi-
fied for producing green electricity. The owners 
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will get a green certificate per unit of electricity 
produced (per MWh). This certificate can be sold 
to distribution companies or other electricity con-
sumers, who will be obliged to cover a certain 
share of their electricity consumption. 
Thus there will be a demand for green certificates by 
distribution companies and other consumers, who will 
have to cover their share on an annual basis. The En-
ergy Authorities will determine this share, presumably 
for a number of years in advance. At the end of each 
year a volume of TGCs corresponding to the quota will 
be withdrawn from the market by the authorities (Min-
istry of Environment and Energy, 1999). Originally a 
share of 20% of total electricity consumption was to be 
covered in Denmark by the end of 2003 (for all renew-
able technologies), but as mentioned above the intro-
duction of the TGC-market is postponed to 2004-5. 
Supply will be determined by the production of elec-
tricity from the above-mentioned renewable energy 
technologies. In 2001 approx. 16% of electricity pro-
duction in Denmark was supplied by wind power and 
1-2 % by other renewables.  
The green certificates will be supplied to the market 
partly by already existing renewable plants, that is 
plants established before the time-period considered, 
and partly by newly established ones. At the core of the 
certificate market approach is a regulated development 
of new renewable capacity. Thus it is important that 
the quota is set in such a way, that after subtracting the 
supply of certificates by existing renewable plants from 
the given quota, then it should be possible to cover the 
residual demand for certificates in the given time-
period by newly established capacity. The increases in 
quotas over time will have significant impacts upon the 
expected future price of certificates, which are of ut-
most importance for potential new investors in renew-
able capacity. 
The long run marginal cost of renewable produced 
electricity is the core in the long run supply of certifi-
cates, where the long run marginal cost is defined as 
the cost per unit of energy produced (per kWh) over 
the lifetime of the plant, taking into account all the 
relevant costing issues. Parameters paramount to the 
decision for establishing a new renewable plant include 
investment costs, O&M costs, the expected lifetime of 
the plant and its electricity production and, finally, an 
appropriate risk premium. The risk premium will to a 
certain extent depend on technological risk factors as 
the expected availability of the plant, but most impor-
tantly will be economic factors as the expected future 
development of the long term price for electricity at the 
spot market and the corresponding price of the green 
certificates. Thus for potentially new renewable plant 
owners not only the green certificate market will be 
relevant, the physical spot market for electricity will be 
important as well36. Price-determination at these two 
markets is expected to be closely interrelated. The 
potential wind turbine owners will have expectations to 
                                                           
36 According to the Danish electricity agreement all electricity has to 
be supplied to a power market, following a transition period this 
accounts for renewable energy technologies too. 
the total price paid for the energy produced, i.e. for the 
price of electricity at the spot market plus the price per 
kWh obtained at the green certificate market. Thus if 
the spot market price is low, this will increase expecta-
tions to the price of green certificates, while if the spot 
price is high a lower price of green certificates might 
be accepted. At the same time the given quotas will 
influence the future price of green certificates. If a 
rapid development of new renewable capacity is stated 
by the quotas, this will tend to rise the certificate-price 
– in a similar way a slow development of the quotas 
will tend to lower the certificate-price.  
The determination of the expected long run equilib-
rium price for the green certificates is shown in Fig. 1 
below.  
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Fig. 1: Price determination and the relation between 
long and short run in a green certificate market. 
The supply from existing renewable plants covers 
part of the predetermined demand for certificates (the 
quota) and those plants expected to be established in 
the previous period has to cover the residual part to 
fulfil the quota. The expected long run equilibrium 
price for the development of new renewable capacity 
(Pe) is determined by the intersection of the expected 
long run marginal cost curve for new capacity and the 
vertical demand line (the quota). As shown in Fig. 1 
this long run equilibrium price is split into a part cov-
ered by the spot market price of power and a residual 
part to be covered by the price of the green certificates. 
Pe is the starting point for the short run supply curve. If 
short-term conditions are in accordance with the ex-
pected long-term development, the short run price of 
certificates will be equal to the long run equilibrium 
price. But if short and long term conditions differ (e.g. 
if produced electricity by existing plants falls short of 
expected production, which will shift the short run 
supply curve inwards), the short run price of certifi-
cates will be different from the one given by the long 
run equilibrium.37 
A number of reasons might exist that the long-term 
equilibrium would not be fulfilled, among these most 
importantly that the amount of generated electricity 
would differ from the expected production. In that case 
the supply of certificates is determined by the short run 
supply curve, as shown in Fig. 1. The shape and slope 
                                                           
37 The short run supply curve in Fig. 1 is drawn given the assumption 
that the validity of certificates is eternal. If the validity is limited to 
e.g. one year, the curve would look much different. 
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of this supply curve will be determined by short run 
considerations, among these the suppliers willingness 
or aversions to risk, their individual economic situation 
and expectations to the size of the quota compared to 
the expected power production. Until now experiences 
with green certificate markets using the obligatory 
quota concept are limited and therefore it is difficult a 
priori to determine the shape of the short run supply 
curve.  
Advantages related to the introduction of a 
TGC-system 
A number of advantages and disadvantages are related 
to a TGC-system. In the following two sections some 
of these will shortly be described. 
In this section the pros of the green certificate system 
will be treated. Among these are the following: 
• Efficiency improvements of new renewable en-
ergy technologies will directly show up as lower 
TGC-prices and thus in a lower payment to the 
owners of renewable plants. 
• Compared to the feed-in tariff system a strong 
regulation of renewable capacity development is 
ensured. The feed-in system is a fixed price ap-
proach, where the market determines the volume 
(capacity). In the TGC-system this is turn upside 
down – the market determines the price while the 
volume is determined a priori. Thus it is much eas-
ier in a TGC-system to keep the burden of subsi-
dising renewable technologies within the expected 
limits. 
• In the former Danish feed-in system the Govern-
ment subsidised the development of renewable 
technologies. In 199838 more than 100 million € 
was paid out of the public budget to subsidies the 
development of wind turbines, only. In the TGC-
system this burden of subsidising renewables is 
put on the shoulders of the electricity consumers. 
Although not a specific characteristic of the TGC-
system this was one of the reasons for introducing 
a green certificate system in Denmark. 
• International trade in green certificates is an obvi-
ous possibility and therefore a TGC-system will 
encourage improving the siting of new renewable 
plants. 
Due to the strong connections between improved ef-
ficiencies of new renewable plants and the long run 
TGC-price, the TGC-market should in principle make 
itself redundant in the long term. To show how this 
influences the development of the TGC-price over time 
the results of an illustrative simulation with a TGC-
market model is shown in Fig. 2. 
The starting point for the simulation is the “no effi-
ciency improvement” case. In this case the simulation 
is adjusted39 to follow a path of almost constant TGC-
prices – the small ups and downs could be removed by 
a closer fine-tuning of the model, but has no influence 
                                                           
38 The feed-in system was brought to an end in 1999 in Denmark. 
39 By adjusting the TGC-quota. 
on the results. Observe that an upper and lower limit of 
the TGC-price is assumed as in the Danish TGC-
approach. If energy production efficiency improve-
ments of new renewable plants are assumed significant 
reductions in the TGC-prices show up as the result. An 
annual efficiency increase of 2% for new plants would 
as a result imply that the TGC-price would hit the 
lower limit after approx. 20 years40. If an efficiency 
improvement of 1% p.a. is combined with a 1% p.a. 
decrease in investment cost, the results would be 
slightly more positive, because investment costs are 
reduced up-front. In Denmark wind power is the domi-
nant renewable technology and for a number of years 
the production efficiency has increased by 3-4% annu-
ally. If this is to continue in the future wind power will 
need the support from the green certificate market for a 
fairly short number of years, only. 
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Fig. 2: Simulating TGC-price developments in cases 
with different technological development (different 
efficiency improvements) assuming an upper and a 
lower price limit. 
An important feature of the TGC-approach is the 
possibility of international trade in certificates. This 
will ensure a cost-effective siting of renewables and 
their development. The renewable technologies will be 
established in countries with the highest production 
potentials and where renewable energy can be pro-
duced at the least cost. Problems in fulfilling the na-
tional quotas will be handled by importing TGCs, 
while the surplus of certificates may be exported to 
countries with a shortage. This ensures that the national 
targets to develop renewable energy technologies are 
reached in the most cost-efficient way.  
The advantages of international trade in certificates 
are illustrated in Fig. 3 below. 
Two countries are illustrated in Fig. 3: country A and 
country B. For each country a quota for the develop-
ment of renewables is specified as shown in Fig. 3. 
According to the marginal production costs of develop-
ing new renewable capacity in the two countries, coun-
try A should develop its domestic renewables until 
point MCRPA, where the quota is covered, and corre-
spondingly country B until point MCRPB. But eco-
nomically both countries would benefit from develop-
                                                           
40 Assuming that no other barriers would restrict the renewable 
development. 
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ing the renewables until point MCRPT, a lower devel-
opment for country A and a higher for country B. Thus 
the national quotas for renewable development in both 
countries would be fulfilled by country B exporting T 
units of green certificates to country A. 
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Fig. 3: International trade in green certificates 
Of course, efficiency in siting new renewable plants 
will be achieved within the borders of an individual 
country as well, but the larger an area covered the more 
renewable development will benefit of a TGC-system. 
Disadvantages related to the introduction of a 
TGC-system 
Unfortunately a number of disadvantages are related to 
the introduction of a green certificate system as well. 
Among these can be mentioned: 
• Only the most economic competitive renewable 
technology is promoted by the TGC-system. 
• To be efficient the national TGC-market should 
have a certain minimum volume. In Denmark it 
worries that the Danish TGC-market would be 
fairly small especially in the transition phase, al-
though no thorough analysis are carried out on this 
subject by now. 
• Assuming as usual that no CO2-credits are at-
tached to the green certificates then an interna-
tional TGC-market will not fit well into an interna-
tional liberalised power market set-up. Those 
countries most ambitious in setting high TGC-
quotas will have to buy certificates from the less 
ambitious ones, although this only contributes to 
fulfilling a national target for renewable develop-
ment, not in reaching their national CO2-reduction 
targets. 
That only the most economic attractive renewable 
technologies are supported by the green certificate 
system is illustrated in Fig. 4 below for two renewable 
technologies – wind power and photovoltaics – assum-
ing that wind power is more economic competitive 
than photovoltaics. Observe that an upper and lower 
limit of the TGC-price is assumed in the figure.  
Price of
TGCs
Time
Wind
power
Mixed
Photovoltaics
Critical period
Minimums
price
Penalty price
 
Fig. 4: The TGC-market will only promote the most 
economic competitive technology. 
Within the support range given by the TGC-system 
wind power is the most profitable of the available 
renewable technologies and during a certain time-
period competition among wind projects equipped with 
still more efficient new turbines drive down the price 
of TGCs41. But at a point of time the limited number of 
available efficient sites increases the price of wind 
power again42, although wind power technology is still 
improving. The critical period shows up when almost 
all just reasonable profitable sites for wind turbines are 
utilised, but no new renewable technology is prepared 
to take over. Thus the TGC-system does not handle the 
development of new technologies in a broad sense. 
Alongside the introduction of a TGC-market specific 
support mechanisms for developing new non-profitable 
technologies are still needed. 
The reduction of greenhouse gas emissions is an im-
portant goal in the energy and environmental policies 
of the European Union and its member states. And 
according to the above-mentioned recent directive-
proposal from the EU commission, the inclusion of 
renewable technologies is one of the important ways to 
achieve this emission reduction. But how the TGC-
system interacts with other GHG-reducing policy in-
struments is not a trivial matter. In the following the 
results of a three-country model assuming an interna-
tional liberalised power market and a common TGC-
market for these countries will be used to illustrate how 
the two markets interact and how these markets will 
behave in relation to reaching national GHG reduction 
targets. Due to limited space only results are reported 
here – details are found in [Morthorst, 2002].  
The starting point for the analysis is a pre-TGC 
situation, where all three countries previously have 
engaged in the development of renewable technologies, 
but no TGC-market yet exists. This starting point is 
shown as the left column in Table 3, below. 
As shown in Table 3 all three countries previously 
have a renewable power production, which together 
with conventional fossil fuel based power production is 
expected to cover the total demand for power in the 
region. Country C has the highest production of renew-
able power (6.0 TWh), while country A has the lowest 
production of 4.0 TWh.  
                                                           
41 Assuming a constant spot market price for power. 
42 Or wind power development is stopped because no new sites are 
available. 
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Table 3. Introducing a TGC-market separately into a 
liberalised power market. 
 Pre-TGC Introducing a TGC-market   
Coun-
try 
Renewable 
power 
production 
Ren. Quota 
Increase in 
ren. power 
Increase in 
actual ren. 
production 
Achieved 
CO2 
reduction 
 TWh TWh TWh MT/a 
A 4.0 0.2 0.9 0.9 
B 5.0 0.3 0.8 0.7 
C 6.0 2.2 1.0 0.8 
Total 15 2.7 2.7 2.4 
 
Now, in common the three countries introduce an in-
ternational tradable green certificate market, assigning 
quotas to the domestic use of renewable power. Thus, 
as shown in Table 3 country C is most ambitious in its 
target setting for renewable development. Compared 
with the other countries the development of renewables 
is assumed to be fairly cheap in country C and there-
fore it increases its amount of renewable power by 2.2 
TWh (36%) to an expected total of 8.2 TWh. The two 
other countries are less ambitious increasing their re-
newable target by 5% and 6%, respectively. The in-
crease in TGC-quotas in the three countries signals a 
total increase in the amount of renewable produced 
electricity of 2.7 TWh or 18%. 
Now, in a TGC-market the total increase in renew-
able production is distributed across the three countries 
according to the marginal cost conditions of develop-
ing new renewable capacity. Assuming that the TGC-
quotas are fulfilled43 the introduction of the TGC-
market increases the renewable power production by 
2.7 TWh. Although country C has increased it’s target 
by 2.2 TWhs only 1.0 TWh is developed domestically. 
Although the development of renewables is fairly 
cheap in country C the residual part is more cost-
efficient developed in the other countries. Thus, coun-
try C will not reach its renewable target by domestic 
supplies alone, but will have to import certificates 
corresponding to 1.2 TWh (cf. Table 3). The fact that 
the most ambitious country cannot expect to fulfil its 
quota only by domestic renewable development is 
perfectly in accordance with the idea of an interna-
tional TGC-market. 
What happens at the spot market is illustrated in Fig. 
5. The supply of power from each of the three coun-
tries is shown at the horizontal axes, while the price is 
shown at the vertical axes. The increase in renewable 
power production shifts the supply curves for the three 
countries to the right – due to the low marginal cost of 
renewable production more power can now be supplied 
at the same price (P1). Because the need for power in 
the three countries has not changed the surplus of 
power depresses the price at the spot market and a new 
equilibrium equalising supply with demand is found at 
a lower price (P2). In this situation the conventional 
power production44 has decreased in all three countries; 
in total by the amount of 2.7 TWh, which was the 
increase in renewable power production.  
                                                           
43 Short-term considerations are not taken into account. 
44 The conventional power is decreased because it is the most ex-
pensive power at the spot market. 
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Fig. 5: The consequences at the spot market of intro-
ducing the TGC-market 
Thus due to market conditions the strong increase in 
the TGC-quota for renewable production in country C 
has as its implication a lower conventional power pro-
duction in all three countries. Observe that only the 
total increase in renewable production together with 
the marginal cost conditions at the spot market deter-
mines how the substitution of conventional power is 
split upon the three countries. How the total increase in 
renewable power production by itself is distributed 
upon the countries has no influence upon the realised 
substitution of conventional power, which depends 
totally on the marginal cost conditions at the spot mar-
ket.  
When conventional power is replaced by renewable 
energy emissions of CO2 are reduced. The emission-
reduction achieved will depend on the emission-
coefficients related to the replaced conventional power. 
As shown in Table 3 a total CO2-reduction of 2.4 MT 
is achieved, almost equally distributed upon the three 
countries. When emissions are related to the produc-
tion of conventional power, the same observation as for 
the substituted power goes for CO2-reductions: How 
the total increase in renewable power production by 
itself is distributed upon the countries has no influence 
upon the realised CO2-reduction in each of the coun-
tries. This is totally determined by the marginal cost 
conditions at the spot market and the marginal emis-
sion-coefficients of the substituted power.  
Thus, the main result of the ambitious renewable tar-
get setting in country C is that they have to share the 
achieved CO2-reduction with the less ambitious coun-
tries, as shown in Table 3. In addition country C will 
have to pay an extra cost for importing that part of the 
TGC-quota, that is not fulfilled by their own domesti-
cally produced renewable power. This cost is only 
related to achieving a national target for renewable 
development, while no additional national CO2-
reduction is gained.  
Thus, a separate introduction of an international 
green certificate system into a liberalised electricity 
market cannot be recommended, if the TGC-market is 
expected to contribute to achieving the national CO2-
reduction targets. But of course the development of 
renewable sources in general does contribute to overall 
European greenhouse gas reductions. 
The problem of renewable development not contrib-
uting in full in reaching a national GHG-reduction 
target is not limited to the use of a TGC-system. Actu-
ally the problem is exactly the same in an ordinary 
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planning system or in an approach based on feed-in 
tariffs. The problem is caused by the fact that a na-
tional emission reduction target does not go well to-
gether with a liberalised power market. Thus a general 
remedy has to be found. One solution is to introduce a 
tradable permits scheme as the one recently suggested 
by the European Commission. Therefore, it could be 
relevant to have a closer look at a combination of an 
international green certificate market and a tradable 
permits market introduced into a liberalised power 
market45.  
How the tradable permits scheme works in relation 
to a TGC-market is illustrated in Fig. 6 below.  
 
Power supply
Emissions
Renewable
Conventional
Quota
 
Fig. 6: The functioning of a tradable permits scheme in 
relation to a TGC-market. 
The total power supply is split into two parts: A con-
ventional part, based on fossil fuel fired plants, and a 
renewable part covered by the TGC-market. The emis-
sion of CO2 corresponds closely to the conventional 
produced power (cf. Fig. 6).  
The tradable permit (TEP) quota is introduced to 
lower emissions from the conventional power industry 
and for that reason the quota assigns a lower volume of 
emissions than previously experienced. The CO2-
reductions are carried out where it is least costly and 
trade in permits will ensure a cost-effective utilisation 
of CO2-reducing options within the power industry. 
What is important for the combined system of TGCs 
and TEPs is a close co-ordination of the use of these 
two instruments. The importance of this with regard to 
achieving CO2 reductions is illustrated in Fig. 7 below. 
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Fig. 7: A non co-ordinated development of the TGC-
market in relation to the tradable permits market. 
In Fig. 7 are shown the consequences of an non-co-
ordinated increase in the renewable power production 
                                                           
45 More details on this combined market set-up are given in 
(Morthorst, 2003). 
undertaken by an increased quota for renewable capac-
ity. Renewable power production takes on a higher 
share of total power supply, thereby decreasing con-
ventional power production. As the quota for tradable 
permits is kept at the previous level, this eases the 
situation for the conventional power industry: The 
TEP-quotas assign allowable emissions in relation to 
an expected level of power production. The increase in 
power production from renewables substitutes conven-
tional power production and although the power indus-
try has to produce less electricity, the emission quotas 
are unchanged. Thus, compared to the needed power 
relatively less CO2-reductions are required in the 
power industry.  
Thus when a TEP-quota is determined it has to take 
into account both the CO2-reduction possibilities and 
the required level of electricity production, thus the 
TGC- and TEP-quotas should be adjusted in a co-
ordinated manner. Otherwise the full value of the ex-
pected CO2-reductions will not be achieved. When the 
green power production is increased, the TEP-quota 
should be decreased correspondingly. Although this of 
course requires a strong co-ordination of policies it is a 
possible way to use the two instruments in combination 
in contributing to achieving national greenhouse gas 
reduction targets. 
Conclusions 
A TGC-scheme could be a relevant policy instrument 
for promoting the development of new renewable tech-
nologies. The advantages in introducing a TGC-system 
include a cost-efficient development of renewable 
technologies because improved production efficiency 
is directly reflected in the TGC-price. Moreover an 
efficient siting of the renewable plants are undertaken, 
especially if an international TGC-market is estab-
lished. 
Unfortunately the TGC-system does not handle all 
issues of relevance regarding the development of new 
renewable technologies. In a TGC-scheme only the 
most economic competitive renewable technology is 
supported, thus alongside the introduction of a TGC-
market specific support mechanisms for developing 
new non-profitable technologies are still needed.  
Finally, the development of renewables is foreseen – 
both by the member states and by the European Com-
mission – to play an important role in the reduction of 
greenhouse gas emissions. A main conclusion from 
this paper is that a separate introduction of an interna-
tional green certificate system into a liberalised elec-
tricity market cannot be recommended, if the TGC-
market is expected to contribute to achieving the na-
tional CO2-reduction targets:  
• Countries most ambitious in renewable target 
setting by increasing their TGC-quotas will only 
partly be gaining the CO2-reduction benefits them-
selves. How much they gain will totally be deter-
mined by the marginal conditions at the spot mar-
kets and the emission-coefficients of the replaced 
power. Thus, the ambitious countries support the 
less ambitious ones in achieving their GHG-
reduction targets. 
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• To fulfil their TGC-quotas the most ambitious 
countries will have to buy certificates from the less 
ambitious ones, although this only contributes to 
fulfilling a national target for renewable develop-
ment, not in reaching their national CO2-reduction 
targets. 
A remedy to this problem is found by introducing a 
combined system of a green certificate and a tradable 
permits market. This requires that the quotas of the two 
markets be adjusted in a co-ordinated manner: When 
the green power production is increased, the tradable 
permits quota should be decreased correspondingly. 
Otherwise the expected CO2-reductions will not con-
tribute by the full value in achieving the national tar-
gets for greenhouse gas reductions. Although this re-
quires a strong co-ordination of these policy instru-
ments it might show the necessary way forward if 
renewable technologies are to contribute significantly 
in achieving the national emission reduction targets.  
Finally, it should be pointed out, that the problem of 
gaining the full benefit of a national implementation of 
renewable power is not only related to green certificate 
markets, but is general in character if the country takes 
part in a liberalised power market. Those countries 
most ambitious in implementing renewables sources 
might see part of the expected CO2 benefit disappear-
ing to other less ambitious countries participating in 
the same power market. If the necessary co-ordination 
of measures is undertaken the introduction of a trad-
able permits scheme may be the solution in these cases 
as well.  
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Abstract: Incentive schemes for the development of renew-
able energy sources may focus on quantities – defining na-
tional targets and setting up bidding systems, or quota sys-
tems providing for green certificate trading – or they may 
focus on prices – feed-in tariffs. Whatever the system chosen, 
the role of the public authorities is quite specific: to stimulate 
technical progress and speed up the technological learning 
processes so that ultimately renewable energy technologies 
will be able to compete with conventional technologies, once 
the environmental costs have been internalised. A compari-
son of instruments must thus take into account the character-
istics of the innovation process and adoption conditions – 
uncertainties regarding cost curves, learning effects – which 
means also looking at dynamic efficiency criteria. The paper 
concludes that a system of feed-in tariffs is more efficient 
than a bidding system, but highlights the theoretical interest 
of green certificate trading which must be confirmed through 
practice, given the influence of market structures and rules on 
the performance of this type of approach. 
Introduction  
Renewable energies sources (RES) are receiving in-
creasing support from public authorities because of the 
environmental advantages they procure in comparison 
with conventional energy sources, particularly for 
controlling greenhouse gas emissions. With confirma-
tion of the risk of climate change (IPCC, 2000), incen-
tives to develop RES have been reinforced so that the 
greenhouse gas emissions reduction targets agreed to in 
the Kyoto Protocol can be achieved. The recent Euro-
pean Directive on renewable energies (EC, 2001), is an 
illustration of the new ambitious objectives assigned to 
RES.  
The possibility of achieving the targets at a lower 
cost, which has until now been a relatively secondary 
concern given that the objectives were limited, has now 
become a central issue, making it necessary to examine 
the efficiency of the instruments used to promote RES. 
These incentives frameworks are based typically on 
the same approaches as environmental policies: price-
based approaches for systems where electric utilities 
are obliged to purchase electricity from green power 
generators at feed-in tariffs, quantity-based approaches 
where the public authorities set an objective to be 
reached and organise competitive bidding processes, or 
where they impose quotas on electricity suppliers and 
set up a system of tradable green certificates. 
Our analysis will focus on renewable energy tech-
nologies used to generate electricity for the grid (RES-
E). Several electricity generation technologies are 
potentially concerned: micro-hydro, wind, bioelectric-
ity, photovoltaic solar, etc. These technologies have 
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reached different stages of maturity, and the type of 
support given to each must therefore be adapted 
(Christiansen, 2001). This paper examines only those 
policies designed to assist entry on the market of tech-
nologies that are nearly competitive with conventional 
technologies, such as biomass technologies and wind 
energy. The example of wind energy development will 
be used as the main reference for the analysis.  
Choice of instruments to foster the develop-
ment of RES-E 
An examination of the policies used in the European 
countries over the last twenty years to promote the 
development of RES-E shows that the instruments used 
are very similar to environmental policy instruments. 
They are all concerned with the question of efficiency 
in the prices versus quantities debate. 
Price-based or quantity-based approach:  
In addition to research and development (R&D), sup-
port schemes fall into three main categories that are 
either price-based or quantity-based in their approach: 
feed-in tariffs, which constitute the oldest and most 
widely used support system; bidding processes based 
on a fixed amount of renewable energy to be generated 
nationally and tradable green certificates schemes, 
where electricity suppliers are obliged to produce or 
distribute a certain quota of renewable energy. 
Feed-in tariffs 
The feed-in tariff scheme involves an obligation on the 
part of electric utilities to purchase the electricity pro-
duced by renewable energy producers in their service 
area at a tariff determined by the public authorities and 
guaranteed for a specified period of time (generally 
about 15 years).  
The feed-in tariff system operates as a subsidy allo-
cated to producers of renewable electricity. It works in 
the same way as a pollution tax does for firms that 
pollute. Take the example of wind energy: producers 
are encouraged to exploit all available generating sites 
until the marginal cost of producing wind power equal-
ises the proposed feed-in tariff Pin. The amount gener-
ated then corresponds to Qout (Fig. 1). Qout is not 
known a priori if the marginal cost curve for wind 
energy generation is not known, which is generally the 
case. 
All projects of course benefit from the tariff Pin, in-
cluding those whose marginal production costs are 
considerably lower than the proposed tariff. The differ-
ence in quality of the various sites leads to the attribu-
tion of a differential rent, to the advantage of those 
projects which have the lowest production costs. The 
overall cost of reaching the objective is given by the 
area Pin x Qout. 
The cost of subsidising producers of RES-E is cov-
ered either through cross-subsidies among all electric-
ity consumers (Spain, Italy) or simply by those cus-
tomers of the utility obliged to buy green electricity 
(Germany until 2000), or by the taxpayer, or a combi-
nation of both systems (Denmark) 46. Calling simply on 
customers of local companies to finance green power 
generation is considered unfair and mechanisms are 
therefore often adopted to share the burden more equi-
tably (cf. infra).  
QuantityQout
Pin
MC
O
Price 
Pout
Qin  
Fig. 1. Prices vs quantity-based approach 
Competitive bidding processes 
In the case of competitive bidding processes, the regu-
lator defines a reserved market for a given amount of 
RES-E and organises a competition between renewable 
producers to allocate this amount. Electric utilities are 
then obliged to purchase the electricity from the se-
lected power producers47.  
Competition focuses on the price per kWh proposed 
during the bidding process. Proposals are classified in 
increasing order of cost until the amount to be con-
tracted is reached. Each of the renewable energy gen-
erators selected is awarded a long term contract to 
supply electricity at the pay-as-bid price. The marginal 
cost Pout is the price paid for the last project selected 
which enables the quantity Qin to be reached (Fig 1). 
The implicit subsidies attributed to each generator 
correspond to the difference between the bid price and 
the wholesale market price.  
The competitive bidding procedure enables the mar-
ginal production costs of all the producers to be identi-
fied (ex post). The overall cost of reaching the target is 
given by the area situated under the marginal cost 
curve. The differential rent which, in a system of feed-
in tariffs, is paid to renewable energy generators, does 
not in this case have to be borne by consumers.  
Another difference between competitive bidding and 
feed-in tariffs is that the exact amount of renewable 
electricity concerned by the bids is in this case a priori 
known. On the other hand, since the precise shape of 
the cost curve is not known (ex ante), the marginal cost 
and the overall cost of reaching the target cannot be 
determined. 
Finally, the extra cost is financed in much the same 
way as in the previous case. It is either added to elec-
tricity bills in the form of a special levy (England), or 
                                                           
46 In Germany, the new tariffs for wind energy are 0.091 €/kWh 
during 5 years, after which the rate decreases depending on the site; 
in Denmark, the tariff is fixed at 85% of the domestic tariff supple-
mented by the reimbursement of the carbon tax.  
47 Competitive bidding systems have been used in the United King-
dom under the Non-Fossil Fuel Obligation (NFFO) set up in 1991 
and which concerned different renewable energy technologies. 
Similar schemes existed in France with the Eole 2005 program set up 
in 1996 to promote wind energy. 
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the cost is covered through cross-subsidisation among 
all electricity consumers (France).  
Green certificates 
In this type of scheme, a fixed quota of the electricity 
sold by operators on the market has to be generated 
from RES. Liable entities then have the possibility of 
generating the required amount of electricity them-
selves, purchasing through long term contracts from a 
specialised renewable energy producer, or purchasing 
certificates for specific amounts of green electricity 
from other operators (Berry, T. et al, 2001; Voogt, M. 
et al. 2000). 
The amount of green electricity to be generated is 
decided for the whole country, as in the case of bidding 
schemes, and is then divided among each of the opera-
tors (consumer, retailer, distributor or producer). Since 
operators do not all benefit from the same opportuni-
ties to develop renewable energy sources and thus have 
different marginal production cost curves, green cer-
tificates enable quotas to be allocated in an efficient 
way. Without such a flexibility mechanism, operators 
with identical obligations would incur different mar-
ginal costs, which would be a source of inefficiency. 
With a certificates system, the burden is shared effi-
ciently: marginal production costs are equalised among 
operators and specialised producers are encouraged to 
enter the market.  
As a result, the global target Qin attributed to the op-
erators is reached at the market price of the certificates 
Pout. Clearly the same results could be achieved without 
flexibility mechanisms by assigning different objec-
tives to each operator. But, in a situation where the 
public authority - and probably also the operators 
themselves - have only incomplete information, it is 
very difficult to allocate efficient quantities which 
would equalise marginal costs. Under the green certifi-
cate system, specific objectives (QA, QB, etc.) can be 
assigned to all the operators while at the same time 
minimising the overall cost of reaching the production 
target through equalisation of the marginal production 
costs. 
Asymmetry of price-based/quantity-based approaches 
in situation with imperfect information 
In the case of pollution control methods, when all the 
necessary information is available, price-based and 
quantity-based schemes produce very similar results. 
The administrative authority can fix the "price" in the 
case of the tax, or the "quantity" in the case of permits, 
so as to reach the same pollution control target. 
Price-based and quantity-based approaches are not 
equivalent in situation where information is incomplete 
(uncertainty). When the depollution cost curves are not 
known, the tax provides a certain control over the cost 
of measures to be used. However, it will not a priori 
provide an indication of the amount of pollution 
avoided, nor therefore of the overall cost of the pollu-
tion control measure.   
Similarly, a quantity-based approach will not enable 
the total cost of pollution control to be estimated since 
the marginal cost of the technical options to be used is 
not known. However, a quantity-based approach en-
sures direct control over the authorised amounts of 
pollution.  
In situation of incomplete information, the symmetry 
between the price-based and quantity-based approaches 
is not total. It is thus understandable that incentives 
based on feed-in tariffs have been criticised for their 
excessively high overall cost. If it is assumed that the 
wind energy cost curves are, at the present stage, rela-
tively flat48 it can be seen that a slight variation in the 
feed-in tariff proposed leads to substantial increase in 
the quantities produced from Q1 to Q2 (Fig.2), and 
consequently in subsidies, whether financed by elec-
tricity consumers or the public budget. On the other 
hand, this risk has been limited by quantity-based 
schemes, since successive tendering procedures have 
made it possible to maintain indirect control over 
prices and to anticipate the level of subsidies. 
Q1         Q2
MC1 MC2 
X Y 
O
Quantity
Price 
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Fig. 2. Price-based approach in a situation of uncer-
tainty 
Differences in dynamic efficiency: the impact on tech-
nical change 
The question of encouraging technical progress in-
volves two different problems. The first concerns cost 
reductions resulting from the pressure of competition 
between projects, based on the portfolio of available 
technologies. The second concerns the effort devoted 
to seeking technological innovations made possible by 
new R&D investments financed by the surplus ob-
tained from selling RES electricity. 
In the first case, the pressure to reduce costs is en-
countered only in the case of competitive bidding and 
green certificates, investors being price-takers in order 
to anticipate the profitability of their projects. The 
system of feed-in tariffs does not provide the same 
kind of incentive. The dynamic effect must also be 
assessed in relation to the installed capacities (techno-
logical learning). In this respect, competitive bidding 
systems are limited in their effects since their perform-
ance in terms of installation is poor in comparison with 
the feed-in tariff system (cf. infra). 
In the second case, the basic premise is that once 
producers and their equipment suppliers attain a certain 
level of profit, they invest in R&D in order to lower 
costs and increase their profit. We must therefore look 
at the surplus resulting from technical change and how 
it is shared out between producers and consumers (or 
taxpayers) depending on the type of incentive used, 
                                                           
48 The precise shape of the cost curves is not known. Intuitively, it 
can be assumed that these curves are relatively flat for a given tech-
nology, since the best sites (coastal areas) have so far hardly been 
exploited. 
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feed-in tariffs, competitive bidding or green certifi-
cates. 
MC
p
Q
MC' 
Q'
p'
O
YX
Z
Price 
Quantity  
Fig. 3. Feed-in tariffs and technical change 
In the case of a guaranteed price level p, when tech-
nical change is included in the calculation, production 
costs are reduced from MC to MC’, and renewable 
energy generation is increased from Q to Q’ (Fig. 3). 
With such a hypothesis, where prices remain constant, 
the community benefits from the increased generation 
of RES-E and producers keep the surplus created by 
technical change (area O’XY). 
In a bidding system, if we take the same amount Q 
and include technical change, we get the equilibrium 
point Z. If prices are attributed according to the “pay as 
bid” price, the surplus O'XZ resulting from technical 
progress goes to the consumer, or to the taxpayer. In 
the case of a green certificates scheme, for an amount 
Q, the equilibrium price will be established at p'. Some 
of the surplus will go to the producers (O'Zp') but 
compared to the previous situation it will be reduced 
by the area pXZp' 
The three instruments produce different results in 
terms of how the surplus is shared. In the case of feed-
in tariffs, technical change tends to increase the pro-
ducers’ surplus, thus encouraging them to innovate. 
Inversely, with quantity-based approaches, the surplus 
that goes to the producers is limited (as in the case of 
green certificates), or it may be attributed entirely to 
consumers (“pay-as-bid” price). Producers are there-
fore not encouraged to innovate by the prospect of an 
increased surplus. However, they are compelled to 
remain competitive and so must try to benefit from 
technical progress because of the pressures of bidding 
processes and the certificates market. In an open econ-
omy, this situation may encourage them to turn to 
foreign technology. 
The comparative efficiency of the different 
incentive schemes 
A number of renewable energy technologies have 
benefited to varying degrees from support of incentive 
programs introduced in the industrialised countries 
over the last 20 years. The impact of these instruments 
has been particularly felt in the case of wind energy, 
which is now nearly competitive with conventional 
technologies. The example of wind energy is therefore 
used here for reference purposes.  
Since 1990, the two main incentives used in the 
European countries to support the development of wind 
energy have been feed-in tariffs and competitive bid-
ding systems, which have given very different results. 
The impact of these policies will be analysed according 
to different criteria:  
• capacity to stimulate renewable electricity genera-
tion 
• net overall cost for the community 
• incentives to reduce costs and prices 
• incentives to innovate. 
Green certificate systems are difficult to analyse at 
this stage on the basis of these criteria because of the 
limited experience acquired. On the other hand, we 
shall examine their potential effectiveness in an inter-
national market, as part of a joint effort by several 
countries to combat climate change. This will be the 
case for the European Member States, which have been 
assigned individual renewable energy generation tar-
gets within the framework of the new European Direc-
tive on RES-E.  
Feed-in tariffs and bidding systems 
In the following analysis, reference will be made to the 
four criteria mentioned above. 
Stimulation of RES-E generation: incentives to 
enter the market 
The two systems exhibit radically different market 
entry incentives in terms of future profitability, risks 
and transaction costs. The feed-in tariffs in operation in 
Germany, Denmark and Spain have led to sustained 
development of wind power, both in terms of installed 
capacity and at the industrial level (Chabot, 2000; 
Gutermuth, 2000; Wagner, 2000). Thus, these three 
countries alone accounted for over 80% of additional 
installed capacity in Europe in 2000 (cf. Table 1).  
The prospect of obtaining a good return on invest-
ment offered by relatively high prices levels is the 
main explanation for the efficiency of this system. The 
success of the incentive scheme can also be explained 
by the low risk run by project developers, since subsi-
dies are granted to all new projects and continue 
throughout the pay off period49. At this point, the mar-
ket risk is non-existent and the profitability of projects 
depends essentially on the ability of investors to con-
trol their costs. Finally, the transaction costs (project 
preparation, selection procedure) are lower than for the 
other system, which is laborious and costly to imple-
ment. To add impetus to wind power development, 
France has recently opted for the feed-in tariff system, 
just a few years after its not totally convincing intro-
duction of a programme based on tendering procedures 
(Eole 2005). 
                                                           
49 Under new German legislation, purchase prices are indexed to the 
wholesale price of electricity and thus likely to change for new 
arrivals, but they are fixed once and for all for completed projects. 
Previously, feed-in tariffs were those for the current year with no 
guarantee for the long term. 
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Table 1: installed wind power capacity in Europe 
(MW) 
Incentives 
Country Installed cap  
(end 2000) 
Add. cap. 
(in 2000) 
Feed-in 
tariffs 
Germany 
Spain 
Denmark 
6113 
2402 
2297 
1668 
872 
555 
 TOTAL 10812 3095 
Bidding 
systems 
UK 
Ireland 
France 
409 
118 
79 
53 
45 
56 
 
TOTAL 
606 154 
Source: WindPower Monthly, The Windindicator 
(http://www.wpm.co.nz), April 2002 
 
The considerably lower purchase prices obtained 
through bidding systems under the pressure of compe-
tition limit the margins with respect to risk and thus 
result in much more limited installed capacities (cf. 
Table 2). The substantial difference in results between 
bidding systems and feed-in tariffs might also be ex-
plained by the relatively flat cost curves for wind 
power in the present phase, a virtual doubling of the 
marginal cost leading to a significant increase in asso-
ciated capacities. 
Table 2: Comparison of wind power prices in Europe 
in 1998 (in €/kWh) 
Feed-in tariffs 
Germany Denmark Spain 
0.086 0.079 0.068 
Average bidding prices 
UK France 
0.041 0.048 
Source: EC; 1999; NFFO; Eole 2005.  
 
The second factor affecting the attraction of bidding 
systems is the uncertainty regarding the profitability of 
submitted projects, for which considerable preparation 
costs are incurred. The allocation of subsidies after a 
competitive tendering procedure introduces an element 
of uncertainty and a new risk50, with the unsuccessful 
bidders remaining fully responsible for the costs of 
preparing their proposals. Furthermore, the very nature 
of the bidding system means that profit margins are 
considerably reduced and expected profitability rates 
significantly lower than those associated with fixed 
tariffs. The balance between the risks involved and 
expected profits is thus clearly to the disadvantage of 
competitive bidding, making it a less attractive system 
for investors.  
A final factor will influence the feasibility of projects 
proposed in the context of a bidding system. Certain 
aspects (environmental impact studies, information 
programs and public interest, site integration …), 
which might appear less important, are given less at-
                                                           
50 Under NFFO-5, 408 bids were examined, of which 147 were 
refused. 
tention in the project preparation phase. Consequently, 
in certain regions there may be a strong opposition 
movement (Brunt, 1998). In comparison, the accept-
ability of projects is much higher in countries that have 
feed-in tariffs. In this case, the better profitability con-
ditions offered make it possible to avoid a concentra-
tion of projects at the most efficient sites, or the crea-
tion of excessively large and controversial wind farms. 
In this type of incentive system, public preferences can 
be taken into account through an implicit internalisa-
tion of visual externalities. Projects are then more 
evenly distributed throughout the country. The absence 
of competition between projects and more favourable 
purchase prices are factors that have contributed to 
more geographically balanced development which 
raises less opposition at the local level. 
Overall cost of supporting renewables  
Feed-in tariffs are extremely simple to implement from 
an administrative point of view. However, they have 
proved very costly in terms of subsidies, either for 
clients of electricity utilities or for the State budget, 
this being the price to pay for the positive impact on 
the generation of renewable energy. In 1998, the Dan-
ish government paid out over 100 million € in subsi-
dies and this figure was expected to rise still further 
with the increase in generation capacity, creating an 
increasingly heavy burden on the public budget 
(Morthorst, 1999). This type of support policy also 
requires very high cross-subsidies, estimated at around 
200 million € in Germany in 2000. 
A big advantage of bidding systems is that the level 
of subsidies for renewable electricity generation can be 
controlled. In this respect, quantity-based approaches 
have enabled authorities to maintain greater control 
over public spending through the organisation of suc-
cessive tendering procedure, progressively revealing 
the shape of the cost curve. A comparable result could 
have been obtained with feed-in tariffs, but the system 
was institutionally rigid, making it impossible to con-
trol through the adjustment of feed-in tariffs. 
The feed-in tariffs versus competitive bidding debate 
has forced the former system to make adaptations to 
take into account ovearall cost of public support. Feed-
in tariffs decreasing in stage with the level of produc-
tion have been introduced in order to limit the surplus 
to the producers at generating sites of high quality. 
These incremental feed-in tariffs ensure a minimum 
rate of return to producers at generating sites of lower 
quality while at the same time controlling the rent 
allowed to producers who benefit from more favour-
able conditions (Elgreen, 2001). Germany, and more 
recently France, have now incorporated this device into 
their support policy. 
Incentives to reduce costs and prices 
Insufficient incentives to lower costs is considered to 
be the principal weakness of feed-in tariffs, while 
competitive bidding systems have proved to be particu-
larly effective in this respect (Mitchell, 1995; Mitchell, 
2000).  
The successive tendering procedures under the 
NFFO (Non-Fossil Fuel Obligation) resulted in regular 
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decreases in the prices awarded to successful bids. The 
average price for proposals, irrespective of the 
technology involved, went from 6.7 c€/kWh under 
NFFO-3 (1994) to 4.2 c€/kWh under NFFO-5 (1998). 
This price was only 0.15 c€/kWh above the pool 
reference purchase price for the corresponding period 
(Kühn et al, 1999). This price reduction bears witness 
to the capacity of bidding schemes to enable 
consumers to benefit from all the opportunities to cut 
production costs. 
At the same time, referring to the theory of interest 
groups, feed-in tariff systems are much less flexible 
and revisable than bidding schemes when it comes to 
limiting rents. There is a fundamental political problem 
in announcing a drop in government support renewable 
energy. The decrease in investment costs and the im-
proved performance of certain renewable energy tech-
nologies, and wind energy in particular, are only par-
tially reflected in the lower feed-in tariffs observed in 
Germany. This relative price stability results paradoxi-
cally in an increase in the share of subsidies allocated 
to new projects that benefit from technical progress51. 
To overcome this problem, price reductions must be 
announced ahead of time, when the device is put in 
place. With degressive feed-in tariffs that anticipate 
technical progress, the profits resulting from technical 
progress can be shared out more equitably by reducing 
the total cost borne by the community while granting a 
certain surplus to producers (Elgreen, 2001). 
While competitive bidding systems undeniably cre-
ate greater incentive to lower prices and costs of re-
newable energies, it should be noted that the price 
reductions observed are not necessarily related solely 
to technical change (falling investment costs, improved 
technical performance, learning experience of opera-
tors, search of scale effects…) or to its side effects (fall 
in cost of credit associated with a different perception 
of the technological risks, for example) but also to a 
systematic effort to reduce costs through economies of 
scale and use of the very best sites available. 
Incentives to innovate 
The criterion of the dynamic efficiency of the incentive 
instruments enables the approach to be extended be-
yond examining simply the effects of reduced costs 
over a short period. Consideration can also be given to 
the possibility of establishing sustainable technical 
progress. The establishment of such a dynamic process 
depends in part on the technological learning processes 
related to the wider diffusion of the technologies, but 
also on manufacturers’ R&D investments and thus on 
the surpluses that they might be allocated. 
Feed-in tariffs and pay-as-bid tendering schemes dif-
fer in terms of how the surplus resulting from technical 
change is shared out. In the first case, it is producers-
investors and manufacturers who benefit from the 
entire surplus resulting from lower costs, if the feed-in 
tariffs are not adjusted in step with technical change. In 
the case of competitive bidding, producers must pass 
                                                           
51 New legislation in Germany – EEG law, Spring 2000 – and in 
France – wind energy tariff decrees, Autumn 2000 – provides a first 
response to this problem (cf. infra). 
on cost savings to taxpayers or consumers. This distri-
bution of the surplus has two consequences: 
The technological learning effects have been much 
greater for manufacturers in countries that have opted 
for feed-in tariffs because of the strong growth in gen-
erating capacities. Remember that the three leading 
countries in Europe, stimulated by feed-in tariffs, in-
stalled 20 times more generating capacity in 2000 than 
the countries operating competitive bidding schemes.  
The reduced margins inherent in the bidding system 
have limited the R&D investment capability of manu-
facturers and their suppliers. Consequently, in interde-
pendent economies operating different support mecha-
nisms, the reduction in costs observed for wind power 
generating systems with bidding systems is helped by 
the technical progress made by manufacturers in coun-
tries where support policies are more favourable. In 
these countries, since firms are allowed to benefit from 
the differential profit, feed-in tariff schemes have en-
abled manufacturers to invest more heavily in R&D 
and to consolidate their industrial base52. 
Green certificates: a new quantity-based approach 
compatible with the liberalisation of the electricity 
market  
Despite their apparent effectiveness in stimulating the 
development of renewable energies, feed-in tariffs 
could be replaced over the next few years by a system 
of green certificates. The reason for such a possible 
change is two-fold: 
• The rapid growth in production and the corre-
sponding increase in RES-E subsidies,  
• The liberalisation of the electricity sector in 
Europe. The cost of supporting renewables, when 
unequally shared, distorts the competition between 
suppliers, a situation which is incompatible with 
the opening up of the European market desired by 
the Commission.  
Feed-in tariffs could develop in such a way that they 
do not distort competition and so that all consumers 
contribute to supporting renewable energies. In 2000, 
Germany set up a system of sharing the cost of sup-
porting renewable energies among the electric utilities. 
Nevertheless, green certificates, designed to allow 
compatibility of incentive frameworks with the open-
ing up to competition, are more adapted to the new 
types of electricity market (Voogt et al, 2000; Wohl-
gemuth, 1999).  
The contribution of green certificates 
Through the system of green certificates, renewable 
energy generation is becoming, to a certain extent, an 
integral part of the electricity market, instead of being 
separate as in the case of other incentive schemes. 
Green certificates are attributed to RES-E generators 
who exploit the power they generate in two different 
ways: by selling the electricity at the wholesale market 
                                                           
52 In 1998, Germany, Denmark and Spain were home to eight of the 
ten biggest wind turbine manufacturers in the world. On the other 
hand, in the United Kingdom, the government has not reached its 
goal of developing a competitive renewable energy industry.  
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price, and by selling certificates to operators who have 
a particular quota to meet. Support mechanisms for 
renewable energy development are then no longer 
unrelated to electricity price changes, as was the case 
with competitive bidding schemes and feed-in tariffs. 
The total price per renewable kWh, which is equal to 
the wholesale market price plus the price of the green 
certificate per kWh, should in theory correspond to the 
full cost of the marginal unit to be installed during the 
growth period of green electricity. Conversely the 
green certificate price at one time would be established 
as the difference between this marginal cost during the 
development phase and the wholesale market price.  
Under the system of green certificates, RES-E gen-
eration objectives can be imposed on electricity dis-
tributors/retailers with an aim of achieving overall 
allocation efficiency when they have access to different 
resources. Green certificate trading in fact makes it 
possible to use the least costly energy sources, for a 
single technology (coastal regions before inland areas) 
and for several competitive technologies (wind power 
before photovoltaic). But this advantage may become a 
disadvantage, from a dynamic point of view, since it 
tends to prevent investment in promising – but insuffi-
ciently developed – technologies. This type of system 
is of particular interest in an international context 
where trading possibilities are greater than at a purely 
national level, in particular where the electricity market 
is small or where one operator supplies virtually the 
entire national territory, as in France.  
Such a system should thus be of particular interest in 
Europe with the introduction of the European Directive 
on green electricity defining national objectives for 
RES-E generation for 2010. The Directive assigns 
differentiated objectives to Member States in order to 
take into account existing potential and the efforts 
already made. However, since the marginal production 
cost curves for each country are not known, this alloca-
tion may not be the most efficient way of sharing the 
burden 53. Through the system of tradable certificates, 
priority could be given to using the least-cost re-
sources, so that the overall target will be reached in the 
most economic way.  
The theoretical interest of certificates must not how-
ever mask the problems associated with the organisa-
tion of certificate exchanges. For a green certificate 
market to work, new functions must be guaranteed - 
certification of RES-E producers, trade register, ac-
counting and auditing, with penalties imposed in the 
event of failure to respect obligations – all of which 
lead to high administration costs. So as not to place too 
much initial pressure on the price of certificates, the 
quotas imposed must be moderate at first then increase 
gradually in step with development possibilities. 
 
                                                           
53 For example, Germany, which has been given the objective of 
increasing RES-E consumption from 2.4 % in 1997 to 10.3% in 2010 
and where wind energy potential is limited and already widely 
exploited, may have to make a greater effort than Ireland, whose 
target is to increase green electricity consumption from 1.1% in 1997 
to 11.7% in 2010 and which has abundant wind energy resources. 
The main risk in this type of system is the volatility 
of the certificate price and its negative effects on inves-
tors, which happens if the market is limited and lacking 
liquidity due to a small number of participants 
(Morthorst, 2000). On the supply side, a supplier wish-
ing to enter the market must be able to anticipate future 
prices and make his project “bankable” in order to 
secure a loan to enable him to invest in new production 
capacity. The creation of a futures market with long 
term contracts would be a way of limiting certificate 
price volatility caused by meteorological factors and 
estimating the future profitability of projects. On the 
demand side, borrowing or banking mechanisms are 
other possible ways of limiting price fluctuations that 
might result from overly strict limits on the validity of 
certificates.  
Expected efficiency of certificate system 
The system of tradable green certificates is similar to 
the quantity-based mechanisms examined earlier but 
differs from a bidding system in that each operator is 
assigned quantitative objectives. The concrete per-
formance of green certificate trading cannot be as-
sessed on the basis of experience, since such mecha-
nisms have so far been introduced only in some coun-
tries. Nevertheless, a number of potential advantages 
can be mentioned. 
• Stimulation of new RES-E generation capacity. 
Environmental policy objectives can be easily de-
fined in quantitative terms, allowing a steady pro-
gression from a known initial situation by intro-
ducing increasingly more ambitious quotas. Any-
way, the possibility of anticipating future prices, 
along with sufficiently profitable price levels, are 
essential conditions if such projects are to remain 
attractive to investors. A futures market could en-
able this difficulty to be overcome if the market is 
sufficiently liquid. With the growth dictated by an 
evolving quota system, market prices will in prin-
ciple be sufficiently profitable because of the in-
creasing demand for certificates.  
• Incentive to lower costs. The creation of a green 
certificates market provides a double incentive to 
lower costs. First, the electricity produced by RES 
installations is sold on the grid at the market price, 
which tends to be falling due to deregulation and 
increased competition. Second, producers of re-
newable electricity are under the constant pressure 
of competition because of the green certificate 
market. This pressure creates incentives for poten-
tial investors not only to control the cost of 
equipment but also to control operating costs once 
the equipment is installed.  
Conclusion 
In ideal theoretical situations, price-based and quantity-
based approaches are seen as comparable methods for 
achieving RES-E targets. But this symmetry is no 
longer applicable when uncertainty is taken into ac-
count. As a consequence, different criteria should be 
considered when evaluating the efficiency of such 
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incentives, and in particular the question of stimulating 
technical change: 
• Policy cost control. It is clear that the quantity-
based approach is the more effective in controlling 
the cost of government incentive policies: by invit-
ing tenders for successive quotas it is possible to 
maintain direct control over installed capacities 
and indirect control over the marginal production 
cost and thus over the cost for the community. 
Similar control is also maintained through the quo-
tas imposed on electricity suppliers under green 
certificate schemes. Conversely, in feed-in tariff 
systems, RES-E production cannot be anticipated 
with any precision because of the uncertainty re-
garding cost curves. It would of course be theo-
retically possible to adjust prices according to the 
response of producers, but in a neutral environ-
ment. In practice, this type of control would be 
difficult to implement for political and institutional 
reasons, making it difficult to adjust quantities and 
thereby control the cost for the community.  
• Installed capacities. In terms of installed capacity, 
price-based approaches have given far better re-
sults than quantity-based approaches. In theory, 
there should be no such difference, since bidding 
prices established at the same level as feed-in tar-
iffs should logically give rise to comparable in-
stalled capacities. The difference can be explained 
by the attraction of fixed prices, which project de-
velopers see as ensuring a safe investment with 
better predictability and a stable incentives frame-
work, as well as by the lower transaction costs for 
each project.  
• Stimulation of technical change. The incentive to 
reduce costs is much stronger in the competitive 
bidding system, since competing producers must 
reflect lower costs in prices in order to win subsi-
dies. In a system of feed-in tariffs, there is less in-
centive to lower costs, since drops in production 
costs have not systematically been reflected in the 
feed-in tariffs (Germany until 2000). However, it 
is possible, as demonstrated by the new incentive 
policy in France, to provide for a gradual reduc-
tion in feed-in tariffs to take into account the pro-
gress made in renewable technologies. 
Other dynamic factors also play a role. First, greater 
new installed capacity allows cost reductions through 
technological learning on the part of national manufac-
turers. Second, feed-in tariffs enable manufacturers to 
invest more heavily in R&D and to consolidate their 
industrial base. This is evidenced by the fact that Den-
mark, Germany and Spain are the world leaders in 
wind turbine production. 
• Other public policy objectives. Finally, while 
competitive bidding systems in theory allow the 
introduction of many selection criteria to take into 
account objectives concerning land development 
or minimisation of the pressure exerted on the best 
sites, it can be seen that such objectives have been 
better achieved in countries operating feed-in tariff 
systems. Moreover, these objectives are not in-
compatible with feed-in tariff mechanisms, as 
shown by the German and French systems in 
which adjustable tariffs have been introduced to 
encourage the development of wind power pro-
jects on supposedly less attractive sites. 
The greater efficiency of feed-in tariff mechanisms 
in helping countries to achieve renewable energy de-
velopment targets is confirmed by the gradual disap-
pearance of competitive bidding systems in the wake 
of low project implementation rates. But the 
price/quantity issue is by no means settled. The poten-
tial advantages of a quota-based green certificate trad-
ing system are prompting an increasing number of 
countries to use such schemes to meet ambitious goals 
for new energy generating capacity in a cost-effective 
way. Compared with other instruments, green certifi-
cate trading provides the best opportunity for distribut-
ing an overall objective in the most efficient way 
among several technologies and for organising renew-
able energy development on the scale of several coun-
tries. But given the limited experience with green cer-
tificate markets, and as long as uncertainties persist 
concerning market operation and the creation of a 
framework that is considered stable by investors, its 
real efficiency has still to be proven.  
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Introduction 
Increasing the share of renewable energy sources for 
electricity generation (RES-E) has a high priority in the 
energy strategies of the European Commission. How-
ever, to facilitate a breakthrough for RES-E, several 
economic, institutional, political, legislative, social and 
environmental barriers have to be overcome. Yet, cur-
rently, despite the wide range of strategies imple-
mented in different EU countries, it is debatable which 
is most effective for increasing the dissemination of 
RES-E (Haas et al 2001). To assist such analysis, the 
project ‘Organising a joint green electricity market –
 ElGreen‘ funded by the EC has been completed 
(Huber et al 2001b). 
The core objective of this project is to find out how 
to bring about the enhancement in market penetration 
of RES-E in the cheapest and most efficient way, from 
the society‘s point-of-view by minimising public costs. 
The objectives of ElGreen in detail are:  
• To summarise the current state-of-the-art and to 
evaluate the performance of various policy instru-
ments applied previously and currently, especially 
for EU Member States; 
• To conduct a formal analysis of how different 
types of strategies work; 
• To develop the computer model ElGreen with 
both bottom-up and top-down features: 
• The top-down approach models harmonised 
strategies for RES-E within the European Union; 
• The bottom-up approach allows different strate-
gies by country and technology;  
• To propose action plans for practical implementa-
tion of the recommendations. 
Method of approach 
The major objective of this project was to evaluate the 
efficiency of various types of promotion strategies for 
renewables for electricity generation and to derive 
recommendations for EU policy strategies. To do so it 
must be born in mind that such instruments have to be  
(i) effective for increasing the penetration of RES-E 
and  (ii) efficient at respect to minimise the arising 
public costs. The criteria used for the evaluation of 
various instruments are based on the following condi-
tions 
1. Minimise generation costs:  
This aim is fulfilled if incentives for investors are 
provided to choose technologies so that generation 
costs are minimised (Resch et. al. 2001). 
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2. Lower producer profits:  
In a second step various options are evaluated with 
the target to minimise costs for society. This 
means that feed-in tariffs, subsidies or trading sys-
tems should be designed in a way that public 
transfer payments are also minimised. Yet, this 
implies lowering producer surplus (PS)55. 
For a better illustration of the used cost definitions 
the various cost elements are depicted in Fig. 8. 
quantity
[MWh]
price, costs
[EURO/MWh]
Market clearing
price = price of
certificate
MC
Quota
pC
MC ... marginal 
generation costs
pC ... market price for 
(conventional) 
electricity
pMC ... Marginal price 
for green 
electricity (due to
quota obligation)
pMC
Generation Costs (GC)
Producer surplus (PS)
Public costs = PS + GC - Revenues market  
Fig. 8. Basic definitions of the cost elements (illus-
trated for a TGC-system) 
For the evaluation of different dissemination strate-
gies the computer-model ElGreen has been developed 
(Faber et. al. 2001). Its major features are described in 
Fig. 9. It allows investigation of the impacts of differ-
ent kinds of instruments. In the following section the 
most important elements of the computer model are 
presented. 
Choice of technologies
Choice of model
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- .... Select policies
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 Feed-In-Tariffs
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   country
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Results
- Production of RES-E
- Share of RES-E
- Expansion of RES-E
- Table by country
- Table by technology
- Cost curves  
Fig. 9. Elements of the computer model ElGreen 
Optimal design of Feed-in tariffs 
For substantial dissemination of RES-E, feed-in tar-
iffs have been successful in all countries where they 
have been introduced to guarantee a fair payment. The 
major advantage of a feed-in tariff is that it is flexible, 
fast and easy to establish. The major criticism of feed-
in tariffs (as with all other price driven instruments 
without tendering) is that they do not encourage com-
petition between generators.  
Under the following assumptions and conditions, 
feed-in tariffs are also an economically effective dis-
semination instrument:  
                                                           
55 The producer surplus is defined as the profit of the green electric-
ity generator. Example: if a green producer receives a feed-in tariff 
of 6 € Cent/kWh and his generation costs are 4 € Cent/kWh, the 
resulting profit would be 2 € Cent for each kWh. The sum of the 
profits of all green generators defines the producer surplus. 
• Flat cost curve! 
The cost curve of the technology is flat and predict-
able with high probability. As cost curves are more 
predictable in a smaller market, feed-in tariffs are more 
suitable if implemented nationally, or even locally, 
rather than internationally. 
• Ensure a stable planning horizon! 
The duration of a feed-in tariff must be guaranteed 
by highly credible sources56 (or by a signed contract). 
• Feed-in tariffs should decrease over time! 
The price of feed-in tariffs should decrease over 
time, in line with the expected learning curve giving 
investment cost reductions. This means that feed-in 
tariffs for new facilities and, hence, new contracts, 
should be adopted every year according to the techno-
logical progress. 
• Limit the time where producer can receive a guar-
anteed tariff! 
The time for a producer to receive a guaranteed feed-
in tariff should be limited to a predefined period, i.e. 
similar to the rolling redemption approach in the case 
of a TGC system. A period of 10 years seems to be 
optimal, because this corresponds to the typical repay-
ment time expected by potential investors. Further-
more, from the European Union’s point-of-view, a shift 
to a harmonised strategy among all EU Member States 
is feasible if the guaranteed duration time is restricted 
in countries utilising feed-in-tariffs. In this case the 
transition time from the old to the new system is like-
wise restricted.  
• Design a stepped feed-in tariff! 
The subsidy of successive phases of feed-in tariffs 
should be decreased as the actual generation from each 
phase increases. The decline in the guaranteed price, 
however, must be less than the total revenue that can 
be gained if an efficient plant and location are chosen, 
otherwise investors have no incentive to implement the 
most efficient technologies and locations. This means 
that profits must be higher at cost efficient locations 
compared to less efficient ones57. The principle of this 
scheme is depicted in the lower part of Fig. 10.  
Note: lower part of figure – producer surplus according 
to standardised baseline; upper part – transfer of the 
incentive-compatible contract to the feed-in tariff 
scheme. 
Given the fundamental objective of minimising total 
costs to society, next a stepped feed-in tariff scheme 
should be analysed in more detail. In Fig. 10, the pub-
lic gain is characterised by the hatched line. Under 
such conditions this scheme is similar to a tendering 
                                                           
56 Without any guarantees, potential producers are afraid to invest in 
RES-E. This is valid especially for technologies which are far away 
from economic efficiency. E.g. in Carinthia, a province of Austria, a 
feed-in tariff for PV of 72,7 € Cent/kWh (10 ATS/kWh) will be paid. 
Nevertheless, due to the non-secured duration of this tariff, to date no 
additional capacity whatsoever has been installed. 
57 E.g. wind energy: 20% expected profit for locations with 2400 
full-load hours and 14% for locations with 1800 expected full-load 
hours. In the new German feed-in tariff scheme (‘Erneuerbare Ener-
gien-Gesetz’) the incentive compatibility constraint is fulfilled for 
the case of wind energy. 
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system, but with the difference that the subsidised price 
for RES-E is given by the government and not by the 
market itself. Under the assumption of a ‘perfect‘ mar-
ket, the feed-in tariffs set by the government will still 
lead to inefficiency as compared to tendering. Consid-
ering, however, strategic bidding and the much higher 
administration costs of the tendering scheme, a feed-in 
tariff seems to be the more efficient solution.  
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Fig. 10. Optimal incentive-compatible feed-in system 
One important condition for such a scheme is the 
measurable and standardised unit or baseline used for 
differentiation. If the costs for electricity generation are 
mainly based on the full-load hours, the latter can be 
such a suitable baseline. In this case, there is less de-
pendence on specific, not standardised, criteria such as 
fuel costs or the special conditions of the location. 
Unfortunately, not every renewable energy technology 
fulfils this constraint. For wind energy or biogas this 
criteria is fulfilled, i.e. a stepped feed-in tariff is easy to 
implement. In the case of biomass, where costs de-
pends on the specific fuel input (bark or wood chips 
from forest residues) an evaluation of the fuel mix 
must be made. This causes an increase of the admini-
stration costs and hence to a less efficient system. 
However, in principle, an incentive compatible scheme 
is implementable58. Similar problems exist with apply-
ing this scheme to hydro power, where generation costs 
depend on full-load hours and investment costs, which 
both depend on the specific characteristics. 
If one major political and societal objective is to 
promote a homogeneous distribution of a RES technol-
ogy (e.g. wind plants should not only be located near 
the shore) the ‘stepped’ feed-in tariff must be adjusted 
so the producer’s profits from generating electricity is 
independent of the generation costs, see Fig. 1159. Fur-
thermore, by granting a ‘marginal’ higher profit if 
investor choose an efficient plant, a compromise be-
tween cost efficiency (and the disadvantage of location 
hot spots) and homogeneous distribution (and the dis-
advantage of economic inefficiency) can be adjusted. 
                                                           
58 In this case, different feed-in tariffs exist in parallel, depended on 
the fuel input. 
59 E.g. wind energy: 12% expected profit for locations with 2400 
full-load hours and 12% for locations with 1800 expected full-load 
hours. Hence, plants will be built on cost efficient and less cost 
efficient locations to the same amount. 
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Fig. 11. Feed-in system creating a homogeneous distri-
bution 
Note: lower part of figure – producer surplus according to standard-
ised baseline; upper part – transfer to feed-in tariff scheme. 
 
In addition, feed-in tariffs are useful in promoting a 
more homogeneous distribution among different tech-
nologies by setting technology specific guaranteed 
tariffs. By implementing such a policy, the long-term 
technology development of various RES, which are 
currently not cost-efficient, can be supported. The 
reason is that due to the application of non-mature 
technologies a dynamic process can be started (i.e. 
stimulation of the learning-curve) which could lead to 
a significant decrease in future generation costs. How-
ever, this positive effect of feed-in tariffs must be 
compensated by economic distortions among the RES. 
By applying a stepped feed-in tariff, producer surplus 
between the technologies can be adjusted in a way that 
a homogeneous distribution appears60. 
Optimal design of a quota system based on 
TGCS 
In the following, the optimal design of a TGC system 
will be discussed. In principle it does not matter if this 
system is based only on mandatory demand or on a 
combination of mandatory and voluntary demand. The 
most important framework conditions are: 
• Standardise TGCs! 
Within a mandatory system, standardisation of TGCs 
becomes important. The market for TGCs will be most 
efficient if there is just one kind of certificate, thereby 
giving higher market transparency, trading volume and 
the encouragement for producers to seek most efficient 
forms of renewable energy. However, for the promo-
tion of less mature technologies, or technologies with 
higher generation costs (e.g. PV), government should 
use other policy instruments than just including all 
renewables as a single technology. 
• Ensure a stable planing horizon! 
One of the most important issues relates to the need 
for a long-term planning horizon with planning cer-
tainty. It has to be guaranteed by highly credible au-
thorities that the TGC trading system will exist for a 
specified and sufficient planning horizon, otherwise 
potential producers will be wary of  investing in RES-
                                                           
60 The value of the subsidised feed-in tariff depends on the slope of 
the marginal cost curve of different technologies. 
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E61. This connection is illustrated for one technology 
with ‘relative’ high marginal generation costs in Fig. 
12. 
MC all technologies - pC
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pTGC single
Quota
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A+B
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Fig. 12. Effects of a strategy change from a single 
technology quota to a quota for two technologies 
Assume that a single quota for this technology A ex-
ists. Due to the high marginal generation costs, a ‘high’ 
price level for the TGCs, pTGC single, can be expected 
(see left-hand-side of the Fig. 12)62. If, it is not certain 
that the single quota would survive for several years, 
then investments will not take place63. Consider for 
example that the single quota for technology A, e.g. 
small hydro power (SHP), shall be replaced by a quota 
for two technologies A+B, e.g. SHP and wind, in fu-
ture years. Under this new framework conditions cur-
rent investments into new facilities for technology A 
are uneconomical. 
More importantly from the European perspective is 
that the same situation can also occur on an interna-
tional level. If in a certain country with a national 
quota, marginal generation costs are relatively high 
compared to the international level, and if it is not 
secured that this quota remains available for national 
production over a specified period, then potential na-
tional producers will have less incentive to invest in 
RES-E. In other words, without the security that the 
current system survives over a specified time-period, 
the fulfilment of the quota is hardly attainable in coun-
tries with high generation costs64. Moreover, if a sys-
tem starts in countries with low generation costs and if 
the system is extended over time to countries with 
higher costs, high windfall profits come to the genera-
tors in the ‘low’ cost countries. The recommendation 
regarding such changes is that the old system should 
remain available for a certain transition period and that 
the new system should start alongside for newly in-
stalled facilities. Both should have assured framework 
conditions. 
• Differ between existing and new capacity! 
From the public’s point-of-view, TGCs should only 
be issued over a pre-defined period of time, i.e. the age 
of the plant has to be considered. More precisely, no 
                                                           
61 The same situation applies, of course, also for a feed-in tariff. 
62 Note that it is irrelevant for this effect if this quota is imposed at a 
national or international level. 
63 TGC price for technology A will drop from pTGC single to pTGC sum, 
see right-hand-side of Fig. 12. 
64 However, by setting an extremely high penalty in the case of non-
fulfilment of the obligation, generators can be compelled to invest in 
RES-E. Still this method is not considered to be optimal because if 
the system changes from being national to international, inefficient 
plant would have been built, which would not be competitive under 
the new conditions. Hence, this situation leads to high economic 
inefficiencies. 
existing or no at least fully depreciated plant should be 
included in a quota system, otherwise substantial wind-
fall profits occur. This means that it is counter-
productive to include old depreciated facilities into a 
trading system, see Fig. 13.  
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Fig. 13. Comparison of producer surplus with and if 
existing capacity is included or not 
• Use rolling redemption! 
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Fig. 14. Comparison of gains due to unlimited and 
restricted time for the creation of TGCs 
Note: Assumption: 10 years internal depreciation time for producers. 
 
The distinction between new and old plants should 
not be seen only from a static point-of-view. The roll-
ing redemption provides a dynamic solution. In prac-
tice such a system can be implemented for plant, not 
older than, say, 10 years. Hence, the issuing body 
awards TGCs only to these facilities. The advantage of 
a rolling redemption for both customers and public is 
illustrated in Fig. 14. Moreover, to set incentives for 
maintenance, upgrade, expansion and revitalisation of 
existing plant, TGCs should be issued also for the 
incremental generation of electricity of such facilities. 
• Avoid volatility of TGC price! 
The volatility of the price for TGCs may cause a se-
rious barrier for a potential investor, see Cleijne and 
Ruijgrok (2001), Morthorst (2000). This problem can 
be prevented or diminished by having a fixed price 
floor (guaranteed by government) and ceiling (e.g. a 
penalty – see later) or by allowing banking and 
borrowing. Additionally, if banking and borrowing are 
allowed, the introduction of a future market may help 
to decrease fluctuations with respect to prices for 
TGCs.  
• Restrict banking and borrowing! 
The validity and, hence, the possibility of banking 
should be restricted to a period of at most five years, a 
period long enough to offset fluctuations in generation 
due to stochastic climatic conditions (e.g. variation in 
wind or water supply), and small enough for strategic 
collections of TGCs. To keep the system as simple as 
possible, banking without interest payments is pre-
ferred. In addition, borrowing for two to three years 
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will result in greater price stabilisation. To avoid bor-
rowed TGCs not being repaid (e.g. due to bankruptcy 
of the obliged organisation) obligated actors should 
provide a deposit sum, which is returned when the 
obligation is fulfilled. 
• Set the ‘correct’ penalty! 
For the fulfilment of the obligation it is important 
that the penalty for not purchasing a certificate is 
higher than the investment needed to meet the quota. 
This means that the lowest penalty must exceed the 
expected marginal generation costs (minus market 
price for conventional electricity) within the system. 
As the penalty serves as price ceiling for TGCs, it 
should be higher than the expected market price for 
TGCs. This fact is depicted in Fig. 15 in more detail. 
The case on the left-hand-side is characterised by no 
distortions due to ‘wrong’ penalty setting. This means 
that all penalties for the countries A, B, and C are 
higher than the additional marginal costs and hence the 
market price for TGCs. Under this assumptions the 
quota for all countries A, B, and C will be reached. The 
impact of a ‘wrong’ penalty setting is depicted on the 
right-hand-side of Fig. 15. As the penalty in country C 
is lower than the additional marginal costs for provid-
ing TGCs, total demand will be less than obligated. In 
this case only country A and B have an incentive to 
reach their quota. For actors in country C it is rational 
to pay the penalty C rather than fulfil the quota at the 
given market price pTGC. In this case the quota QA+B+C 
will not be reached. 
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Fig. 15. Influence of the penalty on the electricity gen-
eration: high penalty (left) and low penalty (right) 
• Strive for an international trading system! 
In principle it is also conceivable that a European-
wide trading system will not bring benefits to society 
as compared to detached national trading systems. This 
would occur if, in most countries, marginal generation 
costs are low and available potential is already mostly 
achieved. Fig. 16 illustrates this connection for two 
countries A and B.  
Total costs (generation costs plus producer surplus) 
in the case of international trade are depicted on the 
right of Fig. 16. Because marginal generation costs to 
fulfil the national quota are lower in country A than in 
country B, the market clearing price in country A, i.e. 
pTGC A, is lower than the TGC price for international 
trade, i.e. pTGC A+B, and for national trade in country B, 
i.e. pTGC B, respectively. Lower price leads to lower 
electricity generation and lower social costs, see left 
section of Fig. 16. Similarly, due to a higher national 
TGC price in country B, electricity generation is higher 
than with international trade, and, therefore, total costs 
for the society increase also, as indicated on Fig. 16. 
However, if the social gain for national trade in coun-
try A exceeds the social loses in country B, national 
trade is preferable to international trade.  Such a situa-
tion is much more probable if both old and new plant is 
included in a quota system. However, in practice, the 
results from the simulation with the computer-model 
ElGreen show that in all investigated cases65 interna-
tional trade leads to lower costs to the society. Hence, 
it can be concluded that in order to reduce costs to EU 
society as a whole, international trade should be pre-
ferred to national trade. 
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Fig. 16. Comparison of benefits from national and 
international trading 
• Allow international trade between countries with 
quota obligations! 
International trade between countries with quota ob-
ligations is possible if the governments allow energy 
purchasers to use foreign TGCs as proof that they have 
fulfilled their obligations. In a long-term international 
system, one single market price for TGCs would be 
formed. If actors in both countries have to fulfil their 
quotas, the total production of RES will not be influ-
enced by the international trading activity, only the 
distribution of total generation in the two countries 
would change. Countries with high marginal genera-
tion costs (due to a low potential for RES or due to a 
high obligation) will be net importers, and countries 
with low marginal generation costs will be net export-
ers. From the environmental point-of-view, less ad-
verse impacts are expected from allowing international 
trade. However, negative effects from international 
trading could occur at geographical hot spots, because 
of extensive use of a certain technology at an optimal 
location (e.g. visual intrusion of extensive wind power 
development in areas of high wind speed, to be set 
against the benefits of income for those regions). 
• Avoid import of TGC from countries with no 
quota obligation! 
International trade between, on the one hand, coun-
tries with a quota obligation and, on the other hand, 
countries without a regulatory quota creates an implicit 
asymmetry. This is especially problematic if installed 
capacity of RES in the country with a voluntary system 
has been promoted by an investment subsidy and low 
voluntary demand. This means that the price that can 
be received from RES-E is similar to the price of con-
ventional electricity. By receiving higher prices, gen-
erators will export their electricity to the country with 
                                                           
65 For details see ‘Final Report of the project ElGreen‘ (Huber et. al., 
2001b). 
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the quota obligation. Thus, significant supply of TGCs 
occurs in the country with the mandatory obligation, so 
contributing to a decrease in the price of TGCs. This 
flow will make it easier to achieve the obligation. 
However, the intention of a mandatory quota system 
may be effected, e.g. the stimulation of national pro-
duction of electricity from RES. It could not be assured 
that the export of TGCs leads to an additional deploy-
ment of RES in the country without the obligation. The 
reason is that the exported share of green electricity 
could be substituted by generation from conventional 
power plant. From an international perspective, coun-
tries with a mandatory quota system might not want to 
accept TGCs from countries with only a voluntary 
demand approach. TGCs from a country without an 
obligation should only be accepted if it is proved that 
the plant is implemented due to the stimulation of the 
trading system. This means that TGCs must be created 
from newly installed RES66.  
• Avoid additional support schemes! 
With respect to a European-wide transboundary trading 
system, it is especially important to avoid discrimina-
tion between countries. This means that additional 
support mechanisms in all countries must be known67, 
with subsidy schemes transparent and the related in-
formation accessible. Otherwise the option of TGC 
trading will be an additional subsidy instead of a cost 
efficient way to promote RES. If subsides differ among 
the countries, then distortions will occur, because mar-
ginal generation costs also differ among the countries. 
The consequence is that producers in countries with 
higher subsidies will increase the generation, and pro-
ducers with lower support will decrease generation 
compared to the optimal case. However, the govern-
ments, and indirectly the taxpayers and electricity 
consumers, of the countries with higher subsidies sup-
port not only the price of the certificate in their own 
country but also in all other countries. This means that 
subsidies granted in one country will lead to a price fall 
in other countries, even if support schemes exist in 
those countries68. In addition, to increase the efficiency 
of the trading system, it is important that no hidden 
market barriers exist, e.g. the condition that only TGCs 
can be imported if physical electricity is imported, too.  
Conclusions 
The most important conclusions of this analysis are: 
                                                           
66 The situation described above is to some extent similar to the 
status of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) in the case of 
international climate change policy. Applying CDM-projects is only 
feasible if it is secured that the emission reduction in the country 
without a mandatory emission restriction (developing country) is due 
to the implemented project. 
67 In a purely national or local market, the question whether or not 
the producers are subsidised will not be important, because all pro-
ducers will have the same framework conditions. However, distor-
tions between different technologies or technology bands, due to 
different promotion schemes lead to efficiency losses. 
68 In theory, there are at least two ways to prevent such negative 
distortions – see e.g. Schaeffer et. al. (1999): 
• abolishment of all other support schemes;  
• compensation payment for the support at the border.  
• Regardless which instrument is chosen the careful 
design of a strategy is more important than the 
question of whether feed-in tariffs or a national or 
international quota/TGC system is implemented. A 
poorly designed system is worse than no promo-
tional system at all ; 
• It must be guaranteed by highly credible sources 
that the promotional strategy, regardless of which 
instrument is implemented, survives for a speci-
fied planning horizon; 
• The support mechanism of any instrument should 
be restricted to a certain time frame e.g.10 years. 
• All selective barriers for new RES-E generators 
should be rigorously removed, e.g. fees for con-
nection to the grid, extraordinary transmission 
fees. 
• A TGC system is only preferable to feed-in tariffs 
if it is introduced as a transboundary system on a 
European-wide scale; Currently, however, it is 
very unlikely that such a harmonised strategy will 
be implemented soon. Therefore, promotional 
schemes based on stepped feed-in tariffs are  the 
best strategy until international trading scheme can 
be implemented; 
• Feed-in tariffs are preferable to national trading 
schemes for three reasons: (a) they are easy to im-
plement and can be revised for new capacities in a 
very short time (if the duration of each specific 
guaranteed tariff is limited to, say, 10 years); (b) 
administration costs are usually lower than for im-
plementing a national trading scheme. This fact is 
especially important for small countries where a 
competitive national trading scheme is difficult to 
implement; (c) a clear distinction between the non-
harmonised strategy for existing capacities (the 
stepped feed-in tariff) and the harmonised strategy 
(international trade) for new capacities is possible. 
This is very important to avoid uncertainties and 
backlashes in the period in which the framework 
conditions for a possible new harmonised system 
are negotiated; 
• Otherwise, if every country tries to implement its 
own national system (with or without international 
trade) a hopelessly confusing mix-up between the 
different system occurs and the transaction costs to 
harmonise the systems afterwards will be very 
high.  
• Moreover, there is no need or reason to change the 
strategies for existing RES-E capacities, either 
EU-wide or on a national level; 
• This leads to the following major conclusion for 
a joint harmonised EU-strategy, when all EU-
countries agree on a joint harmonised Quota / 
TGC-strategy. For this, a clear starting point has 
to be defined, e.g. January 1st 2007 as in Fig. 17. 
From then, all new capacity, but no existing ca-
pacity, would qualify for the Quota / TGC system. 
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Fig. 17. Transition from existing non-harmonised 
strategies in various EU-countries to a fully harmo-
nised EU-wide Quota/TGC-system compatible with 
emission trading 
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The European Dimension of Na-
tional Renewable Electricity Pol-
icy - The Dutch Experience 
Emiel van Sambeek, Energy research Centre of the 
Netherlands69 
Introduction 
Last year’s adoption of the Renewables Directive70 has 
provided an important stimulus for Member State gov-
ernments to increase their renewable energy policy 
efforts. The Directive stipulates indicative targets for 
the consumption of renewable electricity in each of the 
Member States. This paper uses the recent experiences 
in the Dutch green certificate market to illustrate the 
possible interactions between renewable energy policy 
instruments in the different Member States. Based on 
the implications of these policy interactions for na-
tional RES-E policy making the case for co-ordination 
and harmonisation of renewable energy policy in the 
EU is developed.  
The Renewable Electricity Policy in the 
Netherlands 
Under the EU renewables directive the Netherlands 
was allocated a renewable electricity target of 9% of 
total electricity consumption in 2010 (European Com-
mission, 2001). This European target is slightly higher 
than the target that was established on the national 
level in the context of the implementation of the Kyoto 
Protocol (Ministry of VROM, 1999). In 1995 the gov-
ernment established the long-term target for the pene-
tration of renewable energy of 10% of final energy 
consumption in 2020 (Ministry of Economic Affairs, 
1997). This is equivalent to approximately 17% of total 
electricity consumption by that time. In view of the 
greenhouse gas emissions reduction targets for the first 
commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol the gov-
ernment formulated an intermediate target of 5% of 
total energy consumption in 2010. This is estimated to 
be the equivalent of 8.5% of electricity consumption. 
To meet these targets the Renewable Energy Action 
Plan (Ministry of Economic Affairs, 1997) announced 
an intensification of renewable energy policies and 
defined a number of targeted actions and instruments 
to accelerate the penetration of renewable energy in the 
Netherlands.  
Before the start of the liberalisation of the electricity 
market between 1998 and 2000 renewable energy 
support came from a mix of instruments ranging from 
feed-in tariffs based on avoided cost, direct subsidies, 
fiscal investment incentives and a system benefits 
charge (MAP levy). As a consequence of the greening 
of the tax system in the mid-nineties the ecotax or 
regulatory energy tax (REB) on final energy consump-
                                                           
69 Policy Studies, Badhuisweg 3, 1031 CM  Amsterdam, The Nether-
lands. E-mail: vansambeek@ecn.nl.  
70 Directive 2001/77/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 27 September 2001 on the promotion of electricity pro-
duced from renewable energy sources in the internal electricity 
market, OJ L283/33, 27.10.2001. 
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tion was introduced in 1996. Renewable electricity 
consumption was exempt from the ecotax. Moreover, 
producers of renewable electricity receive a production 
incentive from the ecotax funds collected from non-
renewable electricity consumers. Since 1996 this fiscal 
stimulation has become the dominant policy instrument 
to promote renewable electricity. Feed-in tariffs are 
gradually phased out as the electricity market is opened 
to competition. The system benefits charges (MAP) 
have been abolished at the end of 2000. Other policy 
mechanisms such as fiscal investment incentives (de-
preciation allowances) still remain. In July 2001 the 
market for renewable electricity was opened to all 
customers. A tradable green certificate system was set 
up for the verification, registration and tracking of 
renewable electricity and to facilitate the trade and 
retail supply of renewable electricity. The market for 
non-renewable retail customers will be opened in Oc-
tober 2003 (Platform Energy Liberalisation). 
The Dutch Green Certificate System 
Green certificates embody the environmental benefits 
associated with renewable electricity generation and 
provide a unique proof that a certain amount of elec-
tricity was generated in a renewable way. Green cer-
tificates can be traded separately from the physical 
electricity. A green certificate system comprises insti-
tutions, regulations and mechanisms for the issuing, 
registration, tracking and redeeming of green certifi-
cates. In several EU Member States green certificate 
systems are established to offer enhanced temporal and 
spatial flexibility in meeting an obligation on produc-
ers, suppliers or consumers to fulfil a certain percent-
age of their electricity generation, supply or consump-
tion from renewable sources. Contrary to other coun-
tries the green certificate system in the Netherlands 
serves to facilitate a voluntary market in renewable 
electricity. As explained above voluntary demand is 
stimulated through an exemption of renewable electric-
ity from the ecotax on final energy consumption. The 
ecotax exemption can be claimed by surrendering a 
green certificate to the tax authority.  
In addition to the ecotax exemption on renewable 
electricity consumption suppliers can grant a produc-
tion subsidy to renewable electricity generators from 
the ecotax revenues on conventional electricity con-
sumption. The administration of this production sub-
sidy is based on power purchase agreements between 
the producer and the supplier and is not linked to the 
green certificate system.  
Fig. 1 explains the relationship between the Dutch 
green certificate system and the ecotax incentives for 
renewable electricity. The figure abstracts from physi-
cal electricity flows and transactions, and only consid-
ers the transactions related to the green part of renew-
able electricity production, trade and consumption. 
Table 1 outlines the development of the level of the 
ecotax and the production subsidy since the implemen-
tation of the ecotax in 1996. The table shows that the 
level of the ecotax and production subsidy has in-
creased consistently over the years. 
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Fig. 1. Schematic overview of the relation between the 
Dutch GC system and the ecotax.  
Electricity suppliers collect the ecotax (REB) from 
grey electricity customers. Green electricity customers 
pay a premium (€) for the green electricity but do not 
pay the ecotax (REB). The suppliers buy enough green 
certificates (GC) from renewable generators to match 
their supply of renewable electricity to green custom-
ers. Furthermore, based on the power purchase contract 
between the supplier and the renewable generator, the 
supplier may grant a production subsidy (PS) to the 
renewable generator from the ecotax revenues. The 
supplier transfers the total amount of ecotax collected 
from its customers minus the sum of the production 
subsidies to renewable generators (REB-PS) to the tax 
authorities. Moreover, in order to claim the ecotax 
exemption on renewable electricity consumption the 
supplier surrenders its green supply contracts along 
with a matching supply of green certificates (GC) to 
the tax authorities. 
Table 1. Development of the level of the ecotax ex-
emption and production subsidy for renewable electric-
ity in the Netherlands (all numbers in €/kWh). 
User   Category 
[kWh] 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Ecotax        
0-800 0 0 0 0 0 0.0583 0.0601
800-10.000 0.0134 0.0134 0.0134 0.0225 0.0372 0.0583 0.0601
10.000-50.000 0.0134 0.0134 0.0134 0.0147 0.0161 0.0194 0.0200
50.000-10 mln. 0 0 0 0.0010 0.0022 0.0059 0.0061
>10 mln. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Production 
subsidy 
0.0134 0.0134 0.0134 0.0147 0.0161 0.0194 0.0200
Implementation of the Netherlands green 
certificate system 
The Dutch GC system started its operation on the 1st of 
July 2001 concurrent with the opening of the green 
electricity market to retail competition. The Green 
Certificate Body - a 100% daughter of the national 
transmission system operator, Tennet – is responsible 
for the implementation and operation of the system. 
Initially only domestic renewable electricity production 
was eligible for the issuing of green certificates. As a 
consequence only Dutch renewable electricity genera-
tion was able to claim the tax benefits associated with 
the ecotax regulations. However, it was clear from the 
beginning that such a discriminatory arrangement 
could not be upheld in view of European regulations. 
Therefore, with the introduction of the green certificate 
system the Minister announced that the conditions 
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under which imports would become eligible would be 
studied and further regulations on this matter would 
follow (Ministry of Economic Affairs, 2001a). As of 
January 2002 foreign renewable electricity became 
eligible for Dutch green certificates, subject to the 
following conditions (Ministry of Economic Affairs, 
2001d): 
Reciprocity 
Only imports from countries that meet the reciprocity 
criterion as laid down in article 19 of EU Electricity 
Directive (European Commission, 1996) and as im-
plemented through articles 44 and 45 of the Dutch 
Electricity Law of 1998 are eligible. This reciprocity 
clause means that customers in Netherlands for whom 
renewable electricity is imported should be a non-
captive/eligible customer in the country of origin of the 
renewable electricity. This effectively means that re-
newable electricity can only be imported from Euro-
pean countries, which have implemented full retail 
competition. 
No double subsidisation 
Importers of renewable electricity have to sign a decla-
ration that the renewable electricity for which the issu-
ance of green certificates is requested has not been sold 
or subsidised as renewable electricity elsewhere. 
Metering data and plant verification 
Metering data as well as information relating to the 
type of plant has to be provided to the green certificate 
body by the competent authorities in the country of 
origin. The Ministry of Economic Affairs has made a 
list of all parties that have the authority to verify the 
type of plant and to meter the electricity delivered to 
the grid according to the national legislation and regu-
lations in all EU Member States plus Norway and 
Switzerland (Van Sambeek et al., 2002). 
Import capacity 
Importers have to demonstrate that they have acquired 
sufficient transport capacity on the cross-border inter-
connectors to physically import an amount of electric-
ity corresponding with the amount for which the issu-
ance of green certificates is requested. 
Renewable according to the Dutch definition 
Imported renewable electricity should qualify as re-
newable electricity according to the definition given in 
article 53 of the Dutch Electricity Law of 1998. This 
definition includes wind, solar-pv, hydropower under 
15 MW, and biomass. Waste is not eligible for green 
certificates. 
Recent developments in the renewable electric-
ity market 
The ecotax exemption has been a very effective means 
of stimulating the consumption of renewable electricity 
in the Netherlands. Because of the high level of the 
ecotax renewable electricity can be offered to retail 
customers at around the same rate as grey electricity. 
Thus there is currently no financial barrier to switch to 
renewable electricity. A further stimulus to the promo-
tion of the renewable electricity market is the fact that 
as of July 2001 the renewable electricity market is the 
only retail segment that has been opened to competi-
tion. Until the electricity market is fully liberalised the 
renewable energy market provides the only opportunity 
to expand a supplier’s retail customer base. Further-
more, renewable electricity has a strong marketing 
appeal, which may be a valuable instrument once full 
competition enters into force. Finally, because of the 
favourable ecotax regulations the margins on renew-
able electricity supply are relatively high. The suppli-
ers therefore have a strong incentive to promote the 
development of a green electricity market. As a conse-
quence of the negligible price difference between re-
newable electricity and grey electricity and the market-
ing efforts of suppliers the number of renewable elec-
tricity customers has increased from some 250,000 at 
the beginning of 2001 to approximately one million in 
mid 2002. Fig. 2 illustrates the steep increase in renew-
able electricity customers since mid 2001. 
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Fig. 2. Increase in the number of renewable electricity 
customers. 
Source: www.greenprices.com. 
The current domestic renewable electricity produc-
tion is sufficient to supply approximately 500.000 
households (Platform Energy Liberalisation, 2001). 
Consequently a large proportion of demand is met 
through imports of renewable electricity. Fig. 3 gives 
the volumes of imported and domestic green certifi-
cates issued and traded over time. While imports be-
came eligible for green certificates in January 2002 
there has been some delay in issuing the green certifi-
cates. Therefore the graph shows that the first green 
certificates for imported renewable electricity were 
issued in February 2002. Nevertheless, imports of 
renewable electricity had been going on for some time 
before 2002. It is estimated that the total volume of 
renewable electricity imports increased from 1.4 TWh 
in 2000 (CBS, 2001) to approximately 7.5 TWh in 
2001 (Kroon, 2002). It should be noted that all of these 
imports were at least eligible for the production sub-
sidy. Furthermore, except for the period from July 
2001 to January 2002 these imports were also eligible 
for the ecotax exemption. Imports of renewable elec-
tricity thus lead to a vast cost in terms of avoided tax 
revenues to the Dutch government. Total avoided of 
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tax revenues in 2001 to support renewable electricity 
are currently estimated at 205 million Euro: 23 million 
Euro as a consequence of the ecotax exemption and 
182 million euro from the production subsidy (Parlia-
ment, 2002). With total eligible renewable electricity 
production in the Netherlands in 2001 of around 1.6 
TWh and imports of around 7.5 TWh the majority of 
these costs can be attributed to the import of renewable 
electricity. From the green certificate statistics (Green 
Certificate Body, 2002) it can be inferred that cost of 
avoided tax revenues due to imports from January till 
October 2002 amounts to almost 250 million Euro.  
These imports come from existing plants that have 
been realised in absence of the Dutch renewable elec-
tricity policy. Moreover, these plants would have con-
tinued to operate under their national support schemes 
if the Dutch market wouldn’t be more attractive. Thus, 
the Dutch policy does not trigger additional invest-
ments in renewable energy projects abroad. 
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Fig. 3. Green certificate (GC) volumes  
Source: Green Certificate Body. 
Sustainability of the Dutch renewable energy 
support framework 
The number of renewable electricity customers is still 
rising. Moreover, there is increasing interest from the 
business sectors to purchase renewable electricity 
(www.greenprices.com). As domestic supply is fixed 
in the short run the increase in demand will principally 
be fulfilled with imports. As renewable generating 
capacity in the EU is also fixed in the short run the 
ecotax exemption and production subsidy effectively 
only establish a reallocation of foreign production from 
their respective domestic markets to the Dutch renew-
able electricity market. However, the Dutch support 
scheme triggers no additional capacity investments in 
these export countries. If the current favourable in-
vestment conditions in the Netherlands are maintained 
it can be anticipated that new domestic capacity should 
be added in the coming years to fulfil some of the 
demand increase. However, exactly here lies the para-
dox of the Dutch renewables policy framework. Be-
cause the support framework is so favourable, includ-
ing to imports of non-additional renewable electricity, 
the loss of ecotax revenue to other countries renders 
the this very support scheme politically and financially 
unsustainable in the long run. Investors anticipate 
changes to the support framework to correct for the 
loss of tax revenue. Therefore, the scheme is ineffec-
tive in providing the long-term revenue security that is 
needed for investments in new renewable capacity – in 
the Netherlands or in other countries. 
Analysis of the policy problem for the Nether-
lands 
From the above it becomes clear that the primary pol-
icy challenge for the Netherlands is to create investor 
security to stimulate domestic production and to limit 
import volumes to reduce tax losses. An analysis of 
optimal trade flows of renewable electricity to meet the 
Member State consumption targets under the Renew-
ables Directive with the REBUS model71 shows that 
for the Netherlands it is cost-effective to import about 
1,3 TWh in 2010 (Voogt et al., 2001). In other words, a 
cost-effective implementation of the Renewables Di-
rective in the Netherlands requires a certain level of 
import. Therefore, imports cannot simply be discarded. 
A sustainable solution to incorporating imports in the 
renewables policy framework has to be found.  
The above considerations with respect to the import 
of renewable electricity make that the success of the 
Dutch renewable energy policy is directly linked to the 
renewable energy policies in other Member States. The 
value of renewable electricity in any country is primar-
ily determined by the policy framework. Furthermore, 
trade will always take place in the direction of the 
highest value. Therefore we need to have a careful look 
at the policy conditions in other Member States to 
attune the Dutch policy framework to these conditions. 
RES-E Support Policies in the EU 
The dominant renewable electricity policy instruments 
can be categorised as supply or demand oriented, and 
quantity or price based. Fig. 4 gives a categorisation of 
the main policy instruments applied in the EU accord-
ing to these criteria. Fig. 4 shows that the Netherlands 
is the only Member State that uses a combination of 
consumption stimulation and price based policy 
through the ecotax. Moreover, the ecotax regulations 
are generic. That is they apply to both domestic pro-
duction and eligible foreign production. The categori-
sation in Fig. 4 can be used to identify how the differ-
ent policy instruments impact on the supply and de-
mand curve for renewable electricity in the Member 
States. With these supply and demand curves the 
REBUS model can simulate the trade flows between 
the different Member States, and evaluate the effect of 
the ecotax regulations on the value of renewable elec-
tricity in the EU and on the volume of import to the 
Netherlands. As an example Fig. 5 shows the effective 
supply and demand curves for the Dutch renewable 
electricity market in 2005 taking into account the poli-
                                                           
71 REBUS stands for Renewable Energy BUrden Sharing. The model 
contains costs and realisable potentials for all renewables in the EU-
15. These can be used to evaluate the consequences of the implemen-
tation of renewable energy targets and the role of renewable electric-
ity trading. The model assumes a completely open market for green 
certificates in the EU in 2010. Currently the model is expanded and 
updated to model the effects of policy interactions on renewable 
electricity trade and investment. 
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cies in the reciprocal Member States72. Unless new 
policies are announced a continuation of current poli-
cies is assumed. New policies are taken into account to 
the extent that they are known. 
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Fig. 5. Supply and demand curve for the Netherlands in 
2005 
The supply curve for the Dutch market consists of 
the Dutch domestic supply curve plus the minimum 
prices for which foreign producers are willing to offer 
their renewable electricity on the Dutch market. These 
minimum prices are the higher of the level of support 
they receive in their own country and their cost of 
production. In 2005 there will be 9 countries that meet 
the reciprocity criterion for export to the Netherlands73. 
The demand curve for the Dutch market is built up 
according to the structure of the ecotax as given in 
table 1. The 2001 level of the ecotax is assumed to be 
maintained till 2005. Moreover, it is assumed that there 
is a maximum demand of approximately 40% per con-
sumer segment under the ecotax74. The demand curve 
reflects both the value of the ecotax exemption and the 
production subsidy. Both the demand curve and the 
supply curve exclude the value of the physical power, 
which is assumed to be traded on the conventional 
power market. According to the above analysis the 
equilibrium amount of renewable electricity consump-
tion in the Netherlands is approximately 30 TWh. The 
                                                           
72 Assumptions: hydro excluded. 
73 By 2005 the following countries meet the reciprocity criterion: 
Austria, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Finland, Belgium, Spain, 
Germany, and the United Kingdom. 
74 If the demand in any segment is lower than the assumed maximum 
of 40% the demand curve will shift to the left. If demand is higher 
than 40% the demand curve will shift to the right. 
equilibrium price of the green value will lie around 3.6 
€ct/kWh75.  
Implications for government expenditure 
In the above analysis the contribution of domestic 
production to the renewable electricity market amounts 
to around 2 TWh of the total 30 TWh. The remaining 
28 TWh is import76. The Dutch energy suppliers can 
purchase this electricity at a price of about 3.6 
€ct/kWh, i.e. the equilibrium price. However, they can 
claim the tax benefits of the ecotax exemption plus the 
production subsidy, i.e. the first 15 TWh at 7.8 
€ct/kWh and the following 15 TWh at 3.9 €ct/kWh. 
This amounts to €1.75 billion of tax revenue losses in 
2005. 
The 28 TWh of production that was imported to the 
Netherlands would also have been realised if the pro-
ducers would have used their national support 
schemes. Therefore the additionality of this supply is at 
least questionable. Moreover, it can be doubted if this 
supply will be available for the Netherlands in the long 
run to meet its 2010 consumption target. In conclusion, 
according to the above scenario the Dutch government 
will loose €1.75 billion of tax revenue on 28 TWh of 
imported renewable electricity without any certainty as 
to whether this will count towards meeting its 2010 
target and without providing a significant incentive to 
increase the level of domestic production.  
Possible policy responses for the Netherlands 
Possible policy responses for the Netherlands to reduce 
the amount of tax losses to foreign renewable electric-
ity production are to abolish production subsidy (36o) 
and to reduce the ecotax exemption (36i). For example, 
the ecotax exemption can be adjusted to reflect the 
value of the avoided CO2 emissions. However, even 
when the ecotax exemption is lowered, in the short run 
there will always be a large potential of low cost re-
newable electricity that can be imported into the Neth-
erlands, thus causing an outflow of tax revenues. In the 
long run this potential is likely to shrink as other 
Member States increase their policy effort to attain 
their 2010 renewables targets. 
The above ecotax measures can be employed to re-
strict the problem of tax revenue losses due to imports 
of renewable electricity. However, they do not resolve 
the issue of providing investor security to stimulate 
domestic production. There are two principle policy 
instruments that are employed throughout the EU to 
stimulate the production of renewable electricity. 
These are feed-in tariffs and quota systems. Under a 
feed-in system producers of renewable electricity re-
ceive a fixed tariff per kWh delivered to the grid. Un-
der a quota system producers, suppliers or consumers 
                                                           
75 Of course, the supply and demand curves can include uncertain-
ties, which may cause the equilibrium price and amount to be differ-
ent than elaborated in this example. However, it is likely that the 
equilibrium price will roughly lie between 3 and 4 €c/kWh and that 
the equilibrium quantity will be between 15 and 30 TWh. These are 
broad margins, but in any case a lot of tax money is involved. 
76 The requirement to reserve and use import capacity on the cross-
border interconnectors limits the maximum import to about 20TWh.  
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of electricity are obliged to meet a certain percentage 
of their production, supply or demand with renewable 
electricity. Such a quota system can be facilitated 
through a tradable green certificate system as already 
in place in the Netherlands. Both feed-in tariffs and 
quota systems can be used in parallel to the ecotax 
incentives. Also, both can be used to provide a secure 
investment climate for renewable energy investors.  
Interactions between National Renewable Elec-
tricity Support Policies 
Above some possible policy responses of the Nether-
lands to increase domestic renewable production and 
restrict tax losses were outlined. In choosing a set of 
policy instruments and in the design of these instru-
ments the government also needs to take account of the 
developments in other Member States. 
In 2003 all Member States are required to have im-
plemented a system of guarantees of origin to authenti-
cate the sources of renewable electricity production. 
The guarantees of origin will be used as a proof of 
compliance of the Member States with their target 
under the Renewables directive. Although guarantees 
of origin are not necessarily tradable it is likely that in 
many countries they will be. Certainly in the view the 
of market, guarantees of origin are likely to get the 
same status of green certificates. Moreover, several 
Member States have explicitly indicated the possibility 
to open their renewable market to imports from other 
Member States on the basis of reciprocal trade ar-
rangements77. For example, Italy is currently investi-
gating the possibilities of allowing imports of green 
certificates on the condition that the CO2 rights at-
tached to the certificate are imported along with the 
certificate. The establishment of a more standardised 
system of guarantees of origin throughout the EU is 
likely to facilitate the trade of renewable electricity 
between Member States. As Member States open their 
renewable electricity market for foreign production 
markets will become more directly linked. As a conse-
quence the success of renewable energy policy is no 
longer only dependent on domestic policies, but also 
depends on the policies in other Member States. For 
example, depending on the value of renewable electric-
ity in other Member States renewable electricity that is 
currently exported to the Netherlands may shift to a 
competing market (e.g. Italy) and thus no longer count 
for the Dutch renewables target. Thus, if imports are to 
play a role in the Dutch policy effort to attain the 
Dutch target under the Renewables directive the Dutch 
government must seek a fine balance of attracting 
sufficient imports while not unduly increasing the cost 
of their renewable electricity policy. 
Even when markets are not directly linked there may 
be indirect relations between the effects of policies in 
different countries. For example, the Belgium region of 
Flanders operates a green certificate system, which 
does not allow the export of certificates outside Bel-
gium. Thus, no direct international trade of green cer-
tificates from Flanders is possible. Nevertheless, an 
                                                           
77 Denmark, Sweden, UK, Italy. 
operator of a wind park in Flanders may chose not to 
apply for Flemish certificates, but apply for Dutch 
certificates instead if the value of the green certificate 
is higher in the Netherlands than in Flanders. In this 
case part of the supply would be withdrawn from the 
Flemish market. This may complicate compliance in 
Flanders and increase the social cost due to penalty 
payments. Moreover, the production from this wind-
park cannot be counted for Belgium target under the 
Renewables Directive. Similar indirect interactions can 
exist between countries with a feed-in system and with 
green certificate systems. 
Implications for the European green certificate 
market and investment climate 
The case of the Netherlands illustrates the direct and 
indirect interactions that exist between the policy 
frameworks in the different Member States. In absence 
of a harmonised trading framework, and given the 
differences in support schemes between member states 
the value of RES varies per country according to the 
support mechanisms that are in place. Due to the trad-
ing of renewable electricity these differences in the 
value of renewable electricity affect the effectiveness 
of support mechanisms in the different Member States. 
This may cause policy makers to frequently adapt the 
national support frameworks in view of developments 
in the other Member States. Such frequent adaptation 
in different Member States causes a great deal of pol-
icy uncertainty-not only because the value of a project 
may keep changing, but also because investors are 
constantly reassessing which national market to target. 
Of course such uncertainty predominantly plays a role 
in the transition to a harmonised market and support 
framework for RES in Europe. In a completely harmo-
nised market the price signal should be the same in 
each country. Thus while the transition period allowed 
for in the RES directive was meant to provide enough 
certainty to provide investors confidence in the transi-
tion to a harmonised market, the effect may be the 
reverse. Due to the prolonged transition adaptations in 
the national support policies are likely to continue 
which increases uncertainty. 
The Case for harmonisation of Renewables 
Support Frameworks in the EU 
Whereas to date national renewable energy policy 
portfolios are mostly aimed at developing the national 
RES potential with the aim of reaching national RES 
targets, the liberalisation of the EU electricity markets 
and the RES Directive now provide the possibility to 
reach national targets through European trade of re-
newable electricity. The trading of renewable electric-
ity across the EU exploits the benefits of varying local 
circumstances by first using the least expensive options 
available in the EU. In the REBUS project an assess-
ment of the benefits from a harmonised EU RES trad-
ing scheme has been made (Voogt et al., 2001). 
REBUS demonstrated that total cost savings across the 
EU-15 of up to 15% can be achieved through the trad-
ing of green certificates between Member States.  
ENER Forum 3. Successfully Promoting Renewable Energy Sources in Europe. 
 Budapest, Hungary, 6-7 June 2002  
ENER 25.02 67 
In addition to the significant cost savings, a harmo-
nised market would have a single equilibrium price 
that would provide clear short and long-term price 
signals to investors to establish new plants. Moreover, 
the size of the combined national markets would also 
be an important stabilising factor as it provides en-
hanced flexibility for traders to sell the renewable 
electricity in different countries. Thus the commercial 
and political risk of changing market conditions in any 
single country is limited.  
Levels of harmonisation 
Harmonisation is often associated with creating a uni-
form support framework for renewables. Although this 
can be the end point of harmonisation, there are many 
steps in between. By distinguishing the different steps 
along the harmonisation path we can get a clearer pic-
ture of what level of harmonisation is necessary to 
provide a stable investment climate, to meet the targets 
under the Renewables Directive and to safeguard a 
good functioning of the internal market.  
In view of the targets set under the Renewables Di-
rective, the first step of harmonisation is to provide a 
common framework for the registration and verifica-
tion of renewable electricity that is produced. The 
Renewables Directive provides for such a common 
framework by requiring that each Member State set up 
a system of guarantees of origin. These guarantees of 
origin will “specify the energy source from which the 
electricity was produced…”, and “serve to enable pro-
ducers of electricity from renewable energy sources to 
demonstrate that the electricity they sell is produced 
from renewable energy sources…”. Moreover, guaran-
tees of origin are the “exclusive proof” of renewable 
electricity production (European Commission, 2001). 
Each Member State is left to implement its own system 
of guarantees of origin, but if necessary the Commis-
sion may propose common rules on the implementation 
of these systems.  
Guarantees of origin need to be distinguished from 
tradable green certificates, as guarantees of origin are 
not necessarily tradable. However, based on certifi-
cates of origin tradable green certificates can be issued. 
In that case the associated guarantee of origin then has 
to be attached to the green certificate so that it cannot 
be used again to issue another green certificate. In the 
countries that have implemented a green certificate 
system it is likely that green certificates will also get 
the function of guarantees of origin. Vice versa, if 
guarantees of origin are allowed to be traded they will 
also have the function of tradable green certificates. 
The next step is to base the monitoring of the Mem-
ber States’ progress towards reaching their 2010 re-
newables targets on these guarantees of origin. Mem-
ber States will have to demonstrate compliance with 
their targets by surrendering the equivalent amount of 
guarantees of origin. However, in the Renewables 
Directive the Member State targets are specified as 
consumption targets. Therefore, in view of the 
monitoring of the targets agreements have to be made 
on how to account for the consumption of renewable 
electricity. Whatever this agreement is, monitoring of 
tricity. Whatever this agreement is, monitoring of con-
sumption should be based on guarantees of origin.  
In addition to the actual consumption by final energy 
consumers, the use of a support scheme can also be 
seen as consumption. For example, when a producer 
surrenders a guarantee of origin to claim a feed-in tariff 
with a network operator this can be seen as consump-
tion of the guarantee of origin. The network operator 
consequently has to transfer the guarantee of origin to a 
national registry where it can be counted for meeting 
the renewables target. Effectively all support mecha-
nisms that target the output of renewable energy plant 
(e.g. feed-in tariffs, ecotax exemptions and quota) can 
in this respect be seen as consumption of renewable 
electricity and the associated guarantees of origin. 
Thus, the next step for harmonisation is to establish 
that the use of output oriented support schemes in a 
certain Member State counts as consumption of renew-
able electricity in that Member State and that this is 
administered through the system of guarantees of ori-
gin.  
Furthermore, in relation to eligibility rules for na-
tional markets and support mechanisms it is important 
to set common standards for the information content of 
a guarantee of origin. A key requirement in this regard 
is that it should be clear whether a renewable energy 
plant has received investment support. The harmonisa-
tion of the information content becomes more impor-
tant as the role of international trade in renewable 
electricity increases and producers have multiple sup-
port mechanisms and markets to choose from.  
So far the basic steps in harmonising the verification, 
registration and monitoring framework for renewable 
electricity under the Renewables Directive have been 
discussed. In conjunction with the harmonisation of the 
rules for international trade of renewable electricity, 
this level of harmonisation is sufficient to facilitate 
international trade in renewable electricity. Such a 
common framework for verification, registration, 
monitoring and trade can co-exist along various sup-
port schemes. At the same time it provides the possibil-
ity to realise some of the benefits associated with inter-
national trade. 
As alluded before, policy interactions arise from dif-
ferences in the value of renewable electricity in the 
different Member States. This in turn is related to the 
differences in support levels. To avoid undesired pol-
icy interactions the level of support in the different 
Member States can be harmonised. Such harmonisation 
of the support level can first be established between 
countries that have a similar support framework, e.g. 
harmonising penalty levels between quota systems. At 
a later stage the support frameworks of the different 
groups of countries with similar policies can be har-
monised with each other, until finally harmonisation is 
completed.  
Fig. 6 outlines the different levels of harmonisation 
as discussed above. The necessity and level of har-
monisation of the support frameworks within the EU 
has to be established in the light of the experiences 
gained with co-existing support schemes in the differ-
ent Member States. 
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Harmonisation of support 
levels 
Harmonisation of support 
framework and instruments 
 
Fig. 6. Levels of harmonisation. GoO stands for Guar-
antees of Origin. 
The European policy challenge 
The EU RES directive provides the principal legal 
framework for RES policy at the European and Mem-
ber State level. It sets indicative targets for the penetra-
tion of RES-E for each of the Member States for the 
year 2010 and furthermore stipulates trigger criteria 
and a timeframe for the potential further harmonisation 
of the internal market for RES-E. A key milestone in 
the RES directive is the 2005 reporting duty of the 
Commission to the Council and the Parliament on the 
progress of the Member States towards meeting their 
indicative targets, as well as the possible interactions 
between the RES policy instruments in the different 
Member States. Based on the analysis presented in this 
report the Commission may – if necessary – decide to 
develop further initiatives to promote the penetration of 
renewables in EU energy mix. Such initiatives may 
entail mandatory Member State targets and further 
harmonisation of the support framework for RES-E. 
Recognising that by 2005 the implementation of RES 
projects is determined by economic and policy condi-
tions beyond the timeframe of the RES directive, the 
Commission would also need a long-term strategy to 
underpin potential further policy initiatives. 
Having different support schemes in different Mem-
ber States enables the EU to review the pros and cons 
of the distinct national approaches to RES-E policy. 
Many research and evaluation projects have been car-
ried out and many discussions have been held in which 
proponents were trying to convince the opponents of 
their preferred support schemes. These projects and 
discussions have led to a thorough understanding of the 
advantages and disadvantages of the different ap-
proaches. But what is probably more important: they 
show that it is not likely to expect a uniform view on 
“a best support scheme” to be developed for a harmo-
nised renewable electricity market in Europe. Most 
studies demonstrate that different policy instruments 
serve to achieve different policy goals at different 
administrative levels, such as fuel diversity, industrial 
development, employment, specific resource utilisa-
tion, greenhouse gas emissions reductions, improving 
local air quality and increasing the share of renewables 
in the generation mix. 
While this diversity of policy instruments is granted 
in relation to the diversity of policy goals at different 
administrative levels, the trading of RES-E in the in-
ternal market for renewable electricity causes that these 
policy instruments may interact and possibly under-
mine each other’s effectiveness. International trade of 
RES-E in a non-harmonised market introduces a de-
pendency of the value of renewable electricity on the 
policy conditions of other Member States. Therefore, it 
is likely that in the transition period towards a harmo-
nised support framework and EU market for RES, 
national governments would have to make regular 
adjustments to the national support mechanisms in 
order to compensate for the effects of policy develop-
ments in other Member States. Such policy adjust-
ments can cause an uncertain environment for invest-
ment. A harmonised support framework can create a 
more open and stable EU market for renewable elec-
tricity and thus provide a more stimulating environ-
ment for new investments. 
In its harmonisation strategy EU should at minimum 
establish a common framework for the issuing, regis-
tration and consumption of guarantees of origin in 
relation to the monitoring of the progress of the Mem-
ber States towards achieving their targets under the 
Renewables Directive. Furthermore, the rules for 
European trade in guarantees of origin or tradable 
green certificates should be harmonised. The ensuing 
steps of harmonisation consist of first harmonising the 
support levels and trade between Member States with 
similar support frameworks and then harmonising the 
support frameworks between all Member States. Based 
on experience with the efficiency and effectiveness of 
the coexistence of various support schemes in different 
Member States it will have to be decided what mini-
mum level of harmonisation is required. The Dutch 
experience demonstrates that there are interactions 
between support mechanisms in different Member 
States and that these should be taken into account in 
designing or adjusting policy instruments. This demon-
strates the need for at least some form of co-ordination. 
In deciding on the level of harmonisation that is neces-
sary the benefits of harmonisation should be balanced 
with the benefits of pursuing more nationally oriented 
strategies that may be granted in order to achieve a 
divers set of policy goals related to renewable energy. 
Finally, it is necessary to set a long-term target for 
the penetration of renewable electricity in the EU and 
to announce the policy framework in which target is to 
be reached. Most current renewable energy invest-
ments have a lifetime well over the timeframe of the 
Renewables Directive. The Renewables Directive is 
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thereby an insufficient framework for providing long-
term certainty to investors.  
Conclusions 
RES policy making at the EU level has to balance a 
diverse set of policy objectives and associated instru-
ments at the local, national, regional and European 
level with the need to harmonise these instruments 
with a view to insuring the overall effectiveness of 
RES policy at all of these levels. The example of the 
Netherlands demonstrates that there is a relationship 
between policy developments at the various national 
levels, which may affect the effectiveness of national 
support mechanisms. The effectiveness of national 
renewables support mechanisms is primarily hampered 
by the lack of investor security as a consequence of 
continuously changing and interacting policy and mar-
ket conditions. To provide a more stable investment 
climate harmonisation of national renewables support 
policies is necessary. Moreover, the EU should estab-
lish a long-term target for the penetration of renewable 
electricity in the EU electricity market, as well as the 
policy framework within which this target is to be 
achieved in order to create long-term certainty for 
investors. 
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Abstract. The paper provides details on green certificate 
systems in Belgium. The Flemish region has established a 
system and the Walloon region is preparing a slightly differ-
ent one. The lack of uniformity and consequently of transpar-
ency in one country emphasises the need for more EU leader-
ship in the field. 
The main part of the article analyses the established Flem-
ish system. Green certificates are complementary to other 
instruments that promote renewable electricity, e.g. direct 
subventions on the feed-in price of green electricity or direct 
subventions on capital investments. Certificates execute a 
forcing effect on the actual development of green power if 
the imposed shares of green power in total sales are signifi-
cant and if the fine level is at the height to enforce the quota. 
If the fine is too low the incentive effect turns into a financ-
ing tax effect. When the green certificate system does the job 
it is designed for, i.e. operating at the edge of the RES-E 
development and organise the transition from a non-
sustainable to a sustainable power system, certificate prices 
will be high and reduce end-use consumption of electricity. A 
segmentation of the RES-E certificate market along the 
various RES-E technologies is a necessity to keep the system 
affordable, effective and efficient. 
For harmonising the European market for green certificates 
and for installing the equimarginal cost principle among 
RES-E generators within the same technology group, one can 
think of two solutions. Either a single European green certifi-
cates market is established, or  (yearly) optimal quotas are 
assigned to the various member states. Both solutions require 
an intensive follow-up of cost structures and of public policy 
measures (subventions) in all member states, but given the 
infant state of understanding and experience isolating re-
gional and national markets may be best in the nearby years. 
Part I: Green Certificate Systems (proposed) in 
Belgium 
Actors responsible for energy policy in Belgium 
The situation in Belgium is complicated by the legen-
dary institutional complexity of the country. Belgium 
is a federal state consisting of three regions: Flanders, 
Wallonia and Brussels. In Belgium ‘energy’ falls under 
the responsibility of both the federal and the regional 
authorities for certain matters.  
The federal authorities are responsible for:   
• The national equipment programme in the electric-
ity and gas sector;  
• Electricity generation (power stations);  
• Electricity transmission (high-voltage lines);  
• Tariffs.   
The regional authorities are responsible for:    
• Local transmission and distribution of electricity 
(under 70 kV);  
• Public gas distribution;  
• Cogeneration;  
• Promotion of renewable energy sources (RES); 
• Rational use of energy (RUE).   
Flanders has introduced a green certificate system, 
with an obligation starting January 1st, 2002. Wallonia 
is about to introduce a slightly different green certifi-
cate system.  
The Brussel region adopted a new electricity law in 
July 2001, which will come into practice in 2003.  
This new law opens up the possibility for a regional 
certificates scheme covering the Brussels region, but it 
is unclear if a market system for green electricity will 
ever be proposed.  
A separate arrangement will operate at the federal 
level. The federal obligation will apply to large cus-
tomers directly connected to the grid. Offshore wind-
mills don’t belong to one specific region and are there-
fore a federal matter in Belgium. Offshore windmills 
will probably sell their certificates to the grid operator, 
who will then sell them on to distributors at whatever 
price he can obtain. Details have not been made offi-
cial yet.  
Purpose of a green certificate market 
The main objective of a legally enforceable ‘quota-
based system’ is to stimulate the penetration of a pre-
defined amount of Renewable Energy Sourced Elec-
tricity (RES-E) into the electricity market.  
According to the RES-E Directive (2001/77/EC), the 
indicative national target for RES-E for 2010 for Bel-
gium is 6,0%.  
The main characteristic of a tradable green certificate 
(TGC) system is the creation of a separate market for 
the “greenness” of the RES electricity, beside the mar-
ket for physical electricity [Schaeffer 2000, p. 7]. RES-
electricity is treated as any other electricity in the 
(physical) electricity market, and certificates are traded 
separately as financial assets. The green certificate 
market will function as a financial one. There is how-
ever a one-to-one link between the number of green 
certificates and the number of (physical) kWh pro-
duced by renewable technologies.  
General description of the TGC systems in Belgium.  
Generators of Renewable Energy Sourced Electricity 
(RES-E) are certified for producing RES electricity. 
For the production of each unit of RES electricity, they 
will receive a tradable green certificate (TGC) from the 
regional authorities [(1) in Fig. 1]. Because the certifi-
cate is unique, it is the only official proof and guaran-
tee of a unit RES electricity having been produced.  
In Flanders the regional authority will issue a TGC 
of 1000 kWh for each 1000 kWh RES electricity gen-
erated by the RES-E producers in their own region. In 
Wallonia, a green certificate will be issued for each 
450 kg of CO2 avoided. The RES-E producers can sell 
the TGCs to suppliers of electricity (wholesale power 
distributors)  [(2) in Fig. 1].  
Each producer of RES electricity thus produces two 
distinct goods:   
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• Physical electricity, which is fed into the grid 
(exported) and sold at market prices in the ‘physi-
cal electricity market’ [(3) in Fig. 1];  
• Tradable Green Certificates, where each TGC 
represents the ‘added value’ or ‘greenness’ of one 
pre-defined unit of electricity produced from RES-
E.   
RES-E
producers
suppliers of
electricity
regional
authoritiesfund TGC market
electricity
market
(2)
 TG
C
(5) TGC
(7) TGC
(1) TGC
(3) electricity
(3) electricity
(8) fine (penalty price)
(9) financing new RES-E
(6) TGC
(Wallonia)
(10) subsidy (Wallonia)
 (4) Quotum
 
Fig. 1. Structure of the green certificate markets in 
Flanders and in Wallonia. 
Source: CWAPE; Europese Commisssie. Staatsteun nr. N 550/2000 – 
België Groenestroomcertificaten. 
Demand for green certificates is imposed by the re-
gional governments on the suppliers of electricity sell-
ing electricity to the end-users in their region, because 
they must cover a given share (quota) of electricity 
generated by RES-E [(4) in Fig. 1]. The quotas differ 
for the Flemish and Walloon regions (see Table 1). 
To meet this obligation, each electricity supplier may 
be allowed to himself produce RES-E, or buy a spe-
cific number of TGCs from the RES-E producers, 
corresponding to a percentage (quota) of their total 
electricity supplied to the end-users during one calen-
dar year [(5) in Fig. 1].  
The government itself can also act as a buyer of 
green certificates, e.g. by securing a minimum price.  
This is only the case in the Walloon region [(6) in Fig. 
1].  
At the end of each year a volume of tradable green 
certificates corresponding to the quota will be with-
drawn from the market by the regional government. 
Electricity suppliers have to hand over a certain 
amount of certificates to the regional regulating au-
thorities [(7) in Fig. 1].  
Electricity suppliers have an incentive to buy certifi-
cates from the producers, because penalties are set if 
they are not able to meet their obligation [(8) in Fig. 1]. 
The penalties differ for the Flemish and Walloon re-
gions (see Table 1).  
The penalty or fine is used for feeding a regional Re-
newable Energy Fund. This Fund can be used to fi-
nance new renewable installations [(9) in Fig. 1]. In the 
Walloon region, RES-E producers may exchange their 
TGCs to the regional authority for a subsidy [(10) in 
Fig. 1].  
The Flemish and Walloon TGC systems will co-exist 
with other renewable energy regulations. These regula-
tions include, for the household sector, a reduction in 
income taxes for investments such as the installation of 
solar panels for sanitary hot water production or the 
installation of photovoltaïc panels, or the SOLTHERM 
program in Wallonia, providing a subsidy of 620 € for 
the installation of 4 m² solar panels, plus 74 € per extra 
m². For the industry local authorities will continue to 
provide financial support for the development of re-
newable energy.   
Particularities of the Flemish and (proposed) Walloon 
green certificate markets 
See Table 1, next page. 
Part II. Economic Analysis of the Green Cer-
tificate System in Flanders 
In this part of the article we hook up with the discus-
sion on green certificates in Europe (see e.g. Mothorst 
2000, Schaeffer et al. 1999, 2000, Huber et al. 2001, 
2002). Most authors suggest that one has to investigate 
thoroughly the TGC instrument before engaging in 
practical experiments, and we join this argument after 
study of the Flemish system vested since January 1st 
2002. 
For the analysis it is assumed that:  
a) There is a liberalised “physical electricity” market, 
with perfect competition. The balance between 
electricity supply and demand determines the elec-
tricity market equilibrium price PE.  Every RES-E 
producer has the possibility to feed into the grid at 
non-discriminating conditions. 
b) There is a  “tradable green certificate” market, 
with transparent price determination at a green cer-
tificate exchange. The balance between TGC sup-
ply and demand determines the TGC market equi-
librium price. 
c) There is no international trading, and for case of 
simplicity we do not consider the possibility of 
banking certificates over the years. Therefore the 
analysis is mainly static. 
d) There is a consensus among stakeholders, includ-
ing all electricity end-users, that the actual non-
sustainable fossil-fuel and nuclear based power 
system should be phased out and replaced by a 
sustainable one based on renewable energy. 
Our analysis takes the structure of a static supply-
demand analysis.  
The Supply Side of RES-E 
In the present perspective of energy sector liberalisa-
tion and of stimulating private entrepreneurs, govern-
ment will not itself deploy RES-E investments78 but 
rather expect from private investors to divert their 
funds to RES-E projects. In this context it is good to 
remember how private investors make investment 
decisions. 
 
                                                           
78 In the 1980’s the first and only wind farm in Belgium at Zee-
brugge (4.5 MW) was realised by the Ministry of Infrastructure. 
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Table 1. Flemish and (proposed) Walloon TGC systems compared 
 Flanders Wallonia 
 
Legal references 
- “Het decreet van 17 juli 2000 houdende de organisatie van 
de elektriciteitsmarkt” (B.S. 22 september 2000), a.k.a. the 
“Elektriciteitsdecreet”, in particular articles 21 to 25. 
- “Besluit van de Vlaamse regering van 28 september 2001 
inzake de bevordering van elektriciteitsopwekking uit 
hernieuwbare energiebronnnen” 
- “Le décret du 12 avril 2001 à l’organisation du marché 
régional de l’electricité”.  
- Proposal  “Arrêté du Gouvernement wallon relatif à la 
promotion de l’électricité verte”. This bill organizes the 
green certificates market and the promotion of green 
electricity in Wallonia, and has been sent to the Council 
of State for advice 
 
Starting date 
 
January 1st, 2002 
 
Not yet operational  
 
EU competition 
law clearance 
The EC has approved the Flemish system on July 25th, 2001 
“Steunmaatregel N 550/2000 – België”  
The EC has approved the proposed Walloon system om 
November 28th, 2001 
“Steunmaatregel N 415/01 – België” 
Obliged actors Electricity suppliers selling electricity to end-users in the 
Flemish region 
Electricity suppliers selling electricity to end-users in the 
Walloon region 
 
Quantitative 
obligations  
(Quota) 
A percentage obligation in kWh supplied  
The number of certificates to be submitted for a given year is 
fixed according to a certain equation. For the following years, 
the percentage obligation coincides with the Flemish targets 
regarding the use of renewables: 
2002: 1,41% 
2003: 2,05% 
2004: 3% 
2010: 5% 
 
A percentage obligation in kWh supplied  
1/10/2002 – 30/9/2003: 3% 
1/10/2003 – 30/9/2004: 4% 
1/10/2004 – 30/9/2005: 5% 
1/10/2005 – 30/9/2006: 6% 
1/10/2006 – 30/9/2007: 7,2% 
1/10/2007 – 30/9/2008: 8,6% 
1/10/2008 – 30/9/2009: 10,2% 
1/10/2009 – 30/9/2010: 12% 
From september 2010 onward, the quota will be multiplied 
annualy by a factor of 1,01.  
Homogeneity of 
obligations 
 
No technological differentiation of obligations  
 
No technological differentiation of obligations 
Issuing body Regional regulator (public authority) 
VREG (Vlaamse Reguleringsinstantie voor de Elektriciteits- 
en Gasmarkt)  
Regional regulator (public authority) 
CWAPE (Commission wallone pour l’énergie) 
Renewable 
energy tech-
nologies in-
cluded 
- Solar energy (solar thermal power and photovoltaics)  
- Wind-energy (but offshore wind production falls under 
the federal jurisdiction)  
- Small scale hydropower (< 10 MW)  
- Tidal stream energy and tidal wave energy 
- Geothermal electricity 
- Biogas from the fermentation of organic wastes  
- Animal manure, including biogas generated from animal 
manure 
- Biomass, including biogas generated from biomass, if 
not processed alongside residual wastes 
- Energy generated from:  
a) Dead animals 
b) Road verge trimmings 
c) Vegetables, Fruit, and Garden waste (VFG) 
d) Seperately collected or sorted organic wastes 
e) Purification sludge 
f) Frying oil used for making ‘chips’ or ‘French fries’ 
(the national dish in Belgium) 
The Flemish region will introduce a separate certificate sys-
tem for “high quality CHP”.  
- Renewables, as defined in the “RES-E Directive” 
(European Parliament and Council, published 27 Oc-
tober 2001 PB L 283 27.10.2001, p. 33) 
- “High quality CHP” (certificates will be issued on the 
basis of avoided CO2-emissions) 
Technologies 
excluded 
Residual wastes and combined processing with residual 
wastes 
 
Banking YES YES 
Borrowing NO NO 
Maximum price Defined by the penalty Defined by the penalty 
Minimum price NO Producers of RES-E may exchange their TGC to CWAPE 
for a subsidy, at a fixed price of 65 € per TGC (1 TGC = 1 
MWh) 
Penalty for non-
compliance 
Penalty is a fixed price per missing TGC 
2002: 50 € per missing TGC (1000 kWh)  
This fine will gradually increase to a maximum of 124 € per 
missing TGC  
Penalty is a fixed price per missing TGC 
2002: 75 € per missing TGC (1000 kWh).  
From April 1st 2003 onward: 100 € per missing TGC (1000 
kWh) 
Period of valid-
ity 
5 years 
TGC can only be produced for meeting the RES obligation 
during the year of production and five years thereafter.   
5 years 
International 
trading 
- Certificates from installations outside the Flemish region 
plus the Belgian territorial sea, are not taken into account 
within the regional obligation. They may however be used 
to sell  “green power” to end-users in the Flemish region, 
under the provision that the certificates are submitted to the 
authorities in the region where they were issued.  
- Intention to co-operate with Wallonia to make certificates 
exchangeable between these two regions 
- Certificates will be tradable within Belgium 
- Trade with other regions or countries still to be decided.  
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Private Investment Decision Making Rule 
Abstracting from the rules of irreversible investment 
decision-making under uncertainty [Dixit & Pindyck, 
19..], where option values can delay the timing of 
projects, we refer to common Discounted Cash Flow 
(DCF) analysis79.  An investor accepts a project when 
its Net Present Value is positive, or: 
0),( ≥niNPV
 
In this case the rate of return on investment at least 
equals i, the hurdle rate of acceptance, the  
net cash flows of the project being assessed over n 
time periods (years), or:  
 
 
A market agent considering investing in RES-E 
pledges to no other rationality than any other rational 
market agent. But RES-E is a special product with 
characteristics that limit its handling in the same 
manner as other economic products. 
Inherent Characteristics of RES-E 
RES-E projects generally exhibit the following prop-
erties (Twidell & Weir, 1986): 
• The cost of the project is predominantly the 
capital investment cost, because it is running on 
free energy supplies.  For simplicity, we will ne-
glect exploitation costs. 
• Capacity installed refers to a particular capacity 
to intercept free energy currents when available 
at design conditions (mostly the best ones acces-
sible on a particular site), and to convert these 
currents into electricity. 
• Free energy supplies are really ‘free’ and the 
investor has in most projects no discretionary 
impact to steer the supplies (e.g. wind, solar, run-
of-the-river hydro, bio-mass when it is offered as 
a free source because it otherwise has to be 
wasted).  One only can decide to bypass the free 
flow of energy (Twidell & Weir, 1986). 
• It follows that the short-run marginal cost of 
RES-E is nearly zero, but that the supply is not 
under control.  One only can throttle the free cur-
rents and spill part of it, but this is not a rational 
option when there is a demand for the product, as 
is the case when the project is connected to the 
power grid. 
• When the renewable power can be supplied to an 
interconnected and competitive power system, it 
is worth the avoided costs of the power system, 
i.e. at any moment the delivered kWh is basically 
worth the short run marginal cost or system λ 80.  
                                                           
79 We also abstract from other aspects of risks as e.g. covered in 
Lemming 2002, p. 3-5. 
80 Perfect competitive power systems and perfectly planned power 
systems will come up with the same system λ ’s. 
When the power system works under perfect 
market conditions we can state that at any mo-
ment (hour or ½ hour or ¼ hour) the 
λ=ep 81. 
Profitability of RES-E under free market 
conditions 
When the RES-E supplier can participate in the estab-
lished power markets he sells all generated power at 
,1),( =ttpe  … ,8760 (hourly pricing).  To assess 
the market revenues of the project the RES-E investor 
has to make the convolution of the probability density 
function of )(tpe and the probability density func-
tion of )(tg r with )(tg r the physical output of the 
project at any hour t, t = 1, … 8760.  In principle one 
has to assess the convolutions for all future years of 
the project’s life span of n years. 
 
Simplifying one replaces 
∫∫ ⋅ )()( tgtp re   by  )()(^ jGjp re  with 
)(
^
jp e expected (weighted) average price of RES-E 
power delivered in year j 
)( jG r total amount of renewable generation in year 
j 
In this setting, the investor accepts the investment 
when  
0)0(
)1(
)()(
^
0
≥−
+
⋅
=∑
=
yearInvestment
i
jGjp
NPV j
re
n
j
 
In our present non-sustainable societies, appraisals 
of most RES-E project proposals with the above 
formula, end in a preference for other investment 
options above green electricity generation. 
RES-E profitability adjusted by public policy 
Public policy promotes RES-E investment by private 
decision-makers by amending the above formula. 
{ }SubInvInv
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where )( jS  is a per kWh RES-E subsidy assigned 
in year j.  This can also take the form of changing the 
feed-in prices )(
^
jp e  directly (e.g. in Belgium there 
is a direct support of green electricity with 2,48 €ct or 
4,96 €ct/kWh), or indirectly (e.g. allowing the revolv-
ing electricity metering when PV-panels are in-
stalled). 
                                                           
81 We do not extend the analysis to the reliability margin or con-
gestion margin that can come on top of the system λ direct gen-
eration costs. 
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cp
^
 is the expected price per RES-E kWh that fol-
lows from an established system of green power 
certificates. 
SubInv is a direct investment subsidy at the time 
the capital investment is made (e.g. in 2001  the 
Flemish government covered 75% of PV investment 
costs). 
The public policy maker therefore has at least three 
major direct82 instruments to promote the develop-
ment of RES-E.   They can be applied simultaneously 
because they do not contravene one another. 
Focusing on the green certificate system at NPV = 
0, and PV[…] representing the present value of the 
cash flows within brackets. 
Assuming cp
^
as the ”levelised” certificate price, it 
follows 
 
For every individual RES-E project it passes the 
test of profitability at NPV = 0 when the certificate 
price bridges the gap between (partly subsidised) 
capital cost and (partly subsidised) sales revenue per 
kWh.  In a nation there exists a multitude of RES-E 
project opportunities.  Some are realised before the 
certificate system was deployed, i.e. at 0
^
=cp  the 
sales revenues could cover the capital costs. The 
static supply curve of RES-E is as shown by the full 
line in Fig. 2. By technological improvement it is 
expected that the costs of RES-E generation will fall 
(dotted curve in Fig. 2). 
cp
^
Present
output RES-E Generation
static
dynamic
 
Fig. 2. The Supply Curve(s) of RES-E for given cer-
tificate prices 
                                                           
82 More indirect instruments also can be used to promote RES-E, 
e.g. tax credits, soft loans, risk coverage, R & DD grants, etc. 
The supply curve is the horizontal aggregation of 
the long-run83 marginal cost curves of the numerous 
individual projects.  Because certificates are storable 
(and non-perishable when banking is permitted), their 
trade is disconnected from the volatility of the elec-
tricity spot market.  Moreover TGC-quota are not 
imposed as momentary obligations but as an annual 
aggregate.  The trade in GTC therefore will be axed 
on RES-E capacities and their expected outputs, not 
on the momentary output of RES-E plants. 
The actual shape and slope of the curves depend on 
a multitude of factors (technology, availability of 
sites and sources, public policy with respect to feed-
in prices, direct investment subventions and other  
policy instruments).  Therefore the curves may be 
very different from country to country and shift sig-
nificantly over time. When comparing supply curves 
among countries and over time, one must look after 
all the “upstream” policy differences to be taken into 
account. 
Several RES-E projects are not withheld because 
investors increase discount rates with (high) risk 
premiums due to economic and regulatory uncertain-
ties.  Also with respect to the TGC prices 
^
cp uncer-
tainty may be high when the regulatory framework is 
unstable and when future RES-E technologies would 
become much cheaper than the present ones.  An 
expected dip in the 
^
cp values during some years e.g. 
may totally block the development of the RES-E 
market.  
Demand for RES-E 
At the demand side for RES-E two parties are in-
volved and connected ‘in series’: the end-users of 
electricity and the supply companies (that must meet 
the quota system). 
End-users 
The demand of the end-users is represented by a 
standard down-sloping demand curve, with one point 
known (the present end-use at the given price) and 
price elasticity difficult to assess accurately. 
When the supplier must process a quota of RES-E 
equal to k% of his sold volume, when certificates are 
sold at cp
^
per kWh RES-E and the full certificate 
price is paid by the end-users, the power price in-
creases by cpk
^
.  Depending on the price elasticity 
of demand at So consumption will be reduced from qo 
to qn with some of the consumer surplus converted 
into support payments for RES-E (certificates or 
                                                           
83 The relevant marginal costs are indeed the ‘long-run’ ones, and 
not the ‘short-run’ ones as is the case in markets with non-storable 
goods forthcoming from available capacities in diversified genera-
tion systems that can be composed optimally (and where in the 
optimum long-run and short-run costs are equal).  We would 
compare the RES-E/GTC market with the housing market: renting 
prices are not equal to the short-run marginal costs of dwellings 
but to the long-run costs of supplying housing stock. 
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fines) and some social welfare loss84.  The actual 
amounts depend on a multitude of variables 
( OOc Spk ε,,,
^
 and the variables determining these).  
But under normal assumptions, consumption of elec-
tricity is lower at higher prices. 
cpkp
^
0 +
qn q0 kWh
Sn
S0
→ welfare loss
end-users support for RES-E
p0
Price per kWh
 
Fig. 3. End-use demand for electricity 
Power suppliers 
Power suppliers must yearly deliver an amount of 
certificates kV with  
V = the sales volume of kWh  
K = the fraction of sales to be covered by RES-E 
For every unit of kV not covered by a certificate 
the supplier must pay a fine F or penalty per unit. 
The certificate system therefore is steered by the 
two parameters F and k, but also influenced by the 
volume V. 
ki.V
F
O
Fine or
penalty price
Demand curve for
TGC’s with
banking allowed
Demand curve for
TGC’s  without
banking
  
Fig. 4. Demand for GTC by suppliers 
The demand curve for certificates (RES-E) by the 
suppliers is given by a horizontal line segment at 
height F up to the quantity Vki ⋅ where it changes 
into a vertical line segment up to the abscissa, where 
                                                           
84 There is an argument that considers the cpk
^
 price increase as 
the payment for transiting from the present non-sustainable system 
to a sustainable system.  Then, ,
^
0 cpkp +  is the ‘right’ price 
and one is increasing social welfare (avoiding welfare losses) by 
installing this right price. 
it becomes horizontal again at a zero price.  When 
banking is allowed the demand curve around Vki ⋅  
will be more elastic (Fig. 4). 
Equilibrium on the RES-E and certificates 
market 
Supply of RES-E and demand for RES-E (through 
certificates) meet in the certificate market (Fig. 5).  It 
is easy to verify the two k-values that bring the cer-
tificate market in a different price regime, as: 
 
 
 
k < ko ko < k < kf k > kf 
cp
^
= 
0 Amended 
Marginal cost of  
RES-E supplies 
F (fine) 
Stimulus 
RES-E devel-
opment 
None From koV to 
kfV 
Not further than 
kf V 
Taxing effect None Pc plays the 
role of an 
incentive tax 
Incentive and 
financing tax 
effect 
 
The regulating authorities have to establish quota in 
such a way that an appropriate development of new 
RES-E capacity will take place [Morthorst 2000, p. 
1090].  If k is set too low, the equilibrium TGC price 
may be too low to secure the development of new 
RES-E capacity at all.  If k is set too high, the optimal 
RES-E capacity development will be lower than 
prescribed by the quota.  The certificate price plays 
the role of an incentive tax when it is stimulating the 
development of the RES-E market.  When cp
^
 hits 
the Fine-cap it turns over in a financing tax85. 
price supply
cp
^
Fine F
koV kfV RES-E
 
Fig. 5. Market equilibrium in the TGC-market 
changes with set k values 
Depending on the height of the values of F and k, 
on the cost of RES-E supplies and on the price elas-
ticity of demand, the green certificate system will 
have some impact on the end-use of power.  
                                                          
85 Discussing environmental policy, it is argued that taxes are 
imposed for the pursuit of three main goals: 1) incentive taxing of 
target groups for undertaking or refraining from particular activi-
ties, 2) financing taxes to transfer money from target groups to 
public treasuries, 3) compensating taxes for making pollutors pay 
the true costs of the (Pareto-irrelevant) externalities [Verbruggen 
2002]. 
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We have selected some parameter values86 for as-
sessing the impact of green certificate propositions. 
We assume a linear end-use demand curve through a 
market equilibrium at q0 = 50 TWh (109 kWh) and p0 
= 0,10 €/kWh, with a price elasticity of demand ε at 
0,4.  We consider three types of RES-E technologies: 
mature ones (e.g. wind-power), at arms-length ones 
(e.g. bio-mass) and distant ones (e.g. photo-voltaïc 
power).  The supply curve of RES-E certificates is 
given by stepwise linear segments, starting at an 
RES-E output of 400 GWh, and with a slope of re-
spectively 0.5, 0.75 and 1.0 E-10 €/kWh². The TGC 
supply curve is shown in Fig. 6. 
PV
A
Biomass
1 3 TWh
C
€ct/kWh
0 2
B
24
16
8
Wind
 
Fig. 6. TGC supply curve (Flanders) 
TGC can force the RES-E technologies into the 
market. Every costlier technology requires a forcer 
forcing power of the quota-fine pair.  
To bring the first group of RES-E projects based on 
the least-cost options (represented by ‘Wind-power’) 
fully in the market a 3.3% quota is required with a 
forcing fine of at least87 7 €ct/kWh.  The impact on 
end-user is small and welfare losses negligible.  The 
picture changes totally when less available and more 
costly RES-E options have to be addressed to meet 
the quota (see Table 2). 
If a single certificate price is applied, this price 
must step up enormously to bring the marginal tech-
nology in the market.  It creates a significant price 
effect (and demand reduction) and it transfers large 
amounts of cash from the end-users to the RES-E 
generators.  Some of this transfer is required to cover 
part of the RES-E costs, but an increasing share is 
rents received by the sub-marginal RES-E generators.  
While rents within the same technology group are 
acceptable (and comparable to the working of other 
markets), the technology diversity amalgamated 
under the common heading of RES-E creates wind-
fall profits for the mature technologies.  In the exam-
ple, situation B means that 40% of the payments by 
end-users are windfall profits to wind-power inves-
tors, while in situation C even 54% of the payments 
are windfall profits acquired by (mainly) wind-power 
and by bio-mass RES-E generators.  The weight of 
                                                          
86 The values are not based on an in-depth analysis of the real 
situation in Flanders. 
87 The fine set in practice is best a little bit higher than the mar-
ginal forcing fine to keep the GTC market lively. 
the TGC-system on the end-users will also grow to 
unacceptable burdens. The high TGC-prices will 
significantly increase the end-use electricity price 
(e.g. by 1.45 €ct/kWh in point C). At a price elasticity 
of end-use demand of 0.4 the reduced end-use de-
mand would be larger than the generation of RES-E. 
Table 2. Forcing RES-E with the TGC system (non-
segmented market; single target and price) 
 Wind-power 
(point A) 
Bio-mass 
(point B) 
Photo-voltaïc 
(point C) 
Quota (% supplies) 3,3 5 6 
Quota forcing Fine 
(€ct/kWh) 
7 16 25 
Certificate price 
(€ct/kWh) 
6,18 15,18 24,25 
End-use power reduction 
(TWh) 
0,408 1,518 2,910 
RES-E generation 
(TWh) 
1,637 2,424 2,825 
Certificate revenues 
(M€) 
101 368 685 
Cost coverage (M€) 
• Wind-power 
• Bio-mass 
• PV 
 
38 
- 
- 
 
38 
96 
- 
 
38 
96 
89 
Producer surplus (M€) 
• Wind-power 
• Bio-mass 
• PV 
 
63 
- 
- 
 
210 
23 
- 
 
359 
95 
8 
Windfall profits (M€) - 147 367 
 
It is evident that forcing the ‘distant’ RES-E tech-
nology into the market through a single quota-fine (k, 
F) pair creates a lot of bias.  The less distant tech-
nologies reap significant windfall profits, simply by 
freeriding on the system.  It makes the system very 
expensive and it would loose all credibility with the 
end-users that have to pay the bills.  This point was 
addressed extensively by Huber, et al. (2001, 2002). 
For reducing the windfall surpluses they suggest to 
limit the validity of certificate rights in time (e.g. a 
RES-E plant built in 2000 can sell rights only until 
2010).  We believe this regulation will be administra-
tively difficult to follow up (e.g. when ‘some’ retro-
fitting on the above plant occurs in 2008), and it does 
not solve the issue of the diversity in technologies.  
As did Schaeffer (2000) in general, we propose to 
segment the certificates market by technology 
(group), e.g. wind-power, hydro, biomass, and E-
solar in Flanders.  For every technology group t one 
has to study in detail the TGC-supply curve and to 
find the ( tj
t
j Fk , ) pairs that help to force the target 
market development of the technology over time 
(years j = 1 … n). 
 The electricity suppliers are subjected to a quota 
for every technology.  This makes the TGC market 
segments thinner, but the system is more transparent 
and feasible (affordable, acceptable by electricity 
end-users). Assuming the same parameter values as 
above, we have repeated the calculations for a seg-
mented TGC-market, where the three technologies 
are introduced consecutively for meeting the same 
6% target as in the previous example and where the 
present RES-E generation is considered to be wind-
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power. Results are shown in Table 3, contrasting with 
the numbers of Table 2.  
Table 3. Forcing RES-E with the TGC system (add-
on segmented markets; technology specific targets 
and prices) 
 Wind-
power 
(point A) 
Bio-mass 
(point B) 
Photo-
voltaïc   
(point C) 
Total 
Quota (% sup-
plies) 
3,3 +1,7 +1,0 6 
Quota forcing 
Fine (€ct/kWh) 
7 16 26  
Certificate price 
(€ct/kWh) 
6,18 15,54 25,57  
End-use power 
reduction (TWh) 
0,408 0,513 0,479 1,400 
RES-E genera-
tion (TWh) 
1,637 0,834 0,486 2,957 
Certificate 
revenues (M€) 
101 129 124 354 
Cost coverage 
(M€) 
38 103 112 253 
Producer surplus 
(M€) 
63 26 12 101 
Windfall profits 
(M€) 
- - - - 
 
Because windfall profits among technologies are 
excluded, the cost of the system is much lower. In 
every technology segment there remain some pro-
ducer surpluses, but this can create a stimulus for 
further technological development that will lower 
costs. The impact on end-use is smaller. The electric-
ity price is increased three times but in smaller steps 
and overall with 1.1 ct/kWh. This has an impact in 
less on consumption of 1.4 TWh. Because this impact 
is smaller and the aggregate quota is kept at 6% of 
sales volumes, the RES-E output is about 132 GWh 
larger than in the previous case. 
Our analysis does not match the conclusions by 
Jensen and Skytte (2002) on the ambiguous effects of 
TGC’s on the price and consumption of electricity. 
Our TGC supply curve is an amended marginal cost 
curve net of subsidies and receipts by selling the 
electricity in the market. When the price of the latter 
decreases, the supply curve of TGC will shift to the 
left, and the higher electricity prices to the end-users 
will remain unaffected88. Higher prices will reduce 
demand. Our conclusion is that TGC as an instrument 
to force RES-E generation into the market goes hand 
in hand with higher end-use prices that will stimulate 
electricity savings. When the RES-E targets are set 
bullish, the fine levels have to be fixed at heights that 
society considers unacceptable today. The fines and 
the forthcoming certificate prices are really function-
ing as an incentive and financing tax. 
Evaluation of the Flemish TGC market sys-
tem 
It is early days yet to evaluate the performance of 
the Flemish TGC market system. By April first 2002, 
13 RES-E producers had been officially recognised in 
                                                          
88 In the end-user price Pe + k.Pc, the decrease in Pe will be evenly 
compensated by an increase in the k.Pc term due to raising Pc 
values. 
the Flemish region. From July 1st onward TGCs are 
registered and monitored as electronic records in a 
central Internet-based database (before that date 
TGCs were paper certificates). End of June 2002 (6 
months after the introduction of the TGC market 
system), only one supplier and 3 potential buyers of 
TGCs have made themselves known to the Flemish 
regulating authority VREG.  As far as we know, no 
actual trade of TGCs has yet taken place. VREG has 
the legal obligation to publish the amount of certifi-
cates for sale, and the average price of a TGC on a 
monthly basis. As of July 1st 2002, the website of the 
VREG has not made public any information on 
traded volume or prices 
(http://www.vreg.be/groenestroomcertificaten.htm).   
The low number of suppliers and potential buyers 
of TGCs so far may in part be due to electricity sup-
pliers in Flanders producing the own RES-E to meet 
the low 2002-quota (1,41% of sales), and partly to the 
“thinness” of the present Flemish electricity market.  
Our analysis suggests as policy conclusions: 
1. TGC is a very effective instrument. It can also be 
made very efficient when it is handled with fore-
sight and care. Particular attention is needed for 
segmenting the certificate market along RES-E 
technologies with common cost properties, and 
for estimating RES-E cost functions and their 
development over time. Also the setting of the 
parameters k = quota % of RES-E in total sup-
plies and of F = fine per kWh shortfall to the 
quota for the various technologies and for the 
years to come, needs careful consideration. 
2. TGC is not conflicting with other instruments 
supporting RES-E development. TGC can be 
handled as the instrument that is complementary 
to the other supports, and that forces the devel-
opment of RES-E in the market along the poten-
tials and the targets set forward. TGC must be 
matched to the impact of other instruments, in 
particular direct kWh support for RES-E (e.g. 
through improved feed-in conditions) and capital 
subsidies.  
3. TGC’s and in particular also the installed fines 
(price caps of TGC’s) exercise a taxing effect on 
electricity end-use. Final demand will be choked 
by the higher power prices following the pay-
ment for TGC quota by the suppliers. The overall 
effect depends on the elasticity of demand and 
on the cost of RES-E technologies. The welfare 
losses remain small, but the payments by end-
users for the development of RES-E become a 
visible share of their bills. 
4. If the diversity in technologies and their cost 
realities are not recognised and the certificates 
market is not segmented, the taxing effect of the 
TGC system becomes very important when the 
system wants to function at the edge of the mar-
ginal RES-E technology. A large share of the tax 
money would be collected as windfall profits by 
the investors in mature RES-E solutions89. The 
                                                          
89 After weeks of discussion in Flanders it was decided not to 
include the combustion of municipal solid waste as a RES-E 
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payments by end-users would grow so high that 
the system would implode under its own weight. 
5. The crucial key for RES-E to penetrate is and 
remains (of course) the technical and economic 
performance of the various RES-E technologies. 
TGC is very effective to force their development 
to the edge, but over the edge it becomes mainly 
a taxing instrument that stimulates end-users to 
energy efficiency and that creates funds to de-
velop RES-E solutions. R&DD to develop re-
newable technologies to enhance reach and to 
lower cost remains therefore the most important 
policy instrument. 
6. Efficiency within a given region, nation or union 
(EU) is reached when marginal costs of RES-E 
supplies are equated. In principle, there are two 
ways to reach this bliss situation. On the one 
hand, the EU can install a single TGC market. 
This requires unified market clearing systems, 
and a firm control on the TGC supply functions 
to harmonise for subvention mechanisms other 
than TGC’s. On the other hand, the EU can or-
ganise an optimal system of RES-E quota per 
technology and per nation, equating through the 
assigned quota the marginal costs of RES-E gen-
eration per technology all over the EU. Because 
the TGC is such a flexible instrument, the fines 
can be tuned to spur suppliers to attain the set 
quota. Both approaches require sophisticated and 
reliable information on the RES-E cost functions 
and their future development possibilities in the 
various participating nations. 
7. Through the instrument of green certificates pub-
lic policy can force the transition of a non-
sustainable energy system to a sustainable one 
finally based on renewable energy. It can make 
the energy consumers pay for this costly transi-
tion, but it should safeguard that payments are 
always kept as low as possible, because the tran-
sition is a very costly operation. Intensive study 
and a broad societal debate are required to decide 
on the pace of the transition and on the way bur-
dens are allocated among classes of end-users. 
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Abstract.  
This paper introduces the tradable green certificates policy 
instrument that has been introduced in the UK. The Renew-
ables Obligation, as it is known, provides a welcome boost 
for renewables. However, if the policy target of a three-fold 
expansion in renewable capacity is to be met by 2010,  
complementary policy measures will be needed in areas 
such as land use planning, the wholesale electricity market, 
and network access. Moreover, while the Renewables 
Obligation may be suitable for more mature technologies 
(e.g. wind), it may not provide the long-term support 
needed to diffuse the next generation of renewable tech-
nologies. Further development of innovation policy is 
required to address this issue. 
Introduction 
In May 2002, the UK’s renewable energy industry 
received a new lease of life. The introduction of the 
new Renewables Obligation (DTI 2001) marks the 
next stage in the government’s plan to meet 10% of 
our electricity needs from renewables by 2010.92 This 
aim, a commitment since Labour were voted into 
government in 1997, is an ambitious one. Although 
renewable energy sources such as wind and small 
hydro have received public support for many years, 
progress has been slow. 
The Renewables Obligation represents an opportu-
nity for renewables in the UK to live up to their 
promise. It replaces a ‘bidding’ policy framework 
that had been in place for a decade: the Non-Fossil 
Fuel Obligation (NFFO). Renewables currently sup-
ply just under 3% of UK electricity (see Table 1), a 
slight improvement on the level when NFFO was 
introduced in 1990, which was just under 2%. Of the 
10.48 TWh of renewably generated electricity in 
2000, 46.5 % came from large scale hydro (mostly 
located in Scotland). Table 1 provides details for the 
growth in renewable electricity generation in recent 
years. 
The NFFO competitive bidding process led to some 
renewables projects bidding too low which, coupled 
with a challenging planning environment, meant that 
some projects selected for NFFO support have not 
been constructed. 
This paper presents a prospective commentary on 
the Renewables Obligation. Its aim is to introduce the 
                                                          
90 An earlier version of this paper appeared as a Tyndall Briefing 
Paper – see http://www.tyndall.ac.uk/  
91 SPRU, Mantell Building, University of Sussex, Falmer, East 
Sussex, BN1 9RF. Tel 01273 873539. w.j.watson@sussex.ac.uk; 
a.g.smith@sussex.ac.uk 
92 Under the DTI Energy Paper 68 medium economic growth 
scenario, the 10 per cent target implies at least 37.1 TWh of elec-
tricity by 2010 (1 TWh = 1 thousand million kWh or 10 thousand 
million 100W lightbulbs switched on for one hour).  
new policy and then sketch out some of the chal-
lenges that lie ahead in meeting the 2010 target – 
from the electricity market, the planning system, 
established modes of energy regulation, and innovat-
ing in new renewable technologies. 
The Renewables Obligation 
The Renewables Obligation creates a new England 
and Wales market in tradable green certificates, 
known in the UK as Renewables Obligation Certifi-
cates. A similar, but separate system has been created 
for Scotland whose operation is broadly the same. 
Renewables Obligation Certificates (or ROCs) will 
have to be produced by every energy supplier to 
prove that they have sourced a set percentage of their 
electricity from renewables. This percentage starts at 
3% for 2002/03 and rises gradually to 10.4% for 
2010/11 and subsequent years (House of Commons 
2002). According to the details of the policy drawn 
up by the Department of Trade and Industry, these 
suppliers can meet their obligation in three ways: 
• By producing ROCs to show that they have gen-
erated or bought electricity from recognised re-
newable energy generators. 
• By buying ROCs on the open market from other 
suppliers with a surplus. 
• By paying the ‘buyout price’ of 3p per unit 
(kWh) to make up the shortfall between their 
stock of ROCs and their statutory target. Buyout 
price receipts will be recycled back to suppliers 
in proportion to their holdings of ROCs. 
As a result of this new policy, renewable energy 
generators will now earn revenue from two markets: 
the electricity market and a separate market in ROCs. 
The assumption is that this should give renewables an 
extra revenue boost by adding a subsidy of up to 
3p/kWh to the wholesale market price of electricity 
(which is currently around 1.6p/kWh). 
How the Market Should Work 
As Figure 1 shows, the operation of a tradable green 
certificate market such as that designed to meet the 
Renewables Obligation is theoretically simple 
(Morthorst 2000). As the supply curve S illustrates, 
when the price of ROCs rises, more and more devel-
opers will be encouraged to build renewable energy 
generation capacity. Moreover, market mechanisms 
introduce competition between renewables generators 
for ROC revenues. This is to the advantage of cost 
competitive generators and encourages others to 
follow suit. 
By including a fixed ‘buyout price’ for suppliers, 
the UK scheme places a boundary on the operation of 
the ROC market. If the target for renewable energy 
supply is modest (represented by demand-line TMod), 
generators of renewable electricity will sell ROCs at 
price PM. If, however, the government sets a more 
ambitious target in the future (TAmb) such that the 
price for ROCs climbs above the Buyout Price to PA, 
then not all of that obliged demand will be met. Only 
generators that can profit below or at the Buyout 
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Price will meet demand. In this way, an upper finan-
cial limit is imposed on support for renewables ex-
pansion. 
 
Price of 
ROCs (p)                
  S    
 
 PA 
 
Buyout Price 
 
 PM   
   
 
 
 
  TMod
 TAmb 
  Market Size (kWh) 
Fig. 1. An Ideal Market in Renewables Obligation 
Certificates 
This simple supply-demand analysis underpins the 
Renewables Obligation policy instrument. While 
useful heuristically, the analysis does not capture 
many of the factors that will determine the expansion 
of UK renewables in practice. After only a few 
months of operation, it is difficult to predict how 
much the real market will differ from the theoretical 
model. However, there are signs that the market is 
already responding to an initial shortage of renew-
ables capacity. 
Whilst the Renewables Obligation only requires 
suppliers to source 3% of their electricity from re-
newables in 2002/03, ROC prices have already been 
pushed above the artificial ceiling of 3p/kWh (Steen 
2002). The inflation in ROC prices is partly due to 
renewable electricity benefiting from an exemption 
from the Climate Change Levy charged to the busi-
ness use of energy. This exemption is worth 
0.43p/kWh. More importantly, ROC prices are also 
high because the eligibility rules for the Renewables 
Obligation exclude some operational renewables 
schemes (particularly large hydro plants). There is 
high demand for ROCs from electricity suppliers who 
wish to maximise their share of recycled ‘buyout’ 
proceeds.  
 
Table 1: Renewable Electricity Generation in the UK, (GWh). 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
      
Onshore wind 488 667 877 850 946 
Solar photovoltaics - - - 1 1 
Hydro:      
  Small scale 118 164 206 232 239 
  Large scale 3275 4005 4911 5128 4869 
Biofuels:      
Landfill gas 708 918 1185 1703 2188 
Sewage sludge digestion 410 408 386 410 366 
MSW combustion 777 929 1348 1359 1368 
Other (e.g. farm waste, tyres) 326 338 318 515 499 
      
Renewables Total 6101 7428 9231 10199 10476 
Percentage of Total Generation 1.7% 2.1% 2.5% 2.8% 2.8% 
Source: Department of Trade and Industry, 2002. 
 
A recent analysis of possible UK renewable energy 
deployment to 2020 indicates that the average value of 
ROCs is likely to be 3.4-5.7p/kWh in 2002/0393. Under 
some scenarios, it is expected that this value will con-
tinue rising in subsequent years due to slow renewable 
energy deployment rates. Under others, the price will 
fall again towards 3.0p/kWh as deployment expands 
rapidly. The financial implications for electricity sup-
pliers with renewables are mixed – on the positive side, 
they might have a substantial revenue boost from high 
ROC prices. On the negative side, this boost may be 
short-lived and heavily discounted by financiers of new 
projects on the grounds that many new projects will be 
brought forward quickly. 
                                                          
93 Based on four socio-economic scenarios for renewables deploy-
ment to 2020 (Watson 2002), assuming simplified deployment rates. 
Despite the initial evidence that the price signal from 
ROCs is operating as planned, the future of renewables 
deployment is clouded by considerable uncertainty. 
Whilst the market in ROCs will create a positive finan-
cial signal for promoting renewables, it is only one 
signal amongst a host of others. Technological, regula-
tory and planning issues will shape the real ROC sup-
ply curve, perhaps in complex and unanticipated ways. 
The remainder of this paper introduces some of the 
challenges confronting the government’s plan to more 
than triple renewables capacity in the UK by 2010. 
These challenges are: 
• The process of obtaining planning permission for 
new renewables projects, particularly wind. 
• Recent reforms to the rules and operation of the 
wholesale electricity market that favour incumbent 
fossil-fuel generators over renewables generators. 
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• Technical and institutional problems in connecting 
renewables to electricity networks. 
• Whether ROCs will stimulate innovation across a 
range of ‘next generation’ renewables technologies 
that will be needed to move beyond the 10 per cent 
target in the longer-term. 
A coherent set of policies working across all these 
fronts is important not just for meeting the 10 per cent 
target but also for building a solid foundation for fur-
ther expansion beyond 2010. 
Planning Difficulties 
The difficulty of obtaining planning permission – par-
ticularly for wind energy schemes – has presented a 
major barrier to renewables expansion over the past 
decade. Difficulties with the NFFO can be partly at-
tributed to protracted planning disputes. The govern-
ment has been relatively sanguine about the rate of 
success amongst renewables planning applications. 
Under the successive ‘orders’ of the NFFO scheme, 
only 11 per cent of the third order projects were re-
fused planning permission, and six per cent of the 
fourth order were also refused. By 1999, 18 per cent of 
third order projects had not applied for planning per-
mission, and 46 per cent of the fourth order projects 
had not yet done so. The fourth order projects were 
given the green light and assured price supports in 
1997 (ENDS 1999). Many renewables projects have 
been going ahead – but not all of them. 
The above data relates to numbers of projects rather 
than renewable generating capacity installed. The 
majority of these projects have generated electricity 
from landfill gas.94 Analysis by the Confederation of 
Renewable Energy Associations excluded landfill gas 
projects and focused instead on total generating capac-
ity from other renewables. CREA claims that only 
855MW of a total renewables capacity of 3638MW 
had obtained planning permission by 2000 (Hartnell 
2001). This represents only 23 per cent of all renew-
able capacity supported under the old NFFO system, 
excluding landfill gas). The picture is complicated by 
project commissioning rules under the old NFFO sys-
tem – some NFFO projects bid too low and never went 
ahead on commercial grounds. However, it is clear that 
other projects are finding it difficult to get planning 
permission, particularly wind power (Mitchell 2000). 
In response to planning bottlenecks, the government 
is requiring each English region to set strategic renew-
able targets for 2010 (similar to the traditional setting 
of strategic targets for housing). These targets are ex-
pected to cascade down into the structure plans and 
local plans of local authorities and become a material 
consideration in local planning decisions. This will 
take several years to achieve. The targets set by the 
regions will, at best, just meet the national target of 10 
per cent, and at worst fall short by 3.5 percentage 
points (OXERA and ARUP 2002). The government is 
currently seeking to streamline the planning process for 
                                                          
94 Under the fifth NFFO order (1998) 68 per cent of new capacity 
will come from landfill gas projects, and 29 per cent from onshore 
wind projects. 
certain types of development, which could include 
renewables projects. However, there is a risk that such 
top-down imposition of renewables upon local com-
munities, under a planning process reduced in local 
democratic content, could dent opinion towards sus-
tainable energy. Complementary mechanisms that 
build support from the community-level upwards 
might be explored. These include designing renewable 
developments such that they give local communities a 
direct financial stake in the benefits (e.g. a share of the 
profits or reduced electricity bills), and policies that 
educate and bring home the environmental conse-
quences of our energy use (such as a carbon tax). 
Facing up to NETA 
Planning difficulties have recently been compounded 
by a number of market and regulatory barriers to re-
newables deployment. Perhaps the largest challenge of 
all is posed by the reformed electricity trading market, 
known as NETA (the New Electricity Trading Ar-
rangements). NETA was launched in April 2001. It 
was designed to correct perceived imperfections in the 
wholesale electricity market, and lower prices. 
So far, NETA has delivered on this overall promise – 
prices have fallen significantly. However, there are 
concerns with some of its side effects. From the start of 
the reform process, the Department of Trade and 
Industry (DTI) was keen to point out that NETA 
should be designed to promote the use of renewable 
energy sources (DTI 1998). Unfortunately for the 
renewables industry, this has not happened in practice. 
Renewable energy sources have fallen foul of NETA’s 
in-built preference for predictable sources of 
generation. This can leave intermittent sources of 
generation (such as wind power) at a relative cost 
disadvantage under NETA.95 
Is NETA standing in the way of the government’s 
renewables expansion plans; and, if so, what can be 
done to help? The utilities regulator OFGEM, which 
was jointly responsible for NETA with the DTI, has 
shown little willingness to entertain further modifica-
tions to the market. A review of the first three months 
of NETA acknowledged the problem, but felt that it 
was a minor issue when compared with the general 
record of electricity price reductions (OFGEM 2001). 
A further review of NETA’s first year is now under-
way. Moves to try to help renewable generators have 
focused on the development of consolidation services 
to spread the risk of unpredictability across larger 
numbers of renewables plants. The renewables industry 
is unhappy with this solution, and consolidation ar-
rangements have been proceeding slowly (ENDS 
2002). 
It remains to be seen whether the consolidation ap-
proach will be successful in preventing NETA penalis-
ing intermittent renewables. Investors in new intermit-
tent renewables technologies will have to consider 
                                                          
95 There is also evidence to suggest NETA is placing operational 
pressure on the combined heat and power industry and larger gas-
fired power stations, who are already suffering under high gas prices 
- Green 2001; author’s conversations with operators of gas-fired 
CCGT power plants 
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consolidation if they do not wish to be at a disadvan-
tage under NETA. OFGEM and DTI must continue to 
monitor the performance of NETA and the new con-
solidation arrangements, and be open to further re-
forms if necessary. The Utilities Act 2000 provides 
government with the scope to do this. The Act allows 
government to develop social and environmental guid-
ance which should be taken into account as OFGEM 
conducts its business. The draft guidance published in 
May 2001 makes reference to the UK Climate Change 
Programme which includes the 2010 renewables target. 
It states that ‘the Government invites [OFGEM] to 
seek to exercise its functions in a way consistent with 
the objectives set out in this [Programme]’ (DTI 2001). 
Regulating for Embedded Generation 
Whilst NETA may not be good news for renewables, at 
least in the short term, a move to cost reflective 
charges for the use of electricity distribution networks 
certainly could work in their favour. If small renew-
ables plants are embedded within distribution networks 
at particular locations, their economic value to the 
electricity system can be substantial. This value largely 
stems from the avoided cost of reinforcements to the 
distribution and, ultimately, the high voltage transmis-
sion system. 
At present, the charging structure for connection to 
the UK electricity distribution system and for using it 
to export power is not particularly sophisticated. As a 
result, smaller generators are unable to capture the 
value they bring to the system as a whole. Instead they 
are often penalised by electricity distribution compa-
nies because the networks are designed for the tradi-
tional transmission of power from large generators 
down to consumers. An embedded generator wishing 
to connect to the distribution system is expected to pay 
the costs in full, including any upstream reinforce-
ments to the transmission system. Not surprisingly, this 
can be expensive for proposed renewables schemes. 
The revenue support from ROCs will need to offset 
these network charges. 
Embedded generation could be promoted further un-
der a shift towards more ‘active’ distribution networks 
designed to balance large numbers of small generators 
as well as transmitting power in bulk. This shift re-
quires substantial investment enabled by a more cost-
reflective charging structure for the use of distribution 
wires. Distribution companies need to be able to make 
the necessary infrastructure investments – investments 
which would currently fall foul of OFGEM’s rules 
because they are not seen as ‘essential’ to current op-
erations. In short, distribution companies currently 
have little incentive to promote embedded generation 
from renewables. 
The need for reform has recently started to attract 
some government and regulatory interest. A joint 
DTI/OFGEM working group on embedded generation 
produced a report in January 2001 (OFGEM/DTI 
2001) which set out options for new charging struc-
tures. The successor to this group is continuing to work 
on the issue. As with NETA, there is considerable 
debate about the merits of altering the charging struc-
ture for distribution wires, and some reluctance to 
change a system that has delivered price reductions to 
consumers. 
Stimulating Innovation 
The Renewables Obligation targets and the associated 
market in ROCs will give investors in renewable tech-
nology an additional revenue stream to recover costs. 
Yet, as we have illustrated in this paper, the renewables 
investor still faces considerable supply-side uncertain-
ties besides the operation of the ROC market. Ulti-
mately, moving beyond the 10 per cent renewables 
target, possibly to meet a longer term target of 20 per 
cent by 2020 (PIU 2002), will require significant inno-
vation in our electricity supply systems. 
The Renewables Obligation does not distinguish be-
tween renewables technologies. The ROC market re-
quires all renewables technologies to compete against 
the standard of the incumbent market leader. This 
means that promising ‘next generation’ technologies, 
such as wave power or photovoltaics, will have to 
compete against the cheaper technologies, such as on-
shore wind power and energy-from-waste (which, 
incidentally, both court planning controversy). The 
single market in renewables may not prove to support 
the longer-term innovation of a range of new renew-
ables technologies. The experience of NFFO was that 
competitive support for renewables did not nurture a 
renewables industry in the UK. Ironically, developers 
imported the cheapest renewables technology from 
countries such as Denmark and Germany that had 
developed a vibrant domestic renewables industry 
under different systems of support (Mitchell 2000). 
Studies into past transformations in energy systems 
have noted just how uncertain the transformation proc-
ess was in its early stages, that interconnected innova-
tions in many new technologies were required, and that 
some of these proved to be dead-ends (Hughes 1987). 
Many innovation experts in academia and government 
recognise the value of investment in diverse portfolios 
of new technologies as a means of stimulating innova-
tion, building up skills and capabilities, and insuring 
against the risk of locking into sub-optimal technologi-
cal dead-ends (Kemp et al, 1998; Anderson and Jacob-
ssen 2000). Promoting systems innovation implies 
uncertainty, experimentation and a certain degree of 
economic ‘waste’ - in the sense that some experiments 
will fail to become viable technologies yet will still 
create valuable new knowledge (Grabher and Stark 
1997). Encouraging investors to take such risks will 
mean offering them higher potential returns on their 
investment (compared to other, less risky money-
making opportunities). Moreover, stimulating innova-
tion and the growth of new industries is a long-term 
endeavour.96 
There is hope in the UK in the form of government 
capital grants support for demonstration projects in 
these less developed renewable technologies. The 
government has promised £260 million over the next 
                                                          
96 The German wind-turbine sector became successful after 10 years 
of nurturing (Johnson and Jacobssen). 
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three years, primarily for offshore wind and energy 
crops, and with a little support for photovoltaics, wave 
and tidal power (Chief Scientific Adviser 2002). This 
capital funding must link to the assured revenues 
needed if a portfolio of renewable technologies is to 
seriously displace incumbent fossil-fuel and nuclear 
electricity generation. Will support for demonstrations 
include market formation (i.e. deployment) activities 
for successfully demonstrated new technologies? Mar-
ket formation is a vital bridge between the demonstra-
tion projects and the entry of commercial investors. 
Will the New Policy Deliver ? 
It is clear that the Renewables Obligation represents an 
opportunity for renewable energy to gain a foothold in 
the UK. However, despite the level of financial support 
the Renewables Obligation might bring to renewables, 
the UK will struggle to achieve the 10% government 
target by 2010. 
Looking further ahead, the Renewables Obligation is 
only a first step. On its own, we should not expect this 
policy to deliver a break from past trends and deliver a 
transformation in our electricity supply system. A 
portfolio of competitive renewable technologies is not 
sitting waiting to be taken off the shelf, plugged-in and 
put to use like a new washing machine. If the UK 
wishes to displace a significant proportion of the in-
cumbent system of large, centralised, fossil-fuel and 
nuclear electricity generation with renewables, then it 
will need a range of well-developed renewables tech-
nologies. Even when sufficiently well developed, any 
expansion in renewables technology will have to inter-
act with planning processes, electricity markets, and 
transmission issues. 
A renewables policy package must address various 
barriers and challenges: Electricity markets must be 
sensitive to the intermittent nature of some renewable 
generating technologies. The value of embedded gen-
eration in local distribution networks must be re-
warded. Planning controls exist for good reason, to 
control land use and protect public amenity, and any 
policy to greatly expand renewable technologies will 
have to work with local communities if that expansion 
is to proceed smoothly. Most critically, innovation 
policy must stimulate a diverse range of renewable 
technologies and niche market formation initiatives. In 
pursuing this goal, policy-makers must recognise that 
this is a long-term activity.  
Within the context of innovation policy, debates 
about a ‘universal’ best support mechanism for renew-
ables seem misplaced. A sensible policy and research 
agenda would not ask whether green certificate policies 
such as the Renewables Obligation are better than the 
feed-in tariffs in place in some EU countries (e.g. 
Germany). Rather, there is a need explore which com-
binations of policy instruments best help a range of 
renewable technologies in different national contexts. 
This should take into account the different stages of 
development of various renewables together with 
country-specific institutional, market and resource 
conditions. 
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Abstract  Italy has opted for a support system for RES-E 
based on a quota from 2002. This is a new approach after  the 
renewable energy sector has been created under a price sup-
port mechanism known as CIP6 programme in 1992-2002. 
The challenge for the policy makers is to combine the uncer-
tainty of the market to the absence of risk required by the 
investors in this field.  
Even if price based support systems, like those imple-
mented in Germany and Spain, have given remarkable results 
in term of new installed capacity, the ambition of the Italian 
Green Certificate Market is to reconcile the growth of RES-E 
production with a stimulus to the efficiency of the sector. 
The paper looks at the regime for new RES-E in Italy and 
investigates the challenges for its success.  
Introduction  
Italy has started in 1999 the reform of the electricity 
industry for the implementation of the Directive 
1996/92/EC. At the same time the vesting of the for-
mer national electricity board ENEL has been decided, 
with an extremely difficult task of reconciliation of 
conflicting goals. The maximisation of the revenue for 
the State from the privatisation required a strong role 
of ENEL, while the creation of a competitive market 
based on a power exchange pushed for the reduction of 
the market share of ENEL, which was in the region of 
80% of production and 92% of distribution. 
At the same time, the Directive 2001/77/EC assigns 
a target of 25% of electricity from RES in 2010 from a 
rough 18% now. Considering the contribution of some 
16 GW of hydropower plants built along the past cen-
tury and the increase of the demand for electricity 
expected in the next decade, this means some 30 TWh 
of additional renewable energy production at 2010. A 
dramatic task. 
A further challenge for the industry comes from the 
target of the Kyoto protocol. It requires a reduction of 
CO2 emission of 6.5% on 1990 in 2010, being at +4% 
in 2001. The achievement of such a target would imply 
the total restructuring of the industry, with the refur-
bishment and the conversion to combined cycles of 
most of the old oil fired power plant that are supplying 
the baseload. 
As it is easily understood these tasks have goals par-
tially conflicting and an easy solution can not be found 
in the short term. In addition, in the frame of such 
changes renewable energy sources are often perceived 
as a secondary issue, lacking the due attention for a 
long term planning.  
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The reform of the Electricity Industry 
The reform of the electricity industry started in 1999 is 
aimed at introducing competition in the generation and 
supply of electricity. At this end the state monopoly of 
ENEL was unbundled and different companies were 
created operating in different segments of the industry. 
GRTN is the independent system operator of the 
transmission grid, GME (Gestore del Mercato Elet-
trico) operates the power exchange and AU (Ac-
quirente Unico) is in charge of the purchase of electric-
ity on behalf of all the captive customers. They are all 
owned by the Government. The distribution is still 
mostly operated by ENEL, but it was forced to sell 15 
GW of generating plant to new operators of the market. 
ENEL created 3 generating companies and in 2001 the 
Spanish company ENDESA took over the biggest 
Genco Elettrogen in partnership with the municipal 
company ASM of Brescia, while EDF and Italenergia, 
the major Italian independent producer, in 2002 won 
the tender for Eurogen. The last and smallest company 
Interpower should be sold by the end of 2002. 
The path of the reform has been delayed by the diffi-
culties met in the implementation of the new regime. 
The operation of the power exchange, scheduled for 
the 2001, is now expected for end 2002 and maybe 
later, while AU is not yet in charge of the purchase 
contracts for the captive market. 
In addition, the operation and the ownership of the 
transmission grid, which have been separated in 1999, 
will now be merged again in a new company to be 
vested. 
In the frame of the reform a new policy to support 
renewables was also designed, aimed at reconciling the 
growth of their penetration and competition. 
The policy to support renewable energy has been 
based on: 
• The creation of a “new renewables” portfolio, 
mandatory for all fossil thermal producers and 
• Competitive biddings managed by the regions at 
the local level for new RES-E schemes. 
Leaving the old system based on subsidised prices 
for the new quota based market implies a radical 
change in the attitude of the investors. The transition  
from one regulatory regime to another started in 1999 
and is far from concluded, contributing to make uncer-
tain the framework for newcomers and to freeze the 
investments. IWT, the Italian branch of Vestas, which 
sold 320 wind turbines in 2001, did not receive any 
order in the first semester of 2002, even if many pro-
spective investors got in contact. All of them were 
waiting for the new market to be designed in more 
detail. 
The risk is thus to displace investments in renewable 
energy again, like in the past, with an array of stop-
and-go measures that made renewable energy tech-
nologies an unappealing option for big financial opera-
tors. 
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The new challenge: reconciling RES support 
with competition 
The support scheme implemented at the beginning of 
the nineties (Provvedimento CIP 6/1992, April 29th 
1992) was based on a subsidised price for all the RES 
electricity production and for cogeneration plants. This 
measure was primarily intended to support the inde-
pendent production in combined heat and power plants 
at a time when ENEL was suffering local opposition in 
developing new projects. 
All the new power plants submitting application 
could get a contract to sell electricity produced to the 
grid at a price made up of two factors: 1) an avoided 
cost (investment, operation and maintenance, fuel) 
based on an estimate of the investment in a new gas-
fired combined cycle, equal to 6.9 c€/kWh in 2000; 2) 
for the first 8 years of operation an extra price based on 
the estimated extra costs of each different technology 
(3.1 c€/kWh for hydro run of river over 3 MW, 5.3 for 
wind and geothermal, 10.2 for photovoltaic, biomass, 
wastes, 8.9 in peak  hours for hydro with basin and run 
of river below 3 MW). 
Both factors were linked yearly to the retail price in-
dex, except for the fuel avoided cost, which was linked 
to the price of a mix of fuels, so that the resulting risk 
of the investments was  quite low.  
ENEL itself could have its projects included in the 
support programme, buying electricity from itself at a 
subsidised price. 
The price structure was so appealing that in 1992 
ENEL proposed to create a waiting list to be updated 
every 6 months, in order to avoid a wild rush to con-
nect cogeneration plants. The demands made after June 
1995 were ultimately scrapped, and the programme 
closed in January 1997, when most of the accepted 
plant had not yet been built. Even many of the projects 
accepted will not be built, as they were simply applica-
tions made by newcomers with scarce experience in 
the sector. The last projects are expected to be com-
pleted in 2004, without any fine for the delay in the 
commissioning. 
Table 1 shows over 5.6 GW of nominal new capacity 
promoted by the CIP6 programme. ENEL as a pro-
ducer has the largest share of this new capacity. 
The cost of the extra prices given to renewable 
power plants in their first eight years (i.e. excluding the 
avoided costs and extra prices paid to co-generation 
plants) for the whole CIP6 programme is estimated for 
the period 1992-2012 to be in the region of 13 billion € 
at year 2000 prices98. Considering also the money 
given to cogeneration, this is a burden for electricity 
consumers – 0.48 c€/kWh for domestic users in Octo-
ber 2001 – which implies a long-term commitment, 
considered that the last subsidies will be given in 2012. 
The reform of the electricity industry in 1999 was an 
opportunity for the implementation of new support 
measures for renewable energy. The challenge for the 
legislator was to implement an effective support to 
                                                          
98  This figure was  estimated by multiplying  the year 2000 extra 
prices by the energy produced in 8 years by all the RES-E projects 
admitted to the programme 
RES-E in the frame of a competitive market without 
creating unnecessary rents to the owners of the existing 
renewable power plants – mainly big hydro – which 
already benefited from other sources of support in the 
past. 
Table 1: Summary of the new renewable capacity de-
veloped by the CIP 6 support programme (1992-2004) 
[MW] Third 
parties 
Distribu-
tors 
ENEL Total 
capacity
Biogas 133 15  147 
Biomass 266 2  268 
Wind 749 - 20 769 
Photovoltaic 2  3 5 
Hydropower 661 141 2 127 2 929 
Run of river 133 171 134 438 
Wastes 56 -  56 
RDF 30 -  30 
MSW 408 139  547 
Geothermal - - 443 443 
Total RES 2 440 468 2 727 5 634 
Cogeneration 6 188 540  6 728 
TOTAL 8 628 1 008 2 727 12 362 
Source: Own estimates on GRTN and Ministry of Industry data. 
 
The Renewable Portfolio seemed to fit the Italian 
goal of boosting renewable electricity generation with-
out hindering the competition in the generation phase. 
The portfolio has been limited to new renewable power 
plants, i.e. those come on line after April 1, 1999, with 
the aim of supporting only the construction of new 
renewable capacity. 
From 2002 all the electricity producers or importers 
have an obligation to certify that at least 2% of their 
net sales come from new RES-E. Renewables, co-
generation (satisfying an efficiency requirement estab-
lished by the energy regulator) and the first 100 GWh 
per year produced by each company are excluded from 
this obligation. This quota should grow of 0,3% per 
year from 2005 to 2012, raising the portfolio to 4,4% 
in 2012. 
In order to facilitate the fulfilment of the obligation, 
GRTN issues a Tradable Green Certificate (TGC) for 
each 100 MWh produced by RES-E in the first 8 years 
– after up to 18 months of test operation – to plants 
deemed qualified by GRTN. These TGC can be traded 
in an exchange created on purpose by GME (Mercato 
dei Certificati Verdi). According to the principle of 
rolling redemption, after 8 years, the renewable plant 
can no longer  obtain TGCs and has to compete on the 
electricity market. TGCs can be sold separately from 
electricity and GRTN has an obligation to purchase 
electricity from renewables and cogeneration, giving 
them privileged access to the grid. 
The mechanism of rolling redemption has an implicit 
strength in promoting the construction of new power 
plants, as after 8 years the capacity required to satisfy 
the portfolio in the first year has to be replaced. In this 
way, not only the growth of demand implies a growth 
of RES-E generation, but also the replacement of quali-
fied plants after 8 years. Nevertheless, the trend of 
growth due to the mechanism is not sufficient to raise 
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the contribution of RES-E as required by the EU Direc-
tive on renewable energy. A quota of 4.5% should be 
introduced in order to reach the minimum goal of +25 
TWh before 2012. With a lower quota the growth of 
RES-E will not keep the pace of the electricity demand 
and the penetration of RES-E will decrease. 
Table 2 RES-E penetration (new and existing) in the Italian 
electricity sector in our forecast 
year RES-E estimated share of 
electricity production 
2001 19.3% 
2002 18.8% 
2003 18.4% 
2004 17.9% 
2005 17.7% 
2006 17.5% 
2007 17.3% 
2008 17.1% 
2009 17.8% 
2010 17.7% 
Defaulting producers will have to pay a fine equal to 
1.5 times the maximum price of TGC on the GME 
market in the previous year, that will be devolved to a 
fund aimed at supporting renewables. This measure is 
part of a new proposal of law presented in 2002, which 
is essential in making the new market take off. 
A critical aspect is the access of refurbished plants to 
the market: the requirements have been specified in 
March 2002 for hydro and geothermal power stations. 
They will have the right to receive TGCs in function of 
the investments made on the plant: 100% of the pro-
duction when a certain amount per installed kWh will 
be invested, scaled down to zero with lower invest-
ments. 
A further challenge was managing the transition 
from the old support system, committing the electricity 
consumers until 2012, to the new one based on compe-
tition. A large part of the CIP6 contracts are in fact 
eligible for the Green Certificates, as they came on line 
after March 1999. These projects have two choices: 
1. They can give up the CIP 6 contract and opt for 
the TGC. This option is reputed to be quite uncer-
tain because the TGC price is unknown; 
2. They can keep the CIP6 contract, but their TGCs 
will be traded by GRTN, who  pays them the extra 
price. GRTN sells the TGC on the market at a 
price set by law as the average of the extra prices 
paid to acquire electricity from RES plants in the 
CIP6 programme that year. GRTN can recover at 
least part of its extra costs or even all of them, in 
case it could sell all its TGCs.  
Most of the producers are expected to opt for the 
CIP6 contract, as it assures an interesting cash flow for 
8 years, instead of  betting on the TGC market.  
In addition, GRTN can also sell TGC non related to 
a RES production in case it expects to be short, with 
the obligation to cover them in three years. This option 
seems to be of scarce interest for GRTN, which would 
play a dangerous role in exposing itself to trading 
without any influence on the supply of TGCs. 
Figure 3 shows the expected supply of TGCs in the 
coming decade from projects under CIP6 contract, both 
of distributors (mainly ENEL) and third parties, and 
qualified as IAFR (renewable energy fed power plants) 
by GRTN. It is also shown the forecast of the demand 
of TGCs.  
It is evident that GRTN will strongly influence the 
market in the first years of its operation, as it will sell 
most of the certificates at a regulated price. Figure 3, in 
fact, shows that the plants under CIP6 contract could 
satisfy the demand of TGCs, but with fixed prices. The 
market will easily accept the TGCs of new producers if 
they will ask a price lower than that imposed to GRTN 
certificates, that will become a ceiling. 
The capability of GRTN to sell TGCs not related to 
any RES production could hide the scarcity on the 
market and depress the price signal for new prospec-
tive investors. 
Considering the large production of CIP6 projects 
admitted to receive TGCs, GRTN, conscious that it 
could strongly influence the future market, is likely to 
not resort to virtual emissions. 
The expected price of TGCs 
While GRTN has a lot of technical duties, its daughter 
company GME has to operate a market where Green 
Certificates can be freely traded. The price of TGCs 
should be set by the equilibrium of supply and demand. 
Nevertheless, the offer of GRTN of a great amount of 
certificates at a fixed price will be the reference for 
investors for the next 5 years. 
We made a simulation based on the expected produc-
tion of RES-E power plants under CIP6 contract and 
on CIP6 prices for the year 2000 (could be updated at 
2003 according to the variation of the retail price in-
dex). We found a reference price for these TGCs as 
shown in Figure 1, that will be an yearly updated ceil-
ing. 
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Fig. 1: Forecast of the price of the TGC sold by the 
grid operator GRTN 
TGCs can also be traded privately out of the official 
trading floor of the GME. This creates some problems 
of control of the validity of the certificates (the details 
about the registration of each sale of a TGC have not 
yet been issued). At the same time there is the opportu-
nity for the renewable producers to stipulate long-term 
contracts (up to 8 years) for selling certificates at a 
price maybe lower, but secure. 
 
ENER Forum 3. Successfully Promoting Renewable Energy Sources in Europe. 
 Budapest, Hungary, 6-7 June 2002 
ENER 25.02 87 
The demand of TGCs 
The renewable portfolio is set on the electricity pro-
duced and imported. The choice to charge the produc-
ers with the obligation is due to the reduced cost of 
control. 
A forecast has been made of the demand of TGCs in 
the coming years.  We assumed a reasonable growth 
rate for the demand of electricity and combined heat 
and power production, with an increase of RES-E 
production minimum to satisfy the obligation, which 
grows, from a flat 2% in 2002-2004, at an annual rate 
of increase of 0.3% until 2012. According to our esti-
mate the demand of TGCs should be in the region of 
3.5-9 TWh in the next decade. 
Table 3: Estimate of the future demand of electricity 
and RES-E portfolio (TWh per year) 
Year Final  
Electricity 
Demand 
RES-E CHP  Quota 
2002  322.718 58.548 54.771 3.368  
2003  331.108 58.712 56.771 3.532  
2004  339.883 58.885 58.771 3.705  
2005  348.550 59.578 62.771 4.398  
2006  357.089 60.302 66.771 5.122  
2007  365.659 61.541 71.771 6.361  
2008  374.252 62.290 76.771 7.110  
2009  383.047 66.198 80.771 7.808  
2010  392.049 67.251 82.771 8.703  
 
At February 2002, the IAFR-qualified, extra-CIP6 
plants were 154 with a total capacity of 1385 MW and 
an expected production of 2,63 TWh per year. The 
share of each technology is reported in Figure 2. 
wind 
48% hydro 
44% 
wastes 
4% 
solar 
0% 
geoth. 4% 
 
Fig. 2. The new plants qualified for the TGC market in 
February 2002 
The production of CIP6 plants with TGC is expected 
to decrease to zero in 2013, when all the subsidised 
production of these schemes will be terminated. 
The uncertain feasibility of part of these CIP6 pro-
jects, mainly in the field of biomass, suggested that  a 
reduced estimate should also be made, considering the 
mortality rate of CIP6 projects in the 1999-2001 time-
frame (IPP min in Figure 3). 
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Fig, 3 Estimate of the future trend of the Green Certifi-
cate market 
The future still looks dark 
Even if the market has formally become operational in 
2002, it is hard to evaluate the capability of the new 
instrument in promoting new renewable energy pro-
duction. Almost 80% of the plants qualified as IAFR 
for the TGC market are at the project phase and not yet 
fully built. They are on the good track to take advan-
tage of the certificates, but at least part of them still 
wait to see how the market will evolve. 
Other projects are at the design stage and could be 
exploited soon, but the investors are waiting for a bet-
ter assessment of the market, being difficult at the 
moment  to finance any new project. 
The first step in the right direction was setting a fine 
for the defaulting producers. The penalty equal to 1.5 
times the maximum price in the previous year is a fair 
measure, but it is not yet law, being part of an overall 
reform law for the energy industry, which is expected 
to become effective before the end of the year 2002. 
Other aspects still remain critical: 
• Size of the certificate  
The choice to set at 100 MWh the size of a TGC 
could displace some small producers. In fact, even 
if they can aggregate their productions to reach 
100 MWh, for some technologies (PV) the cost for 
the aggregation of different producers could be 
high. Why not a smaller size? 
• Energy sources admitted 
The Italian energy policy advocated the inclusion 
of wastes and big hydro among the renewable 
technologies. Different choices could be made  by 
other countries. Could this be an obstacle to the in-
tegration of the TGC market at the EU level? 
• Lack of a long term target 
The TGC market is not backed by specific docu-
ments of energy policy setting binding long-term 
targets, as required by the EU Directive 
2001/77/EC. A clear commitment to maintain 
support to RES-E in the long term is not taken, 
and investors perceive this as a risk. A focused 
policy act with targets for RES-E at the national 
level, as required by the renewable energy Direc-
tive, would boost the confidence of new investors 
in  the new market. 
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• Administrative costs 
A basic requirement for a support scheme is its 
low administrative cost. It is not yet known who 
has to pay the costs of the TGC market and how. 
Is this a system cost to be socialised? Or should 
the suppliers pay a fee to participate? Or perhaps 
the consumers should pay a surcharge to their 
electricity bills? 
• Reciprocity  
It is provided that the obligation can also be ful-
filled by importing electricity from power stations 
fed by renewable sources commissioned after 31 
March 1999, but only from countries adopting 
similar support systems for renewable energy, 
open to the power stations located in Italy. At this 
time such countries do not exist. Moreover, in the 
case of import, there is the additional barrier that 
the TGC is traded jointly with its electricity pro-
duction and not separately as it happens for the 
Italian renewable production. Could these condi-
tions ever be met? 
• Stability of the programme 
A closing date of the programme has not been set 
and it could in theory be interrupted soon. It would 
be important to guarantee the investors that the 
TGC market will remain operational for a reason-
able time. 
Under these conditions it appears difficult to finance 
new initiatives aimed at fulfilling the goals of the 
directive 2001/77/EC, even if the lower estimate of 75 
TWh of RES-E is chosen (20 TWh to be added). 
In addition, it appears urgent to co-ordinate the sup-
port to RES to the other instruments of environmental 
policy under development in the EU. CO2 abatement is 
only one of the benefits of renewables: how can these 
other benefits be taken into account properly? When 
the motivation for supporting renewable energy is 
found only in their potential for reducing greenhouse 
gas emissions, RES could be disadvantaged respect to 
other measures which appears cheaper, like Joint Im-
plementation or Clean Development Mechanisms. The 
challenge for the renewable energy industry is to high-
light the additional benefits of renewables on other 
measures. 
Other non technical barriers 
The growth of RES in Italy towards the goals set by the 
Directive 2001/77/EC seems to be quite difficult also 
for other reasons, not directly linked to the support 
scheme or the physical availability of the resources.  
The construction of new plants is highly discouraged 
also by the length of the procedure for authorisations, 
and the wide range of rules set at the local level (Re-
gions or even municipalities) that do not allow to re-
peat successful projects. An effective action in favour 
of RES would have to start from these basics, other-
wise a new class of small investors will hardly arise 
and the existing players of the electricity market will 
be favoured in big scale projects that can not exploit 
the full dividend of renewables. 
Conclusions 
The TGCs market is a great opportunity to develop 
new RES in Italy, but some steps are still missing for 
the instrument to be fully operational. The indetermi-
nate aspects and the uncertainty of the long term regu-
lation are delaying the new investments and pose some 
questions on the effectiveness of the market approach. 
The targets accepted by the Italian Government at 
the international level for 2010 will not be achieved 
with the TGC alone and other measures should be 
enforced. With all the technologies in competition, the 
only possibility for exploiting the resources relatively 
more expensive – namely biomass and wastes – is to 
set a feed in tariff specific for these sources, otherwise 
they will be permanently out the TGC market. An 
investor will have the possibility to choose between the 
feed in tariff and the issue of certificates. 
A dramatic effort has to be done in Italy to attract 
new investments in the field of renewable energy and 
achieve the international commitments. It is necessary 
to reduce the risk for the new investors, aware that in 
any case the TGC market recently started will make 
only part of the work. Without a firm commitment at 
the national as well as local level, Italy will be in de-
fault with its goals in 2010. 
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Session 3: Promoting RES: stakeholders point-of-view 
 
The effect of renewable energy 
supporting strategies on society. 
The issue of public acceptance 
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Keywords. Renewable energy, Wind energy, Support poli-
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 Abstract. The paper is focused on the effects of support 
policies for renewable energy technologies (RETs) on soci-
ety. In the last decade different promotion schemes have been 
implemented in European countries to increase the develop-
ment of renewable energy sources. It is obvious that different 
cultural traditions within European countries call for their 
own well adapted solutions. Nevertheless, clear trends can be 
seen. Especially the birth and high-rise of wind energy in 
some countries is an important indicator for the success of 
the support measures applied. In general, feed-in tariffs have 
proven their ability to boost the development of RETs.  
Introduction 
The European Wind Energy Association (EWEA) was 
founded in 1982 with a set of goals to be achieved: 
• To create a sustainable future by maximising the 
use of wind energy; 
• To create awareness of the potential of wind en-
ergy towards this end; 
• To represent the interests of the wind energy sec-
tor. 
Today, the association has over 20,000 members. A 
lot of them represent the industry – manufacturers, 
utilities, developers, R&D institutes, universities, fi-
nanciers etc. – but also national wind energy associa-
tions and individuals are on board. 
Capacity building 
The market – building up a critical mass 
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Fig. 1 Cumulative wind energy – installed capacity 
In general, renewable energy technologies (RETs) 
are associated with a lot of benefits and their exploita-
tion is of crucial importance to achieve the smooth 
transition to a cleaner and more sustainable develop-
ment in the energy sector. As a first step towards this 
                                                          
99 adreas.wagner@ps.ge.com 
target, in the last decade, especially within Europe the 
birth and boost of wind energy has begun, see Fig. 1.  
Among the Top-10 Markets for wind energy world-
wide Germany took the leading position in the last 
years, followed by the U.S.A., Spain and Denmark. As 
there can be seen from Fig. 2, seven of the ten leading 
markets with respect to wind energy are Member 
States of the European Union.  
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Fig. 2 Top-10 Markets in the World, EWEA 2002, 
based on: BTM Consult ApS, 2001 
The owners and operators 
A look at the owners and operators of wind power 
plants in the leading countries is undertaken in Table 1, 
which reflects the country-specific situations and the 
different cultural traditions, respectively.  
Table 1: Comparison of owners and operators of wind 
power plants with respect to their investment size for 
Germany, Denmark, United Kingdom and the US 
Size of investment < 1M€ 1-5 M€ 5-10 M€ > 10 M€
Individual private 
investor  
(e.g. farmers) 
D, DK D   
Group of private 
investors 
(e.g. co-ops) 
D, DK, 
UK D, UK D, UK D 
Small companies < 
15 M€ UK UK D, UK D 
Larger companies > 
15 M€  UK, D 
UK, D, 
E, US 
UK, D, E, 
US 
Utility projects  UK, D UK, D, US UK, US 
 
In Denmark – the first country within Europe which 
took the leading position with respect to wind power in 
the late eighties and early nineties – the market is 
dominated by private investors, both individuals and 
groups of investors. Of course, their typical size of 
investment is rather small (< 1M€). This reflects the 
state of the art technology at the time, as well as the 
typical cultural tradition, as in general within Denmark 
local communities have a strong role. 
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A totally different situation shows the US market: It 
is dominated by large companies and larger utility 
projects with a huge specific investment size, even in 
the 1980s (5–10 M€ and more).  
For Germany, a country with a de-centralised and 
fragmented political system, and the UK with its cen-
tralised political system, where regional autonomy is 
growing recently, the market seems to be more ho-
mogenous: Nearly all kind of investors are represented, 
even though there are some important distinctions to be 
made. Utility based investments are more common in 
the UK. In Germany, private investors have been 
dominating the market with about 95 percent market 
share. Both has to do with the support mechanism in 
place which has given more stability for private in-
vestments in Germany, compared to the rather risky 
tendering procedures applied in the UK throughout the 
1990s. Public acceptance issues have to be seen linked 
to the kind of political framework in place. Of course, 
for private investors budget restrictions occur to some 
extent, as projects become bigger, with tens or even 
hundreds of million Euro investment (e.g. offshore). 
Policy makers 
The influence of policy makers on the development of 
RETs is of crucial importance. In this context, the 
following areas of activity have to be mentioned:  
• Clear political commitment, or even a consensus 
on supporting schemes for RETs; 
• Create favourable legal framework that allows 
citizen participation; 
• Local/regional wind energy plans; 
• Information dissemination. 
Factors influencing public acceptance 
Aside from political will, public acceptance determines 
the success of renewable energies (REs) in a certain 
country. A set of factors influencing public acceptance 
can be named: 
• Openness of Support Systems for public participa-
tion;  
• Political systems/cultures and mentality (e.g. cen-
tralized or decentralized system, etc.); 
• Local/regional tax revenues/ job creation by RE; 
• Environmental awareness of decision-makers, and 
the general public; 
• Social acceptance through information policy, 
marketing, alliance building among associations; 
• Share of RE in the electricity system (wind), in 
relation to population density and size of the  
country. 
RE Support Policies 
Lessons from the past – Feed-in Tariff vs. Tendering 
Quota Systems 
Feed-in Tariff and Tendering Quota Systems have been 
the most popular policy instruments to support RETs 
within Europe in the past decade. With respect to their 
effectiveness on fostering the development of RETs it 
must be stated: Feed-in Tariffs are clearly preferable 
policy tool for a rapid market introduction policy. As 
there can be seen from Table 2 and Fig. 3, in countries 
with Feed-in Tariff schemes the installed capacity of 
wind power plants has reached a level of about 10.6 
GW at the end of 2000, although the wind potential is 
quite moderate. On contrary, in countries with high 
wind potential where Tendering Quota Systems have 
been applied, only 0.5 GW of wind power have been 
installed in the same time. This picture hasn’t changed 
substantially in 2001. 
Table 2: Development of wind energy in countries with 
Feed-in Tariff and Tendering Quota Systems 
 
Total installed capacity 
by 2000  10,683 MW      590 MW   
Growth in 2000    3,008 MW     129 MW 
 
REFITs (RE Feed in Tariffs) Tendering Î RECs
NB: France introduced REFITs for wind power on 8 June 2001  
Fig. 3 Comparison of the wind potential and the devel-
opment of wind energy in countries with Feed-in Tariff 
and Tendering Quota Systems 
Objectives of RE Support Policies 
In general, with respect to RE Support Policies the 
following objectives are named: 
• Environmental and climate policy objectives; 
• Capacity increase; 
• Cost reduction; 
• Openness and flexibility to attract new investors; 
• Foster regional development by offering invest-
ment opportunities; 
• Job creation and industrial development. 
Case study wind energy – Employment effects 
The fast growing wind energy industry in the European 
Union is an impressive example for possible employ-
  
 
  
Country 
 
Installed 
capacity 
(1999) 
New 
installation 
(1999) 
 
European 
market 
share 
(1999) 
Installed 
capacity 
(2000) 
 
New 
installation
(2000) 
 
European 
market 
share 
(2000) 
  
Premium 
price 
markets 
 
  MW MW % MW MW %
Germany
 
4,442 
 
1,567 
 
47.7 
 
6,113 
 
1,671 47.7 
 
Denmark 1,738 
 
290 18.6 
 
2,300 
 
562 17.9 
 
Spain 1,495 661 16.0 2,270 775 17.7 
  Total 
 
7,675 2,518 82.5 
 
10,683 
 
3,008 
 
83.4 
  
Tendering 
fixed 
quota 
system 
markets 
UK 362 29 3.9 406 44 3.2 
Ireland 74 1 0.8 118 44 0.9 
France 25 6 0.2 66 41 0.5 
  Total 461 36 5.0 
 
590 129 4.6 
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ment effects of an accelerated development of RETs. 
Of course, such an expansion was the result of the 
encouraged Support Policy within some EU countries. 
In more detail, within the wind energy sector major 
areas of job creation are: 
• Component Manufacturing (local, regional,  
national), 
• Machinery Assembly (regional, national, interna-
tional). 
• Construction and Grid Connection Operations 
(local, regional), 
• Wind Farm Operation & Service/Maintenance 
(local, regional), 
• Project Development (local, regional, national), 
• Research and Development (national), 
• Approval and Certification (national). 
To illustrate the above mentioned points, the total 
job creation in the wind energy sector (direct/indirect) 
amounts to approximately 70,000 jobs across the EU, 
or 35,000 in Germany, respectively. It’s important to 
mention the fact that these jobs have mainly been cre-
ated within only 10 years. 
Conclusions 
The most important conclusions of this analysis are:  
• Careful design and consistency, and long-term 
stability of RE Support Policies is required; 
• The local, regional and national benefits of RE 
must be identified and pro-actively communicated 
by the wind industry and politicians alike; 
• For the development of policies it is important to 
take into account historical development and po-
litical structures, incl. electricity market; 
• Investment opportunities and financial incentives 
for individuals (e.g. tax system, co-operatives etc.) 
are of high relevance to increase the public accep-
tance of RE; 
Further comparative analysis and research studies are 
definitely needed to better understand the underlying 
success factors to public acceptance issues. 
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Abstract. The paper is focused on the framework conditions 
that have made possible the birth and development of the 
renewable sector in Spain. Dozens of new companies have 
emerged in the wake of a stable legal framework that has 
politically guaranteed environmental premiums for electricity 
produced from renewable energy sources (RES-E). This 
feed-in framework has delivered good results in some tech-
nologies – mainly in small hydro and wind energy – although 
has not given enough profitability to foster biomass, biogas 
and solar. Nevertheless, APPA regards the Spanish support 
scheme as a good example of how to combine market forces 
and incentives for clean energies at an affordable cost and 
without complex mechanisms or bureaucracy. Therefore, 
investors and independent developers are reluctant to be 
involved in the experiments already done in some other 
countries with alternative schemes such as the tradable green 
certificates. In order to reach the 12% goal enshrined in the 
Electricity Act 54/1997 and in the National RES Develop-
ment Plan 2000-2010 the small hydro and wind premiums 
will have to be kept though increasing the compensations for 
biomass electricity. Administrative and grid barriers should 
also be removed to foster RES development. The achieve-
ment of the 12% goal will impossible unless current energy 
consumption trends are no curbed.      
A stable legal framework 
The Spanish Renewable Energy Association – APPA 
was founded in 1987 with only a few small hydro de-
velopers. Fifteen years later the same organisation 
brings together more than 200 corporate members, 
mainly independent producers from small hydro, wind, 
biomass and solar, whose total capacity is more than 
2,500 MW, only in Spain. This evolution illustrates the 
progress of renewable energy in the country. 
This development would not have taken place unless 
the promotion of renewable energy sources of electric-
ity (RES-E) had not been a national policy in Spain for 
20 years. Since 1980 and under different Governments 
and different political majorities, there has been a con-
tinuity in the legal framework aimed at fostering  
RES-E. 
The three Acts that have regulated the energy and/or 
electricity sectors in Spain since 1980 – the Energy 
Conservation Act 82/1980, the National Electricity 
System Act 40/1994 and the Electricity Act 54/1997 
(currently in force) – have given support to the devel-
opment of RES-E. Whereas the main goal of such a 
policy in 1980 was to reduce energy dependence, both 
the 1994 and the 1997 Acts put more emphasis on the 
environmental benefits of RES. Regardless of the 
                                                          
100 The author works as International Affairs Officer at APPA’s 
headquarters (París, 205 ·08008 Barcelona, Spain · mbustos@appa.es 
·Tel. +34 93 4142277). 
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grounds for this, these different Acts have set a stable 
legal framework for 20 years. 
Electricity Act 54/1997 
The Electricity Act 54/1997 gave up the old notion of 
electricity supply as a public service and opened the 
door to a new electricity legal framework aimed at 
making the guarantee of supply to all consumers com-
patible with the principles of objectivity and transpar-
ency within a liberalised market. This Act brought into 
force in Spain the provisions of the European Directive 
96/92/EC. 
Such an Act enshrined two different electricity pro-
duction systems: the Ordinary System and the Special 
System. Whereas in the former the regulatory basis is 
the free generation market or electricity pool where 
demand and supply bids for electricity are matched and 
prices are set in consequence, in the latter all genera-
tion plants below 50 MW belonging to three clearly 
separated areas – cogeneration, RES-E and waste – are 
given a special treatment justified by their contribution 
to “the environmental protection, energy efficiency 
improvement and the reduction in consumption”. 
According to article 30 of that Act RES-E producers 
are entitled to incorporate all their output power into 
the grid system and to receive as remuneration the 
general generation hourly pool price plus a premium or 
incentive fixed by the Central Government for all 
Spain. The total amount paid to RES-E generators must 
be between 80% and 90% of the average electricity 
price estimated each year by the Government. That 
average is calculated by dividing the total electricity 
supply revenues estimated from the whole electricity 
supply billing (excluding VAT and other taxes) by the 
total estimated power supplied 101. 
Regarding hydro this rule only applies to small 
plants (10 MW or below). The Act allows solar plants 
to surpass such a range. The authorisation of any of 
these special plants is left in the hands of the Regional 
Autonomous Governments (Article 28), according to 
the federal political system in place in Spain since 
1978. 
As far as RES-E are concerned the Electricity Act 
contains a very important clause in its 16th Transitory 
Provision, since it not only enshrines the European 
12% goal as a legal one but also links the existence and 
amount of RES premiums to the fulfilment of such a 
goal. This Provision states that “In order for RES to 
satisfy at least 12% of Spain’s total energy demand by 
the year 2010, a plan shall be drawn up to promote 
renewable energies and whose objectives shall be taken 
into account in the setting of premiums”. This Provi-
sion linking the premiums with the achievement of 
ambitious goals has been a key one in order to 
strengthen the confidence of developers and financial 
investors in the long-term stability of the Spanish RES 
policy. Thus, premiums have been regarded by every-
body as politically and legally guaranteed. 
                                                          
101 The Spanish Central Government estimated that electricity reve-
nues for the year 2002 will total 13,457 M€ with a total supplied 
power of 197,425 kWh and an average electricity price of 6.82 
€c/kWh.  
Royal Decree 2818/1998 
This Special System was developed in depth by the 
Royal Decree 2818/1998, which entered into force on 
January 1st 1999. This legal disposition begins stating 
in its preamble that “the established incentive for RES 
facilities has no time limit placed on it because their 
environmental benefits must be internalised and RES 
special characteristics – higher costs – prevent them 
from competing in a free market”. 
Regarding the economic arrangements this Royal 
Decree 2818 fixed the amounts for the 1999 RES-E 
premiums or incentives established. As foreseen in the 
18th article of said Decree the premiums have been 
adjusted annually since then by the central Government 
“in line with the variation in the average electricity sale 
price102, that shall be applied to sum total of the market 
price plus the premium”. Table 1 shows the evolution 
of premiums since 1999. 
Table 1: Evolution of RES-E premiums by technology 
APPA 4
RES-E PREMIUMS
(Euro cents)
1999 2000 2001 2002
Wind 3.16 2.87 2.87 2.89
Smallhydro 3.27 2.98 2.98 3
Biomass 3.04 2.76 2.76 2.78
Biogas 2.82 2.55 2.55 2.57
Solar <5 kW 36 36 36 36
Solar >5 kW 18 18 18 18
 
Although the premiums are paid directly by the dis-
tributors who are fed with the electricity from the re-
newable generator, they are entitled to pass such 
amounts to the National Energy Commission (CNE), 
which they always do. Premiums are legally regarded 
as a permanent cost of the electricity system like nu-
clear fuel costs or stranded costs. Premiums are there-
fore paid by all consumers as any other permanent cost 
of the system.103 
In order to offer RES-E producers a way to know 
fully in advance their kWh revenues regardless of 
hourly market price changes, the same Royal Decree 
2818 has given producers the right to opt for a fixed 
price instead of the “market price + premium” basic 
option. That fixed price is also adjusted annually by the 
Government according to the variation in the average 
electricity sale price. Table 2 compares both options in 
2002 assuming an average market price of 3.6 €c/kWh. 
Notice that the basic option will be a bit better in terms 
                                                          
102 The average electricity sale price is defined as the forecast in-
come from billing for electricity supply divided by the forecast 
electricity supplied. See footnote 1 for year 2002 estimate.   
103 Although all independent RES-E generators have chosen this 
feed-in scheme, according to the Spanish legislation they could 
follow two other alternative schemes: to make offers directly to the 
electricity market or to sign physical bilateral contracts with distribu-
tors, suppliers and qualified consumers. In both cases they are also 
entitled to receive the same premiums as in the feed in scheme. 
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of revenues, as actually happened last year, although 
the difference between the two options is rather small. 
Most RES-E producers follow the basic “market + 
premium” option. Legally, they are only entitled to 
change from one option to the other once every year. 
Table 2: Comparison between premiums and fixed prices 
APPA 3
RES PRICES 2002
(Euro cents)
Fixed
Prices
Market Price +
Premium
Wind 6.2 3.6+2.8
Smallhydro 6.3 3.6+3
Biomass 6.1 3.6+2.7
Biogas 5.9 3.6+2.5
Solar <5 kW 39 3.6+36
Solar >5 kW 21 3.6+18
 
According to the 32nd article of this Royal Decree 
“every four years the premiums set in this Royal De-
cree shall be revised by taking into account the evolu-
tion of the price of electric power, the participation of 
these facilities in the coverage of demand and their 
impact on the technical management of the system”. 
Hence, later this year the Central Government will 
have to carry out the first revision of such premiums. It 
is expected that the Government will keep the current 
amounts of premiums though biomass and biogas ones 
should be increased to ensure the required profitability 
of plants and investments.  
The existence of both the “market price + premium” 
scheme and the annual adjustment of premiums and 
fixed prices according to the variations in the average 
electricity sale price stress the market oriented ap-
proach of the Spanish support system. This way all 
reductions in costs brought about by conventional 
producers in the electricity market are passed onto 
RES-E producers’ revenues. Thus, APPA regards the 
Spanish support scheme as a good example of how to 
combine market forces and incentives for clean ener-
gies without complex mechanisms or bureaucracy. 
Moreover, this framework is able to deliver quite good 
results at an affordable cost: RES-E generators within 
the Special Regime received last year premiums under 
this scheme that totalled 335 M€, which represents 
only 2.4% of the total electricity supply revenues. 
RES framework: goals and achievements  
The Spanish support system has been able to deliver 
goods results in some technologies but obviously it has 
not been capable of overcoming alone all kinds of 
barriers.  
As was foreseen in the 16th Transitory Provision of 
the Electricity Act, the Central Government adopted in 
1999 a National RES Development Plan 2000-2010 
whose general and specific goals are shown in Table 3 
and 4.   
Table 3: Spanish RES Plan: general goals by 2010 
APPA 4
SPANISH RES DEVELOPMENT
PLAN 2000-2010
2000
Goals
2010
Gross Electricty Gener. (GWh) 224,875 260,063
RES-E (GWh) 37,974 76,458
RES-E (%) 16.9% 29,4%*
RES-E (–Hydro>10 MW)(GWh) 11,059 45,511
RES-E (–Hydro>10 MW)(%) 4.9% 17.5%
* Same 2010 goal as European Directive RES-E
Table 4: Spanish RES Plan: goals and achievements by 
technology 
APPA 5
RES PLAN 2000-2010
EVOLUTION
2010
Goal
2001
Wind 9000 MW 3337 MW
Smallhydro 2230 MW 1607 MW
Biomass 1896 MW 164 MW
Biogas 150 MW 45 MW
Solar PV 143 MW 16 MW
 
Actually, wind is the only RES technology on the 
right track to achieve the 2010 goals. The stable legal 
framework, the right level of the wind premiums and 
the regional development plans put in place by many 
Autonomous Regional Communities have been able to 
foster a swift wind development with more than 800 
new MW installed last year. 
As far as the small hydro sector is concerned, only 
87 new MW were added to the installed power in 
Spain over the last two years. As the Spanish Renew-
able Energy Agency (IDAE) states in its last regular 
report “the pace at which new small hydro plants are 
currently being installed is insufficient to achieve the 
2010 goals”. This situation clearly points out that a 
good support system in terms of economic revenues is 
not enough to overcome the administrative and envi-
ronmental barriers that prevent small hydro from de-
veloping all its potential.  
Other technologies such as biomass and solar have 
been hindered from really taking off by too low premi-
ums, among other barriers. That’s why APPA has 
asked the Government to increase biomass and biogas 
premiums in order to foster new investments, guaran-
tee their profitability and deliver the planned power 
within the National RES Development Plan 2000-
2010. Biomass development would also require a more 
integrated approach capable of taking into account 
environmental and agricultural considerations. 
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Main barriers for RES-E development 
The achievement of the 2010 goals will be impossible 
if the current trends in energy and electricity consump-
tion – 50% increase in the last decade – are not curbed. 
More concrete barriers for RES-E development have to 
do with the weak grid infrastructure in some parts of 
the country – a problem that is being solved partly by 
agreements to share the cost of grid strengthening 
between groups of wind developers – and the connec-
tion with the distributors’ grid. Independent developers 
usually face substantial difficulties in reaching an 
agreement with the grid operators, commonly big utili-
ties, which in many cases have been abusing their 
dominant position to try to avoid or delay access to 
their networks by independent RES-E operators. The 
present legal regime regarding grid connection is com-
pletely outdated –it was passed in 1985– and unsuit-
able for RES-E plants. A new legal framework is in the 
pipeline in order to guarantee a more transparent and 
objective procedure. 
Thirdly, it seems essential to streamline administra-
tive procedures regarding authorisation, since at pre-
sent bureaucracy makes often this process to be a 
nightmare. There should be also some kind of har-
monisation among Autonomous Regional Communi-
ties since each of them follows currently its own singu-
lar procedure. 
Moreover, RES-E development has been only possi-
ble in those Spanish regions where a wide political and 
social consensus has been achieved between the 
Autonomous Government and the local councils. Last 
but no least, social and economic local agreements 
have helped to prevent conflicts with local organisa-
tions and residents. Information campaigns and careful 
environmental impact assessments have helped in 
many cases to overcome landscape concerns of local 
population and lack of energy awareness.  
Conclusion: Spanish Developers' Perspectives 
The current Spanish support system has demonstrated 
its efficiency in delivering good results in those RES-E 
technologies with the appropriate amount of premium. 
Financial institutions have confidence in the stability of 
this framework and its ability to combine market forces 
and incentives for clean energies without complex 
mechanisms or bureaucracy. The framework needs 
only to be improved to deliver better results and be 
complemented by new policies aimed at removing 
pending administrative and market barriers. For the 
time being, Spanish independent investors an develop-
ers are pleased with the feed in economic scheme and 
are therefore reluctant to be involved in the experi-
ments already in place in some other countries with 
alternative schemes such as the tradable green certifi-
cates or voluntary approaches such as green electricity 
offers.    
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Session 4: Promoting RES in accession countries 
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Abstract. Electricity produced from renewable sources 
supported by feed-in tariffs may become an economic 
burden on the national economy and may interfere with 
electricity markets. Setting of the feed-in tariffs, their level 
and structure should be consistent with the economic, 
environmental and other strategic goals. Also, the authority 
is in a dynamic regulatory situation. A value-based ap-
proach to tariff  setting is described and regulatory dynamic 
considerations discussed. Feed-in tariffs, as further modi-
fied by policy and investor needs considerations and 
adopted in Slovenia in March 2002 are presented.  
Introduction 
Legal basis and choice of the RES support instrument 
The Energy Act (EA) of 1999 of Slovenia has been 
promulgated primarily as a transposition of the EU 
energy market directives into national law, as part of 
the accession process. In the policy declarations of 
the Energy Act, renewable energy sources (RES) and 
“conversion with very high efficiency” (virtually 
equivalent to combined heat and power production, 
CHP), jointly defined as “qualified production of 
electricity” (QP) are to be provided special support.  
As to the type of support, EA provides legal basis 
for either a green certificate system (a quota system, 
Art. 19) or a feed-in tariff (as “priority dispatch”, 
Art.24.). Further options, such as investment subsi-
dies from the budget, are possible without specific 
legal framework.  
A recent overview (Haas, 2001) reports that a pre-
vailing majority of EU countries apply a feed-in 
tariff, set by a regulatory authority, for support of 
electricity production from RES, either uniquely or in 
combination with other instruments. In a policy sup-
port study performed in the year 2000 the options for 
promotion of qualified production were reviewed 
(IJS, 2000) from the point of view of their applicabil-
ity in Slovenia. Foreign as well as domestic experi-
ence to date provided sufficient basis for a decision to 
proceed first with the feed-in tariffs. This decision is 
the basis for the work reported here. 
Feed-in tariffs and energy markets 
Better economic efficiency of the energy sector is 
sought by opening of the markets for electricity and 
gas, in addition to the already developed markets for 
non-network energies. Any support mechanisms for 
particular types of energy sources may distort the 
markets. Precautions are taken by the regulators, such 
as the provision of the electricity directive of the EU, 
where only up to 15% of domestic primary energy 
sources for electricity production may receive a 
preferential treatment (“priority dispatch”).  
Often existing market conditions are distorted so as 
to discriminate against renewable and other 
decentralised power production, at the least by: 
• lack of internalisation of external costs of large-
scale and fossil-based electricity production,  
• market rules disfavouring distributed generation, 
and  
• market power of incumbent large-scale produc-
ers. 
Support of renewable electricity production by 
feed-in tariffs may be viewed as violation of the sin-
gle market for electricity as a commodity. On the 
other hand, imperfections and single-mindedness of 
the market mechanism, which  focuses on the com-
modity price only, requires corrections. One way is to 
create parallel markets, such as the hedging (deriva-
tives) market, or a market for “green certificates”, a 
token of the desired renewable qualities of produc-
tion. Reliance on feed-in tariffs lacks the sophistica-
tion of multi-commodity situation, and may be more 
likened to the historic situation when a multi-faceted 
social contract existed between the community and a 
(monopolistic) electricity producer. 
Feed-in tariffs are economic instruments, compared 
to command-and-control actions, such as setting 
quantitative goals on renewable production without 
attention to the costs involved. The economic actors: 
proprietors of investment opportunities, investors and 
equipment manufacturers, will respond by competi-
tive action that will include cost-cutting in order to 
increase profits. Their activity will lead to an in-
creased market share. If not the price, the supply 
volume will, in the ideal case, be optimised by the 
market. The feasibility and the social benefits will 
greatly depend on the effectiveness of the regulating 
authority. 
A dynamic regulatory task 
Sufficient historic evidence attests to the delicate task 
of the regulatory authorities in the case that they 
assume the responsibility to set feed-in prices. A case 
in point is the experience in Italy (Tomassetti, 1998) 
during the 90's. The prices set in 1992 by an inter-
ministerial body (decision CIP 6/92) were quite 
stimulating, especially for small hydro power plants 
and cogeneration. The CIP 6/92 decision led to a 
landslide of registered projects. Favourable feed-in 
prices have not been corrected as needed, and the 
support system came to a standstill a few years later, 
when the electric power system operator, ENEL 
decided not to accept any new offers.  
The powerful regulatory instrument of feed-in 
prices can easily backfire, if the authority is not well 
aware and prepared to act as a part of a dynamic 
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control loop. The real-life situation, most often gov-
erned by a superimposed political process, should be 
expected to destabilise the situation either by impos-
ing rigidity or jerks. A feed-in support system should 
contain both elements of stability and responsive 
change. 
The usual stability element is a provision for a 
long-term power purchase price. For dynamic con-
trol, the feed-in tariffs should be adjusted in time. 
Even though both elements existed in historic exam-
ples, their real-life performance was not always satis-
factory. 
Principles for setting the feed-in tariffs 
Value of electricity or investor needs? 
Two main principles for defining feed in tariffs may 
be used:  
a) value of electricity + correction for externalities 
and strategic issues, or  
b) needs of the investors.  
Closeness of both requirements is a prerequisite for 
a successful promotion scheme. Both points of view 
should be examined in the preparatory analysis. The 
question remains, however, which point of view 
should be retained in the final justification. The value 
of electricity is perceived as a much stronger argu-
ment in any energy-policy debate than investors' 
needs.  
If we look at a feed-in tariff table, a clue to the 
point of view taken by the regulator are differences 
between tariffs for different types of RES. A uniform 
tariff across all types indicates that value principle is 
dominating. Differentiated tariffs for different types 
of RES indicate that needs of the investors are more 
strongly considered. Data presented in (Haas, 2001, 
Fig. 5) indicates both practices. In some cases, e.g. 
Denmark, a trend towards unification of feed-in tar-
iffs across RES types is detected. 
Time dependent tariffs 
The value of electric power in a system is widely 
varying in time, same as for many other utilities 
(transportation, heating, cooling and other services). 
This goes even beyond the “price volatility” encoun-
tered on the electricity markets in the short term, 
when mostly variable production costs are at play and 
a daily-weekly pattern is dominating. On a longer 
time scale, prices should be expected to skyrocket if 
and when capacity falls below demand. 
Many types of RES depend on the instantaneous 
availability of the energy source, such as wind, sun-
shine, tide or waves. Time-of-service considerations 
are not very popular in the RES community. For 
value-based feed-in tariffs the temporal aspect of 
electricity production can not be avoided, especially 
if a realistic comparison is to be made between such 
diverse situations as: run-of-the-river and accumulat-
ing hydro power plants, biomass-fired plants and 
severely intermittent sources as wind. CHP as an 
RES-assimilated type of electricity production has 
distinct advantage in this respect, as it relies on fuels 
and, in temperate and cold climates, the maximal heat 
and electricity demands coincide. 
RES and CHP, in any case under regulatory scru-
tiny, are important for long term stability of electric-
ity markets, when and if the market share of these 
technologies exceeds the marginal few percent. 
Regulatory actions should reflect the full strategic 
value of electricity produced. This includes respon-
siveness to demand changes, including such minimal 
attention to system integration issues as scheduling 
maintenance outages and providing rapid repair, 
especially during high demand periods. Time-of-
service tariffs can assist significantly in this direction. 
Diversity of potential and scope of feed-in tariffs 
The feed-in tariffs as the support instrument of choice 
for the next period in Slovenia, should be defined for 
the range of energy sources that qualify. The reverse 
is also obvious, that economic potential and sheer 
viability of renewable sources will depends on the 
support instruments. 
In Slovenia several types of RES are of immediate 
interest. There is still some potential for hydro power 
plants (small and medium sized, up to 30 MW); also 
biomass (wood) fired power plants, preferably as 
cogeneration units, are feasible. Wind power poten-
tial has not been sufficiently investigated and bio-gas 
potential is obviously under-utilised. It is particularly 
in this new development areas that details of the 
support scheme are decisive. Theoretical or technical 
potential of wind power certainly exists, but eco-
nomic feasibility of large-scale penetration is ques-
tionable. A conflict of interest between environ-
mental protection and wind power development is 
also in sight.  
The other major potential towards sustainable en-
ergy policy is development of CHP, particularly for 
space heating. In several cases even existing heating 
networks rely on heat-only gas-fired boilers. 
No official target is set for development of RES 
and/or CHP in Slovenia. It is expected that a National 
Energy Programme will be developed according to 
the Energy Act, and that it will establish goals in 
these sectors. Also, reaching the Kyoto targets, con-
firmed by the recent ratification (June 2002), will 
require a shift towards less carbon intensive electric-
ity production. 
Feed-in tariffs based on electricity value  
Previous experience 
A feed-in tariff has been used in Slovenia for the last 
10 years. All small power plants (up to 10 MW) were 
eligible to conclude a contract with the local utility 
company and sell excess electricity at a relatively 
favourable price. A two-position tariff was used, with 
peak and off-peak prices, same for all types of small 
power plants. 
Due to this feed-in tariff arrangement and soft 
loans available in the early 90's for small hydro 
power plants, the early 90's witnessed a boom of 
small hydro construction. Some examples of crude 
construction, slack environmental inspection and 
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alleged excessive profitability of some plants led to a 
reversal of public opinion support for small hydro. 
On the other hand, investors have also experienced 
consequences of deficient legal and political frame-
work. As an example, in a financial environment with 
almost two-digit inflation, the government failed to 
update the feed-in tariff levels from late 1998 through 
early 2002. By early 2002 in real terms the feed-in 
price lost 30% of the value as set in 1998. 
Economic basis of feed-in tariffs 
New feed-in tariffs were to be established according 
to one of the two principles:  
• (strategic) value of commodity (including exter-
nalities), and/or  
• revenue needs of the investors and operators. 
Both points of view should normally be investi-
gated. 
The following components of the value of electric-
ity produced from RES (or in CHPs) were consid-
ered: 
• current (market) and long term value of electric 
power in the system, 
• compensation for network relief and auxiliary 
services, 
• premium for reliability, long term security of 
supply and lower environmental impacts. 
In addition to these components, which should be 
considered for all types of qualified electricity pro-
duction, development of QP may be beneficial for 
industrial (technological), employment or other envi-
ronmental and social reasons. These items are project 
specific and should be dealt with separately. 
Current and strategic value of electricity 
Electricity market opening in Europe revealed gross 
overcapacity. During the last 3 to 4 years in Conti-
nental Europe and Scandinavia the electricity prices 
on the power exchanges (Nordpool, APX, PLX and 
emerging other exchanges) are, except on rare occa-
sions, reflecting the variable operating costs only. 
Incumbent utilities cope with this situation in differ-
ent ways. In many cases they are able to cross-
subsidise production for  the transmission and distri-
bution charges (probably the case in Germany, Aus-
tria etc.), and/or they have to, at least temporarily, 
renounce their capital gains. National legislation 
based on EU directives allows relief for “stranded 
investments”. There is little doubt that over the next 
decade, the effective electricity prices will approach 
levels reflecting full costs, including recovery of 
capital investment. 
There is relatively good agreement in the recent lit-
erature used in European studies about the technolo-
gies of large-scale electricity production and the full 
production costs (“Shared Analysis”, (European 
Commission 1999); Lorenzoni and De Paoli ( Loren-
zoni, 1999), “Green Paper” (European Commission, 
2000; Capros, 2000)). The more recent study was 
used (European Commission), from which Table 1. is 
derived. 
Table 1: Expected full production costs for electricity 
Operating  
hours 
€2001/MWh 
 Austria Italy Germany average 
7000 44,1 41,5 41,5 42,4 
5000 50,6 50,6 46,7 49,3 
2500 70,0 71,3 71,3 70,9 
Note: An inflation factor of 1,297 was used between the € values 
for 1990 (original data) and 2001. 
 
A base load price of approximately 40 €/MWh may 
be estimated from the Table 1 data. Instead, the table 
data were used directly as a yardstick for a time- 
differentiated feed-in component of long-term elec-
tricity cost estimate. This component of the feed-in 
price may be dubbed: “long term strategic value of 
electricity”. 
A different, complementary rather than conflicting, 
point of view is presented in (Cremer, 2001). It is 
expected that marginal costs of generation will reach 
30 €/MWh in Germany by the year 2005 in and Po-
land by the year 2010, and stay in Italy at approxi-
mately 34 €/MWh. 
Bonus for network relief 
Distributed generation will require, in principle, less 
network capacities than centralised generation. Net-
work capacities relate to investment costs as well as 
operating costs, including some of the auxiliary (sys-
tem) services. Any such savings should be considered 
as a monetary bonus for distributed generation. An 
equitable analysis should consider several details, 
such as: Is the network cost relay avoided (in view of 
existence of the network)? Is the network cost 
avoided in each individual case?  
It is recommended (IJS, 2001) that a bonus be 
awarded for distributed generation related to the feed-
in point. A bonus can be claimed for the network 
costs between the very-high voltage level (it is at this 
level that electricity exchanges conceptually operate), 
and the point or level at which the flow is always 
“down”, i.e. toward the customers. Any costs involv-
ing “upward” transmission of electricity should be 
assumed by the generator. This logical and equitable 
position is not favourable for some renewable 
sources, such as wind power, which will often be 
located in remote areas and in concentrations grossly 
exceeding local consumption. 
For the majority of practical cases the applicable 
level is medium voltage (in Slovenia nominally 1-35 
kV, now being standardised to 20 kV). The bonus for 
this level was estimated from relevant components of 
the fees for the use of networks, at 5,8 €/MWh, aver-
age over time. 
In the distribution networks it is the maximum load 
that is functionally responsible for most of the costs. 
In a time-differentiated feed-in tariff this means that 
the bonus for feeding into the grid at high load hours 
should be much higher than the off-peak bonus. A 
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ratio of approximately 5:1 was proposed, based on a 
tariff study (IJS, 1993) 
Second best approach to external costs of electricity 
production 
The importance of the political position taken by the 
EC in 2001 regarding external costs of electricity 
production (Busquin, 2001) is hard to overemphasise. 
The position, based on extensive research of external 
costs of electricity production chains (ExternE, 
2001), is formally incorporated into the acquis 
through rules on allowable state aid for production 
from renewable sources and CHP (European Com-
munity, 2001). The maximal acceptable level of sub-
sidy is 50 €/MWh, but has to be, in principle, con-
firmed by country specific evaluation of externalities. 
The subsidisation of RES and CHP is clearly stated 
(Busquin, 2001) only as “second best” approach to a 
more direct one: internalisation of externalities ac-
cording to the “polluter pays” principle. The “first 
best” approach is so far politically unfeasible. 
Some generally accepted guidance to the level of 
one component of externalities, that of CO2 emis-
sions, is available in Slovenia. A CO2 levy is cur-
rently applied, as part of other taxes on fuels, at the 
level of approximately 13,5 €/ton CO2 (3 Slovenian 
tolars per kg CO2 ). A standard figure for carbon 
intensity of electricity, 0.44 kg CO2 / kWh is also 
used, reflecting approximately both the CO2 emis-
sions from the reference production plant, a gas fired 
combined cycle plan, and the average carbon content 
of electricity production in Slovenia. Monetary 
equivalent of this is 6 €/MWh, or one-eight of the 
guideline value. 
Several externalities besides CO2 emissions should 
be considered. In the ExternE study, greenhouse 
gases external effects for coal fired plants were ap-
proximately one third of all externalities. (This is the 
total that supports the proposed upper limit of 50 
€/MWh.) There are also positive externalities of pro-
duction form renewable resources. A value of 8.2 € 
was proposed to compensate externalities besides 
CO2 emissions. Total subsidy for all unaccounted 
externalities of 14.2 €/MWh was proposed to tilt the 
uneven playing field in favour of renewable sources 
compared to large-scale central production of elec-
tricity from non-renewable resources. This proposed 
level is less than one third of the guideline value. 
Recommendations 
The preparatory study for the government decision on 
the feed-in prices (IJS, 2001) includes the results of 
considerations as described above for a unique feed-
in tariff for all electricity produced from all RES. For 
CHP the proposed feed-in price is lower. The avoided 
externalities component is included in the price only 
proportional to the “net primary energy savings” 
compared to the reference fossil plants: CCGT for 
electricity and condensing boilers for heat. For small 
units, a single year-round tariff is proposed, whereas 
for plants in excess of 1 MW, a time-dependent tariff 
is recommended. 
The proposed feed-in tariff was commented by an 
evaluation of the probable investor's point of view; 
i.e. by estimated profitability of typical QP projects. 
A careful consideration of the investors' and regula-
tory risks was proposed. Investors are to be given 
adequate assurance, by a long-term contract or 
equivalent, of the real value of feed-in tariffs, in view 
of the inflation which is expected to remain at sub-
stantial level for some years to come. Regulatory risk 
is mainly an excessive feed-in price, possibly leading 
to excessive support of QP an consequently to an 
unstable investment process. Considering the diffi-
culty of decreasing nominal feed-in tariffs after they 
have been set (witnessed by the Italian example), the 
regulatory risk can be mitigated by allowing auto-
matic erosion of the real value of the feed-in tariff, if 
price levels are not re-confirmed and corrected. It 
was proposed that a maximal 3% real price erosion is 
built into the system. This may be a reasonable com-
promise between two points of view of the price risk 
problem. 
In addition to the components taken in considera-
tion (long term value of electricity, network relief 
bonus, compensation for externalities), it may be 
desirable that certain types of RES or other QP are 
supported at a higher level, for merits such as social, 
regional development or research and industrial de-
velopment interests. It was proposed that such addi-
tional support, generally within the range between 6 
and 12 €/MWh (except for photovoltaics, where a 
much higher overprice is accepted), may be granted 
on a project basis or for a program of similar projects. 
Any such additional support would have to be condi-
tioned on perfect environmental acceptability of the 
project or program. 
Government decree on feed in prices 
The government ruling on feed-in prices for qualified 
production of March 2002 includes a Decree on the 
rules for setting feed-in tariffs, with a standard power 
purchase agreement, to be offered by the network 
operator, and a Decision on prices. The prices are to 
be reviewed at least annually. 
Feed-in prices are determined as annual average 
price for each type of qualified production. This is at 
a variance with the proposed guiding principle, that 
all renewable sources be initially treated on an equal 
basis, with possible deviations at the individual pro-
ject or programme basis. 
The producer can opt for a time-dependent tariff 
(two daily periods, three seasons). A sample of the 
annual prices is given in Table 2. 
Profitability for the plants with the assumption of 
constant feed-in prices (no price erosion) is presented 
in Figure 3. For some types the estimated straight 
IRR is very high, indicating paybacks in the order of 
two or three years.  
The Decree offers an alternative to electricity sale 
to the network operators. A producer can sell electric-
ity on the market and claim a premium at the amount 
of the feed-in price as in Table 2., less an implied 
standard value of electricity of 3.56 c€/kWh. 
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Table 2: Feed-in prices for electricity, Slovenia 2002  
 c€/kWh 
Power plant size  up to 36 
kW 
up to 1 
MW 
1 to 10 
MW 
> 10 MW
solar 28,47 6,24 6,24 6,24
biomass + 7,13 6,91 6,91
wind + 6,47 6,24 -
hydro + 6,24 6,02 -
geothermal + 6,24 6,24 6,24
CHP for district 
heating 
+ 5,94 5,72 -
municipal waste + 5,50 5,28 -
industrial CHP + 5,50 - 
Notes: + not specified, same as for larger size; - not available 
 
0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40%
Hydro   700 kW
Hydro   3000 kW
Biogas  700 kW
Biogas  3000 kW
Biomass  >1MW
Geothermal
Wind >1MW
PV up to 36 kW
Industr. CHP 700 kW
CHP - Distr. h.  700 kW
CHP - Distr. h.  3000 kW
IRR MIRR*
 
Notes: IRR: internal rate of return, MIRR: modified internal rate of 
return, implied reinvestment rate: 8% p.a. 
Fig. 1. Estimated profitability of qualified production 
of electricity in Slovenia, feed-in prices of 2002  
Conclusions 
Work on definition and justification of feed-in prices 
has been based on the concept of a strategic value of 
electricity fed into the grid by qualified producers of 
electricity (RES + CHP), and a bonus transfer pay-
ment for externalities not accounted for in competing 
large-scale production form fossil fuels. This point of 
view is considered as more favourable than the argu-
ment of investors' needs. 
The government decree of March 2002 completes a 
legal framework for support of renewable sources of 
electricity and CHP on the basis of regulated feed-in 
prices. The European legal background for such ar-
rangement has been approved by a decision of the 
European Court on the case of feed-in prices in Ger-
many. No use is made of a more recent position of 
levelling the playing ground by accounting for exter-
nalities in a “second best” approach (Busquin, 2001). 
The response of existing qualified producers has 
been favourable, as the feed-in price has been 
brought to a level as it has been in 1998 and a more 
stable legal framework is provided for the future. 
Whether the arrangement, especially the long-term 
stability of economic conditions for investors, is 
satisfactory can not yet be estimated with any cer-
tainty. Immediate price levels seem sufficient, but it 
remains to be seen whether the administrative details 
and perceived political risks will be acceptable. It is 
noted that the government is yet to launch a promo-
tion campaign, except for wind power. (Wind power 
siting proposals have encountered less than enthusias-
tic response from the nature protection circles.) 
The author proposes further inquiry into the regula-
tory dynamics of support schemes for renewables and 
CHP. As with other regulatory situations, only a well 
designed and sensitive regulatory process can yield 
results that would approach an optimal trajectory into 
a more sustainable energy system. 
As for development of technologies, for mature 
technologies, such as for hydro power plants and 
CHP,  a steady stream of improvements and new 
quantitative developments is desired. Sufficient im-
pulse is needed for emerging technologies, such as 
wind energy, high efficiency biomass and possibly 
photovoltaics.  
The regulator should in our opinion assume a “cy-
bernetic” position within the control loop seeking a 
(moving) target, alas, with many error inputs and 
constraints.  
 
References  
Busquin, P. (2001), press conference, July 20, 2001, 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/-
research/press/2001/pr2007en.html  
Capros, P. et al. (2000): Note on the impact of Fuel Taxa-
tion on Technology Choice, Athens November 2002, 
published as: Annex 2, of the Green Paper (European 
Commission (2000) 
Cremer, C., Bradke, H. (2001) Options and potentials for 
European electricity imports: a German perspective, 
ENER Bulletin, 24.01, pp. 31-35; www.eu.fhg.de/ENER/ 
European Commission (1999), “The Shared Analysis Pro-
ject: European Union Energy Outlook to 2020.” Energy 
in Europe. Special Issue, European Commission, Direc-
torate General for Energy. www.shared-analysis.fhg.de./. 
European Commission (2000), "Green Paper" : "Towards 
a European strategy for the security of energy supply", 
COM(2000)769 
European Commission (2001), Community guidelines on 
State aid for environmental potection (O.J. C 37, 
3.2.2001)  
EXTERNE (2001), several works, overview abstract pre-
sented in (Busquin, 2001) 
Haas, R. ed. (2001): Rewiew Report on Promotion Strate-
gies for Electricity from Renewable Energy Sources in 
EU Countries, June 2001, TU Wien, Compiled within 
the cluster “Green electricity”, 
http://www.tuwien.ac.at/iew/elgreen/ 
IJS (1993), Vrednotenje električne energije v Sloveniji 
(Value of electric power in Slovenia, in Slovene), Final 
report, IJS-DP-6713, for EGE-RI (Electricity Research 
and Engineering Co., Maribor, SLO), Ljubljana, SLO, 
March 1993. 
IJS (2000), Development Programme of Slovenia for Quali-
fied Producers of Electricity, (in Slovene; Razvojni pro-
gram Slovenije na področju kvalificiranih proizvajalcev 
električne energije), Final  report, Instirute "Jožef 
Stefan", IJS-DP-8388, for the Ministry of Economic Af-
fairs of Slovenia, Ljubljana, SLO, March, 2001 
IJS (2001), Sklep vlade o odkupnih cenah za električno 
energijo od kvalificiranih proizvajalcev električne ener-
gije (A government decision on feed-in prices for elec-
tricity from qualified producers of electricity, in Slo-
vene), Final report, Institute "Jožef Stefan", IJS-DP-
ENER Forum 3. Successfully Promoting Renewable Energy Sources in Europe. 
 Budapest, Hungary, 6-7 June 2002 
100 ENER 25.02 
8501, (For Ministry of environment and physical plan-
ning), Ljubljana, SLO, November 2001. 
Lorenzoni A. ed. (1999): Economia e politica delle fonti 
rinnovabili e della cogenerazione, Franco Angeli 1999; 
cited and excerpted in European Commission (1999), 
vol. 8, Ch. 4: The Expected Impact of Electricity 
Regulation, pp.153-170 
Tomassetti, G. (1998) The Italian Experience on CHP 
Development, Inernal report to the project "CHP devel-
opment programme for Slovenia", (For Ministry of For-
eign Trade, I), February 1998. 
 
Is current RES support policy in 
the Czech Republic sufficient and 
efficient? Barriers and challenges 
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Abstract. Although the potential of renewable energy 
sources (RES) in the Czech Republic is limited by natural 
conditions, the share of RES could be at least doubled by 
2010. In the last few years, some important steps have been 
made in the Czech Republic towards more intensive RES 
support. A National programme for Promotion of Energy 
Efficiency and a Wider Use of RES was introduced, new 
energy legislation adopted and preferential feed-in tariffs 
for RES electricity implemented. However, in the context 
of EU accession, there are still several missing pieces in the 
puzzle of the Czech RES support policy that would make it 
efficient and sufficient in terms of meeting EU legislative 
requirements and contributing to EU targets regarding RES 
utilisation. 
Introduction 
The non-renewable energy sources make up 98% of 
total primary energy sources (TPES) in the Czech 
Republic. The current share of utilisation of renew-
able energy sources (RES) is low partly due limited 
natural conditions, however, it is also a result of en-
ergy policy in the previous period, which preferred 
the concentration of energy sources to decentralised 
generation and also provided subsidies to non-
renewable energy sources (coal, nuclear).  
Current status and potential of RES utilisa-
tion in the Czech Republic 
In 1999, the National Energy Efficiency Study for the 
Czech Republic was elaborated with the support of 
the World Bank and the Dutch government [1]. The 
study contains a detailed analysis of RES potentials 
in the Czech Republic and one of the major outcomes 
of the Study was the Renewable Energy Action Plan 
including the list of concrete policy actions, ready for 
implementation [2].  
Current utilisation of RES 
According to updated results of the above-mentioned 
study, the total renewable energy production in 2001 
was approx. 26 PJ (of which 70% was in biomass and 
17% in hydropower), representing altogether ap-
proximately 2% of TPES. This level is below an 
average figure in Central and Eastern European coun-
tries (and less than in three comparable Central Euro-
pean countries - Hungary, Poland and Slovakia) and 
well below an average figure in EU countries. Re-
garding RES electricity, its share in gross national 
electricity consumption was 4.2% in 2001. 
Biomass is the major RES used in the Czech Re-
public. Biomass fuels include mainly wood waste 
                                                          
104  Formerly SRC International CS. 
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with a slowly growing share of liquid biofuels105 and 
solid biofuels (woodchips, woodpellets). 
Hydropower is already developed given the natural 
conditions of the Czech Republic with a total in-
stalled capacity of 2,147 MW and 2.46 TWh of gen-
erated electricity in 2001 (or 4.1% of total genera-
tion). Other renewable energy sources (wind, solar, 
geothermal) have made a marginal contribution only. 
Wind energy utilisation is still rather symbolic (to-
tal installed capacity is approx. 7.5 MW) and had a 
stagnating tendency in the last years due to unfavour-
able economic conditions (low feed-in price of elec-
tricity, grid connection issues). 
Potentials of RES 
The available potential106 of RES utilisation in the 
year 2010 identified in the above-mentioned study is 
97.0 PJ, which corresponds to the share of 7.0% of 
TPER, while an economic potential107 of RES utilisa-
tion in 2010 is estimated as high as 39.3 PJ which 
corresponds to the share of 3.6% in TPER.  
Biomass represents nearly 90% of the total poten-
tial and consists mainly of agricultural waste (straw) 
and forest exploitation products (wood and wood 
waste).  
The potential for large hydro is already utilised108, 
there still exists a potential for further extension of 
small hydropower capacity, however, the unit costs 
of new small hydro plants rather high as the most 
profitable projects have already been developed so 
the further development will be possible only under 
more favourable conditions for RES electricity. In the 
case that the conditions allow full utilisation of the 
potential for small hydro, production of electricity 
from these sources could be increased by approx. 
0.45 TWh.  
According to several sources of information, the 
available potential of wind energy varies between 1.2 
(conservative estimates) up to 5 TWh per year (opti-
mistic estimates). The economic potential will sig-
nificantly depend on conditions for RES electricity. 
This means that the conventional energy sources 
will still play an important role in the Czech Republic 
in the future, however, if the barriers to RES devel-
opment are removed, the contribution of renewables 
to the national energy balance could be at least dou-
bled by 2010. 
The Figure 1 summarises the current share and po-
tentials of RES in the Czech Republic by type of 
RES. 
                                                          
105 Biodiesel had the share of 4.9% in the total diesel fuel sold in 
the Czech Republic in 1999. 
106 The available potential is the technical potential that could be 
utilised by currently available technologies, taking into account 
administrative, legislative, environmental and other constraints.  
107 The economic potential is estimated on the basis of given 
economic criteria. 
108 New large hydropower plants would be connected with signifi-
cant negative environmental impact which is not acceptable. 
Fig.  1. Current share and potentials of RES in the 
Czech Republic by type of RES  
 
Current status of RES support policy frame-
work in the Czech Republic 
During last few years, the policy and legislative envi-
ronment has changed significantly in the Czech Re-
public in the context of the EU accession and eco-
nomic transformation.  
New National Energy and Environmental Policy 
documents 
In the year 2000 a new national Energy Policy was 
approved by the Government. This policy document  
indicates the priorities and  key issues to be resolved 
including creation of a well-functioning, non-
discriminatory, transparent and motivating system of 
support to energy savings, effective use of renewable 
energy sources and CHP.  
The Energy policy document also sets a target for 
the share of RES on TPES to about 3-6 % in  2010 
and to about 4-8 % as of the year 2020.  The national 
Environmental Policy approved in 2001 sets a similar 
RES target for the year 2010: 4-6% of RES on TPES. 
However, these targets are not binding.  Both policy 
documents call for setting necessary legal framework 
for promotion of RES. 
New energy legislation 
In the year 2000, two key legislative documents have 
been adopted - new Energy Act (Act No. 458/2000 
Coll.) and Energy Management Act (Act No. 
406/2000 Coll.).  
The Energy Act sets the framework for business ac-
tivities in the energy sector. The Energy Act also 
specifies the RES and CHP generated electricity 
purchase obligation for grid operators and provisions 
for priority access to the grid for electricity generated 
from RES and CHP. Despite the fact that access to 
the grid is a necessary condition for investors of RES 
it is not sufficient for future efficient use of RES 
potential. Nevertheless the Act does not specify other 
necessary tools for promotion of RES. 
The Energy Management Act is implemented since  
1st January 2001. The Energy Management Act deals 
specifically with the ways to promote energy effi-
ciency such as minimum energy efficiency require-
ments, conditions for thermal and technical properties 
of buildings, energy efficiency labelling, local and 
regional energy planning, energy audits and co-
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generation of heat and power (CHP). In the fields 
directly related to RES utilisation, the Energy Man-
agement Act is further supported by legislative de-
crees specifying a definition of RES (Decree No. 
214/2001 Coll.), and conditions for buy-out of elec-
tricity from RES and CHP (Decree No. 252/2001 
Coll.). The latter decree contains detailed provisions 
on obligatory purchase of electricity from all RES 
with exception of hydro power plants above 10 MW. 
The Energy Management Act also calls for setting the 
National Programme for Promotion of Energy Effi-
ciency and a Wider Use of Renewable and Waste 
Energy Resources. 
National Programme for Promotion of Energy Effi-
ciency and a Wider Use of Renewable and Waste 
Energy Resources [4] 
The National Programme was approved by the Czech 
government in late 2001. The National Programme is 
prepared for four year period by the Ministry of In-
dustry and Trade, in collaboration with the Ministry 
of the Environment and has to be regularly assessed 
at least once every two years. 
The National Programme is a framework pro-
gramme and lists the priority tools for promotion of 
RES. One of the major tools is the annual State Pro-
gramme for Energy Efficiency and Use of Renewable 
and Waste Energy Resources. 
State Programme for Energy Efficiency and Use of 
Renewable and Waste Energy Resources 
The State Programme deals with the various types of 
support in the form of subsidies provided by the State 
budget and State Environmental Fund for relevant 
programmes including support to RES. In case of 
RES all types of RES are supported through invest-
ment grants and soft loans. The support is provided 
on the basis of the results of the bidding procedure. 
As the budget is limited only part of bids can be re-
warded by the subsidy grant. 
Feed-in tariffs for RES electricity 
Following the requirements of the Decree No. 
252/2001 Coll.. on conditions for buy-out of electric-
ity from RES and CHP the new increased feed-in 
tariffs for RES electricity have been introduced by 
the price decision of the Energy Regulatory Office 
1/2002 since January 2002 (for more details see chap-
ter on RES Electricity support). 
Flexible mechanisms 
The Czech Republic is a signatory of the Kyoto Pro-
tocol to the UN Framework Convention on Climate 
Change. In accordance with the Kyoto Protocol, on 
January 7, 2002, the Ministry of the Environment 
(MoE) approved the “Rules of the Ministry of the 
Environment for Joint Implementation Projects in the 
Czech Republic”. This is one of the necessary condi-
tions for participation on the Kyoto flexible mecha-
nisms through implementation of concrete projects. 
Among the potential projects for JI there are mostly 
projects using RES (biomass boilers, landfill gas 
etc.).  
RES electricity support 
The most important step done in last two years is the 
adoption of the Energy Law, which contains RES 
electricity purchase obligation for grid operators and 
provisions for priority access to the grid for electric-
ity generated from RES and CHP. On the other hand, 
there still exist relatively strict technical conditions 
for grid connection and for application of feed-in 
tariffs (contracted supply versus time variation of 
RES supply). 
Introduction of increased feed-in tariffs for RES 
electricity by the price decision of the Energy 
Regulatory Office 1/2002 is another important step. 
Compared to previously applied uniform feed-in 
tariff for electricity from all small sources (1.10-1.13 
CZK/kWh, i.e.3.5-3.7 c€/kWh), the conditions for 
RES electricity have improved significantly. How-
ever, there are still several issues related to the feed-
in tariffs to be resolved in order to introduce this 
support mechanism into real life. The following table 
gives an overview of the currently applied feed-in 
tariffs in the Czech Republic. 
Tab. 1. Feed-in tariffs for RES electricity valid since 
1st January 2002 
 CZK/kWh c€/kWh 
original feed-in tariff 
  all sources 1.13 3.7
new feed-in tariffs since 1.1.2002: 
  small hydro 1.5 4.9
  wind 3.0 9.8
  biomass 2.5 8.2
  biogas 2.5 8.2
  geothermal 3.0 9.8
  solar PV 6.0 19.6
Biomass and biofuels market support 
The support of energy utilisation of biomass and 
production of biofuels is based on various subsidy 
schemes for individual projects rather than on sys-
tem-wide measures. Individual projects for biomass 
utilisation (particularly small biomass district heating 
sources) are supported by the State Environmental 
Fund in the framework of National Programme for 
Promotion of Energy Efficiency and a Wider use of 
RES.  
It is worth to mention an extensive biodiesel mar-
ket in the Czech Republic - current production capac-
ity is approx. 60 thousand tons per year. This capac-
ity was developed using subsidies in the framework 
of the so called “Oleoprogram” of the Ministry of 
Agriculture in the years 1992-1996. The current sup-
port for production of biofuels (biodiesel, bioethanol) 
is provided mainly through the schemes of the Minis-
try of Agriculture for support of non-food agricultural 
production (subsidy for local production of rapeseed 
methylester is 3 CZK/kg) and through exemption 
from excise tax. Both solid and liquid biofuels are 
also supported by lower taxation.. 
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Taxation measures  
Tax incentives 
The following tax incentives relevant to RES are 
currently applied in the Czech Republic: 
• Reduced import duties and VAT rate (5% instead 
of 22%) for selected RES equipment (small sized 
equipment). 
• Five-year tax relief (income and property) for 
investment in RES. 
• Reduced VAT rate of 5% for biomass fuels 
• Reduced excise tax on biodiesel. 
Introduction of carbon/energy tax 
Several studies/analyses initiated by the Ministry of 
the Environment analysing possible introduction of 
energy / carbon tax have been already carried out. 
According to the Ministry of the Environment an 
introduction is desirable but due to negative position 
of  the Ministry of Finance that is strictly against 
increase of taxation burden, the Czech Republic is 
currently in “wait for common EU approach” posi-
tion and the introduction of carbon/energy tax is 
unlikely before the EU accession and also before a 
common EU policy in this field is implemented. 
The Ministry of the Environment have also pre-
pared a scheme consisting of a levy on electricity 
sales at a rate of 0.6% of the final energy prices to 
support investment in renewable energy (“greeen 
cent” scheme). This scheme have been widely dis-
cussed but not accepted so far. 
Barriers and issues to be resolved 
Despite large progress in RES promotion in the 
Czech Republic in last 2-3 years there are still many 
barriers and issues to be resolved. These are briefly 
discussed below. 
Statistics on RES 
Even if the Czech Statistical Office has started data 
gathering and processing on RES, the results showed 
that more efforts are needed for getting reliable data. 
Data is needed for assessment on the success of vari-
ous tools and programmes and also for setting new 
targets. 
Feed-in tariffs 
As it was outlined above, the application of feed-in 
tariffs have some (rather significant) drawbacks and 
there are several other issues that have to be solved:  
• Given the currently applied procedure of setting 
regulated electricity prices (prices are set once a 
year by the Energy Regulatory Office), the feed 
in tariffs have to be updated or reconfirmed each 
year. The application and the price level of feed-
in tariffs is therefore not guaranteed for the fu-
ture years which creates significant uncertainty 
for investors into RES electricity projects. This 
has to be resolved otherwise the feed-in tariffs 
would be ineffective.  
• It is not clear if the feed-in tariffs will be sup-
ported by another measure such as regional quota 
system or green cent scheme. Currently, the in-
creased costs for power distributors resulting 
from purchase of RES electricity are projected 
into end-user prices. This is, however, possible 
only when the share of RES is low and the elec-
tricity market is not fully liberalised. It will be 
necessary to develop and introduce supplemen-
tary measures to feed-in tariffs that would ad-
dress the issues of increased costs of regional 
distributors resulting from buy-out of RES elec-
tricity and the issues of regional differences (the 
power distributors in regions with higher RES 
electricity production will be disadvantaged). 
The long-term approach to RES electricity and 
the support tools should be introduced into new 
energy policy document that is to be elaborated 
in 2003 and also in the new Energy Act. 
• It will be necessary to introduce scheme for the 
guarantee of origin109 of RES electricity accord-
ing to requirements of RES-E Directive 
2001/77/EC. This should be a priority issue. 
Biomass market support 
Given the potential of biomass, it would be necessary 
to set clear priorities reflecting market conditions and 
potentials of different RES:  1. biomass, 2. RES-E, 3. 
other RES.  
Utilisation of biomass for heating should be sup-
ported by stimulation of development of solid biofu-
els market (wood pellets, briquettes, woodchips), 
increase of information and awareness and support 
for identification and development of the projects 
rather than via the project investment subsidies. The 
Government should consider introduction of the 
following subprogrammes of  the National pro-
gramme for promotion of EE and wider use of RES: 
• Start-up support for increase of production ca-
pacities of refined biofuels (woodpellets, bri-
quettes) and marketing of these fuels. 
• Support to local producers of biomass end-use 
equipment (R&D, marketing). 
• Support to biomass logistics and trade of biofu-
els. 
• Support to biomass project development (project 
identification, feasibility studies, energy audits). 
Inconsistent and non-binding policy targets 
The targets for RES development in the Czech Re-
public are not consistent as they are specified in vari-
ous policy documents and it is not clear what target is 
the priority one:  
• 3-6% in 2010 – State Energy policy; 
• 4-6% in 2010 – State Environmental policy; 
                                                          
109 Currently, some of the power distributors have already started 
their RES electricity marketing schemes without guaranteeing the 
origin of the electricity to the final customers. 
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• 3.2 % in 2005 - National Programme for Promo-
tion of Energy Efficiency and a Wider Use of 
RES; 
• 5.1% RES-E in 2005 - National Programme for 
Promotion of Energy Efficiency and a Wider Use 
of RES. 
In addition, the targets are more or less proclama-
tive and non-binding as there is no clear commitment 
to meet them and there are no monitoring, evaluation 
and enforcement instruments for meeting the targets.  
It will be necessary to set  realistic, clear and bind-
ing national targets compatible with EU goals for the 
share of RES and RES electricity in energy supply 
and to introduce the system of monitoring of the 
meeting of the targets. These targets should be pref-
erably incorporated into the new energy policy 
document. It will be also necessary to negotiate and 
agree the targets with Commission of the EU in order 
to reflect natural conditions in the Czech Republic 
but to contribute to common EU RES targets. 
Legislation  
The current energy legislation does not fully reflect 
the latest developments in EU - there are missing 
links and provisions related to EU directives (RES-E 
Directive) and EU RES targets. This should be incor-
porated into new Energy law that is under prepara-
tion. 
Tax support 
The current tax incentives apply to very small capac-
ity units (i.e.: hydropower lower than 0.1 MW, wind: 
0.075 MW). The government should consider extend-
ing the scope of these measures to higher capacity 
equipment (hydropower: 10 MW, wind: 1 MW) 
Inconsistencies in tax support of biofuels (propos-
als for removal of preferential excise tax for bio-
diesel) should be resolved and put in line with long 
term priorities and with other support schemes to 
keep the biodiesel market alive. 
Institutional and policy framework 
An implementation of the State Programme for En-
ergy Efficiency and Use of Renewable and Waste 
Energy Resources in the field of RES is done by 2 
government agencies – the Czech Energy Agency 
and the State Environmental Fund. This reduce the 
efficiency of the State Programme management and 
confuses the bidders for grants as different criteria are 
applied by these two agencies for evaluation of bids. 
A uniform system with one responsible agency and 
uniform criteria for bid evaluation will be necessary. 
It is necessary to finalise development of frame-
work for JI projects (establishment of national regis-
try and setting the national target in AAU units). 
The country does not participate in EU Altener 
programme. Patricipation in Altener should be recon-
sidered. 
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Abstract.  
The most important document for development of  renew-
able energy sources in Poland is the ‘Development Strategy 
of Renewable Energy Sector’, which was adopted by the 
Parliament in August 2001 sets forth ambitious goals. 
Renewable energy is a cross-sector issue referring to envi-
ronmental, economic and social aspects thus various gov-
ernmental bodies undertake steps, which aim at  their sup-
port. Unfortunately the so far legal framework for RES 
development is not coherent.  This article presents the 
existing legal framework for RES in Poland.  
Introduction to RES policy in Poland 
The present contribution of renewable energy to the 
primary energy balance has been estimated at 2.5%, 
ca.  104 PJ (EC BREC 1999). Wood has the biggest 
share from among all renewables. The current struc-
ture of utilisation of energy produced from renewable 
sources is following: 
biomass  98.05% 
hydro power   1.82% 
geothermal energy 
wind power    0.02% 
solar energy    0.01%. 
The Polish policy regarding renewable energy is 
guided by the accession to the EU and the adherence 
to the Kyoto Protocol. Renewable energy was not a 
priority of the energy policy in the 90-s, as attention 
was given to restructuring of the fossil fuel sector, 
improving the structure of the primary energy pro-
duction towards increased use of natural gas and 
decreasing energy consumption. Renewable energy 
was seen in a long-term perspective.  The end of 90-s 
is the period of increased political engagement in 
creating conditions for renewable energy develop-
ment. The ‘Resolution on Increase of  Renewable 
Energy Sources Utilisation’ 1999 approved by the 
Polish Parliament was a milestone. The Parliament 
called the Council of Ministers to prepare the ‘Devel-
opment Strategy of Renewable Energy Sector’ in 
Poland and its harmonisation with the energy and 
environmental policies of the country. The Minister 
of Environment took over the task of preparing the 
strategy on behalf of the Council of Ministers.  Along 
with preparing the ‘Strategy’, the government was 
working and approving of other key documents, such 
as: ‘Assumptions of the Poland’s Energy Policy to 
2020’ approved in 2000, ‘The Second Environmental 
Policy’, and also ‘Strategy of Sustainable Develop-
ment of Poland to 2025’.   
The documents concerning different aspects of 
RES utilisation have been initiated by different Min-
istries, unfortunately till now there is no coherence of 
actions undertaken by them. This is due to the fact 
that the Ministries have different responsibilities and  
sometimes opposing interests.  
The Ministry of Environment: is responsible for the 
state policy in the area of climate change, sustainable 
development; environmental protection, which in-
cludes the management of RES. From the point of 
view of this Ministry the most important is the 
“green” aspect of the renewable energy utilisation. 
The  Ministry of Economic Affairs is responsible for 
the energy policy and general regulation of the en-
ergy sector. Its general task is to develop and imple-
ment state policy in the area of economic develop-
ment. From the point of view of the Ministry of Eco-
nomic Affairs renewables are important as far as 
impact on the energy prices, stability of electricity 
grid, creation of new job places, domestic production 
of installations are concerned, whereas the Ministry 
of Finance about the state of the domestic budget, the 
Ministry of Agriculture about the development of 
rural, poor areas and giving additional income to 
farmers and stimulating agricultural production and 
the Ministry of Infrastructure about adjusting Polish 
infrastructure to the EU modern standards. The de-
centralised energy generation based on RES is not as 
important as larger scale projects based on utilisation 
of conventional fuels.  
The documents prepared by these Ministries can be 
divided into policy making documents and enforce-
ment documents. Such documents include: Climate, 
Environmental, Energy, and Agricultural Develop-
ment Policies. Strategies, concern specific topics of 
the Country’s development such as: sustainable de-
velopment or economy. Economic Strategy of the 
Polish Government ‘Initiative-Development-Labour’, 
endorsed in 2002 is the most important document for 
the Polish government in the election period 2001-
2005, it also mentions utilisation of renewable en-
ergy, as one of the main areas of modernisation of 
economy. Another group of documents are enforce-
ment documents i.e. acts and ordinances. Acts have 
the legal power by stipulating rules which must be 
followed. Following documents can be included in  
this group Acts on: Energy, Thermomodernisation, 
Financial Support to Investments and Public Support 
to Private Investors. The ordinances, of which the 
Feed-in and Excise Ordinances are examples, have 
weaker political meaning than Acts because they are 
issued directly by the Ministries and the legislative 
way to change them is much shorter than in case of 
Acts.  
There is a number of incoherence between different 
documents, the only chance to harmonise actions 
undertaken by different institutions in the area of 
renewable energy utilisation is elaboration of the 
Renewable Energy Act, which should provide a real 
legal framework (not only directions and wishful 
thinking like in case of policies and strategies) and 
lasting stability (not like in case of ordinances) for 
investors. When prepared and endorsed it will build a 
real foundation for stable development of renewables 
in Poland. In this article the documents presented in 
the Figure 1are described in more detail.  
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Figure  1 Official documents concerning RES
 
Environmental policy 
Environmental obligations, which Poland undertook 
by participating in EU accession as well as being a 
party to the Climate Convention are the driving fac-
tors for development of renewables. Currently ‘Cli-
mate Policy’ for Poland is being prepared. The emis-
sion reduction units available for sale (considering 
the fact that some percentage of units must be treated 
as country’s reserves) are now under the process of 
discussion and are estimated  between 50 to 130 mln 
tonnes of CO2 reduction units between 2008-2012 
(Bodnar et al 2002). The official figures are under the 
process of negotiation. The possible incomes to the 
budget have been estimated at the 5-20 USD/t CO2.  
The ‘Second Environmental Policy’ endorsed by 
Government in 2000 and by the Parliament in 2001 
sets out the goal for renewables at doubling the par-
ticipation of RES in the energy balance to 2010. 
Currently the implementation program to the above 
mentioned document is in the phase of preparation.  
In 2000, the Council of Ministers adopted the 
document ‘Development Strategy of Renewable En-
ergy Sources‘, then it was endorsed by the Parliament 
in 2001. Approving the ‘Strategy’ by the Council of 
Ministers took place after a long, lasting several 
months discussion, which led to a fundamental 
change in the government's approach to the possibil-
ity of utilising renewable energy sources. Approving 
the goals stated in the ‘Strategy’ is of historical sig-
nificance not only for development of renewable 
energy but also for the energy policy. It is the first 
policy document relating to the whole renewable 
energy sector, pointing the basic goals and conditions 
for its development to 2020. It was elaborated in 
response to the EU White Paper ‘Energy for the fu-
ture: Renewable Energy Sources’. The ‘Strategy’ is a 
pioneer document but also the first policy document 
of such importance in Central and Eastern Europe. 
The ‘Strategy’ calls for 7.5% contribution of renew-
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able energy to the primarily energy of the balance in 
2010 and 14% in 2020, as development targets for 
renewables. Such  increase of renewables in the en-
ergy balance would require production of 340 PJ of 
‘green energy’ in 2010, i.e. growth by 235 PJ com-
pared with 1999, assuming the energy needs of Po-
land in 2010 at 4570 PJ. Such targets oblige the gov-
ernment to take actions to actively support renew-
ables in Poland. The amounts are ambitious: in com-
parison to ca. 2.5% share in 1999, it means triple 
increase in utilisation of energy produced from re-
newable sources during the coming ten years.  
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Fig. 2. Renewable energy production in 2010, TJ as 
per the  Strategy   
Activities aimed at securing dynamic development 
of renewable energy in Poland constitute an integral 
part of the ‘Strategy’, the most important ones are the 
following: 
• Formal and legal activities facilitating access to 
renewable energy sources; iter alia preparation 
of the RES Act, 
• Economic instruments increasing feasibility of 
renewable energy sources utilisation and 
supporting, 
• Development of new systems, e.g. Tradable 
Green Certificates, 
• Education and promotion activities for renewable 
energy sources and international co-operation. 
In the Strategy it was emphasised that the devel-
opment of renewable energy sector creates opportuni-
ties especially for the local communities as regards 
local energy independence, regional development and 
creation of new jobs as well as environmentally-
friendly modernisation of infrastructure, diversifica-
tion and decentralisation of the energy sector. It was 
estimated that achieving the goals outlined in the 
Strategy will lead to reduction of greenhouse gases 
emissions by around 18 million tonnes and creation 
of additional 30-40 thousand jobs (in direct employ-
ment) annually.   
It has been assumed that the ‘Strategy’ will be im-
plemented by means of enforcement programs for 
particular sources of renewables. In order to execute 
the provisions of the Strategy, the Ministry of Envi-
ronment prepared the first midterm enforcement  
‘Wind Energy Development Program 2002-2005’, it 
is (2002) still in the phase of interministerial consul-
tations. This is a model program which opens the 
door for the preparation, endorsement and execution 
of other development programs (small hydro, solar, 
geothermal and biomass energy). The ‘Strategy’ 
shows moderate growth of the wind energy sector in 
Poland to 2010 by 600-1,600 MW. This means that 
the contribution of wind turbines to the total final 
energy balance in Poland would not exceed 2.0%. 
Wind energy will, however, be one of the most sig-
nificant factors for obtaining a general quantitative 
objective in production of ‘green’ electricity to  2010. 
Growing interest in the preparation of wind energy 
projects has been observed among investors and 
developers in Poland. Only last year the number of 
installations has grown from 16 turbines in 2001 to 
41 turbines (in 20 places), the total capacity growing 
from 4,7 MW to 28,2 MW. Implementation of pro-
jects is being withheld by uncertainity regarding 
electricity buyback rates. In addition, investors’ ac-
tivities and expectations of local governments have 
encountered legal and bureaucratic barriers. The 
‘Program’ is to create economic and legal conditions, 
initiate successful projects and prepare local govern-
ments, industry and investors for the growth of the 
number of wind energy projects thus permitting not 
only a reasonable increase of the amount of electric-
ity produced (particularly after 2005) but also the 
attaining of maximum social, economic and envi-
ronmental benefits. 
Energy policy 
The documents concerning renewables in the energy 
policy are the responsibility of the Ministry of Eco-
nomic Affairs. Due to the fact that Poland is in the 
EU accession process the documents are constantly 
being changed. This year (2002) both the amend-
ments to the Energy Policy as well as to the Energy 
Act have been prepared.  
‘Assumptions of the Energy Policy to 2020’. The 
Assumptions define the basic elements of the energy 
policy, based on an analysis of the present state and 
the expected future development of the energy sector. 
The main goals are similar to the EU energy policy 
objectives (security of supply, competitiveness and 
environmental protection). In the ‘Assumptions’ the 
role of renewable energy sources in the development 
of infrastructure was mentioned.  RES are described 
here as having very low technical potential, and their 
utilisation as ‘insignificant to 2020’.  ‘Amendments to 
the Assumptions of the Energy Policy to 2020’ have 
been prepared in 2002. RES are mentioned many 
times there but on the other hand a lot of attention is 
given to utilisation of natural gas, which is the main 
competitor of RES on the energy market. The ‘As-
sumptions’ are not coherent with the already accepted 
by the Parliament ‘Development Strategy of Renew-
able Energy Sources’.  
The document says ‘the years 2001-2010 are very 
unfavourable for development of RES due to slow 
economic development, surplus energy capacities, 
decreasing demand for energy’. According to the 
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document priority should be given to biomass and 
feed-in ordinance should be supported by TGC.  
The ‘Energy Act’, is the basic legal framework for 
the regulation of the energy sector. It provides the 
necessary legal conditions for businesses in the field 
of energy production, transmission, distribution and 
trade. Furthermore, the ‘Energy Act’ defines the re-
sponsibilities of the Ministry of Economic Affairs 
and  Energy Regulation Office (URE).  Under the 
law, energy enterprises have to sign contracts for the 
delivery of electricity, gas and heat, and have to fol-
low the third party access rule. As far as renewables 
are concerned the Act: 1) gives definition of renew-
able  energy, 2) obliges the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs to issue a Feed-in ordinance for renewables, 
3) obliges communes to prepare energy plans. ‘Draft 
Amendments to the Energy Act’, 2002 are currently 
under the final phase of amendment process. Com-
pared with the former version following changes 
have been made: 1) the definition of renewable en-
ergy source is changed in accordance with the EU 
Directive, 2) it obliges the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs to elaborate Feed-in ordinance in which fol-
lowing information will be given: types of installa-
tions, technical and technological parameters of RES, 
level of electric energy purchases, which are obliga-
tory for energy utilities. 
Apart form the ‘Energy Act’ there are ordinances 
which deal with different issues of electricity market. 
One of them concerns the obligation for utilities to 
purchase electricity from RES. ‘Feed-in Ordinance’ 
sets the obligation for energy enterprises dealing with 
trade of electricity and heat to purchase electricity or 
heat from non-conventional and renewable energy 
sources connected to the common electricity grid. 
Electricity and heat generated from waste incinera-
tion are not included in this definition. The obligation 
to buy electricity from non-conventional and renew-
able energy sources (including CHP generation) shall 
be fulfilled if the quota of these sources in the total 
annual sale of electricity of the energy supplier is not 
less than percentages presented in the figure below. 
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Fig. 3. Graphical presentation of the feed-in quotasfor 
energy utilities. 
The idea of this ordinance was to encourage energy 
utilities to gradually increase the participation of 
renewables in their overall energy balance. Again it 
does not specify the level of buyback rates for the 
renewable electricity, thus increasing level of uncer-
tainty among investors. Currently the prices are nego-
tiated on the case by case basis and they vary from 4-
7 c€/kWh. The ordinance is incomplete for two rea-
sons: 1) does not specify the level of punishment for 
non-compliance, 2) it is not supported by a trading 
scheme, such as for instance tradable green certifi-
cates, which would enable paper trading of produced 
“green’ electricity between utilities. Currently the 
Regulation Office is evaluating the first year of the 
functioning of the ordinance (URE 2002) and inver-
stors are impatiently waiting for the announcement of 
the punishment fee. If the punishment fee is high 
enough it will result in dynamic development of 
investments, if not it will be just a ‘dead’ regulation 
not stimulating growth of renewables.  
‘Thermodernisation Act’ stipulates that conversion 
of installations based on fossil fuels to installations 
based on renewables along with energy efficiency 
measures is considered as thermomdernisation. The 
Act stipulates principles of financial contribution for 
investments from this area. The thermomodernisation 
premium is paid in the amount of ca. 25% of the 
investment credit, after finalising the whole invest-
ment. The financial resources are given from the state 
budget.  
Agricultural policy 
Currently the ‘Biofuel Act’ is under preparation. This 
legal document is an initiative of the Ministry of 
Agriculture and the draft is in the process of 
interministerial consultation. The production of 
biofuels is regulated by the ‘domestic limit’, which 
will increase every year up to 5% of biodiesel and 
4.5% of bioethanol in the overall transport fuel 
market which makes 260,000 tones of biethanol and 
400,000 of biodiesel. The production of bioethanol 
will require additional production of 0.8 million 
tonnes of rye and 2.4 million tonnes of potatoes. The 
production of biodiesel will induce additional 
production of 0.7 million tones of rape. The Biofuels 
Act has was a subject by criticism of the Minister of 
Finance, who is reluctant to release biofues from 
excise duty payments (currently the excise is 
approximately 45% of the petrol price) as it can be 
cause serious loses to the already very much strained 
state budget. Additional arguments against the 
‘Biofulels Act’ is that there is no Polish norm for 
biodiesel, which can be a reason for the misuse. The 
future of the Biofuel Act remains unknown but it has 
been evaluated as a step in a good direction.  
Financial Policy 
‘Act on Financial Support to Investments’ was en-
dorsed in March 2002 as a response to dropping level 
of investments in Poland. Its goal is to increase the 
attractiveness of investments in Poland as well as the 
number of new job places. The Act assumes support 
for environmental investments inter alia for RES 
installations. The financial support is predicted both 
for the private investor and the municipality and is 
given by the Ministry of Economic Affairs. The total 
amounts to be distributed are specified each year by 
the Budget Act. In the area of environmental protec-
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tion financial means for 50 investments have been 
predicted each year amounting to 0.5 mln € per in-
vestment. The public support to private investors 
varies for different territories of Poland, regulated by 
a separate Ordinance. There are specific criteria for 
evaluation of the investment proposal, which shall be 
performed by a special committee. The proposals are 
to be submitted for a tender to the Ministry of Eco-
nomic Affairs twice a year.  
‘Excise Ordinace’ stipulates the level of excise for 
different goods every year. It sets the electricity ex-
cise at the level of ca. 0.56 ¢€/kWh, i.e. 10% of the 
electricity price paid by the final consumers. The 
Ordinance of the Ministry of Finances exempts elec-
tricity generated by RES installations as well as 
pumped-storage power stations from payment of this 
tax. Because the excise tax applies to utilisation of 
fossil fuels in the energy sector and due to the fact 
that renewables are exempted, it can be considered as 
a form of a carbon tax. Carbon tax is one of the chief 
supporting mechanisms enabling to internalise exter-
nal costs of energy production from fossil fuels thus 
making renewables more competitive on the energy 
market. As far as excise tax in reference to biofuels is 
concerned  biofuels would be ca. 45% times cheaper 
and much more competitive on the market if they 
were released from payment.   
Financial Institutions 
Additionally to the legal instruments financial incen-
tives to support RES are necessary. The istitututions, 
which support the development of RES financially 
are following:  
• EcoFund’s income comes from the national debt-
for-environment swap. One the priorities of this 
fund is support to RES (currently biomass is the 
top priority- already 85 MW projects got the 
support and additional 120 MW are underway). 
No support is given to small hydro. The total so-
far subsidies amount to ca. 250 mln EUR, the 
number of installations being 720.  
• National Fund for the Environmental Protection 
and Water Management generates its income 
from the pollution levies. In 2001 30 investments 
were supported the majority being solar and 
biomass.  
• Regional Funds Fund for the Environmental 
Protection (they spend app. 85 mln EUR (Swid-
erska et al 2001) to support air protection in-
vestments every year)  
Bank for Environmental Protection also has signifi-
cant financial support to  RES investments.  
Summary 
The most important document for development of  
renewable energy sources in Poland is the ‘Develop-
ment Strategy of Renewable Energy Sector’ , which 
was adopted by the Parliament in August 2001 sets 
forth ambitious goals. The main legislative initiative 
so far lies on the side of the Ministry of Environment. 
With this renewable energy policy document, Poland 
is ahead of the other countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe.  Important barriers to development of RES in 
Poland relate to: 
• Insufficient attention to renewable energy both 
with decision-makers and other stakeholders; 
• Difficult co-operation between administrative 
units (e.g. ministries) on renewable energy pol-
icy; 
• Clashes of interests between different renewable 
energy lobbies and with electricity generators 
and distributors (utilities); 
• Contradictory policy documents on renewable 
energy;  
• Subsidies for conventional fuels and coal mines, 
and over-production of electricity,  
• Difficulties to find proper targeted financial 
resources for development of RES (current prob-
lems with the budget, accessibility of EU funds 
after 2004).  
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Thursday 6 June, 2002:   
(Chair: Reinhard Haas) 
  9:00 Opening of the ENER Forum 
  9:10 Sustainable energy systems in the Sixth 
RTD Framework Programme 
 Domenico Rossetti, DG Research, EC 
 
Session 1: Promoting RES in Europe – The 
state-of-the-art (Chair: Poul-Erik Morthorst) 
  9:35 The EC's directives on RES: a basis for a 
broader market penetration  
 Karl Kellner, DG TREN, European 
Commission 
10:05 Survey on and review of promotion 
strategies for RES in Europe 
 Reinhard Haas, Energy Economics Group, 
Austria 
10:45 Coffee break 
11:10 Transaction Cost of Regulations to foster 
RES   
 Ole Langniss, Lund University, Sweden 
11:50 Regulatory and Institutional Innovation for 
the Promotion of Renewable Energy Use 
review 
 Reinhard Madlener/Eberhard Jochem, CEPE 
Switzerland 
12:40 Discussion 
13:00 Lunch  
Session 2: Pros and Cons of various promotion 
strategies  (Chair: Hans Auer) 
14:00  Success criteria for quotas based on TGCs 
 Poul-Erik Morthorst (RISOE), Denmark 
14:40 Feed-in tarifs versus quotas : how to pro-
mote renewables and stimulate technical 
progress for cost decrease ?" 
Philipp Menanteau, IEPE, Grenoble, France 
15:20 Tea break  
15:50 Tradable Green Certificates or Feed-in 
tariffs? What is more effective for 
promoting RES-E? 
 Claus Huber/Thomas Faber, Energy 
Economics Group, Austria 
16.30 The European Dimension of National RES-
E policy making – The Dutch experience 
 Emiel van Sambeek (ECN), The Netherlands 
17.10 Green electricity certificates in Belgium 
Aviel Verbruggen, UFSIA, Antwerpen, Bel-
gium 
17.30 Closing of the day  
19:30 Dinner  
 
 
 
 
Friday 7 June, 2002: 
9.00 Leaving REFIT for the green certificate 
market: a jump in the dark?  
 Arturo Lorenzoni, IEFE; Milano, Italy  
 
Session 3: Promoting RES: stakeholders point-
of-view (Chair:Wolfgang Eichhammer) 
9:40 The effect of renewable energy supporting 
strategies on society. The issue of public 
acceptance   
 Andreas Wagner, EWEA; Germany 
10:20 Coffee break   
10:50 Experience of Spanish independent 
Renewable energy developers and investors 
 Manuel Bustos, Spanish Renewable Energy 
Association-(APPA), Spain 
 
Session 4: Promoting RES in accession coun-
tries (Chair:Zoltan Vass) 
11:40 Information Disclosure on Electricity 
Generation 
 Diana Urge-Vorsatz, Central European 
University, Budapest, Hungary 
12:10 How to justify and define a feed-in-tariff? : 
A debate and decisions in Slovenia, 2002 
 Mihael G. Tomsic, Jozef Stefan-Institute, 
Slovenia 
12:30 Lunch 
13:30 Promoting RES in Hungary: The 
regulators point-of-view  
 Peter Kaderják , Hungarian Energy Office, 
Hungary 
14:00  Is current RES support policy in the Czech 
Republic sufficient and efficient? Barriers 
and challanges 
 Jaroslav Jakubes, SRCI, Prague, Czech 
Republic 
14:30 Coffee Break 
15:00 Renewable energy supporting strategies in 
the Baltic Sea Region. The Polish example 
 Anna Oniszk-Popławska, EC BREC, Poland  
15.30 Final Discussion and Closure of the Forum  
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